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Abstract
On the Physical Explanation for Quantum Computational Speedup
Michael E. Cuffaro
The aim of this dissertation is to clarify the debate over the explanation of
quantum speedup and to submit, for the reader’s consideration, a tentative
resolution to it. In particular, I argue, in this dissertation, that the physical
explanation for quantum speedup is precisely the fact that the phenomenon of
quantum entanglement enables a quantum computer to fully exploit the
representational capacity of Hilbert space. This is impossible for classical systems,
joint states of which must always be representable as product states.
I begin the dissertation by considering, in Chapter 2, the most popular of the
candidate physical explanations for quantum speedup: the many worlds explanation
of quantum computation. I argue that, although it is inspired by the neo-Everettian
interpretation of quantum mechanics, unlike the latter it does not have the
conceptual resources required to overcome objections such as the so-called ‘preferred
basis objection’. I further argue that the many worlds explanation, at best, can
serve as a good description of the physical process which takes place in so-called
network-based computation, but that it is incompatible with other models of
computation such as cluster state quantum computing. I next consider, in Chapter
3, a common component of most other candidate explanations of quantum speedup:
quantum entanglement. I investigate whether entanglement can be said to be a
necessary component of any explanation for quantum speedup, and I consider two
major purported counter-examples to this claim. I argue that neither of these, in
fact, show that entanglement is unnecessary for speedup, and that, on the contrary,
we should conclude that it is. In Chapters 4 and 5 I then ask whether entanglement
can be said to be sufficient as well. In Chapter 4 I argue that despite a result that
seems to indicate the contrary, entanglement, considered as a resource, can be seen
as sufficient to enable quantum speedup. Finally, in Chapter 5 I argue that
entanglement is sufficient to explain quantum speedup as well.
Keywords: quantum speedup, quantum computation, quantum computing,
quantum information theory, quantum entanglement, quantum parallelism, many
worlds explanation, many worlds interpretation, cluster state, necessity of
entanglement, sufficiency of entanglement, how-possibly questions.
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1Chapter 1
Overview
1.1 Introduction
Of the many and varied applications of quantum information theory, perhaps the
most fascinating is the sub-field of quantum computation. In this sub-field,
computational algorithms are designed which utilise the resources available in
quantum systems to compute solutions to computational problems with, in some
cases, exponentially fewer resources than any known classical algorithm. But while
the fact of quantum computational speedup is almost beyond doubt,1 the source of
quantum speedup is still a matter of debate. Candidate explanations of quantum
speedup range from the purported ability of quantum computers to perform
multiple function evaluations simultaneously (Deutsch, 1997; Duwell, 2004;
Hewitt-Horsman, 2009) to the purported ability of a quantum computer to compute
a global property of a function by performing fewer, not more, computations (e.g.
Steane, 2003; Bub, 2010) than classical computers.
The aim of this dissertation is to clarify this debate and to submit, for the
reader’s consideration, a tentative resolution to it. In the following pages I will
argue that the explanation for quantum speedup is precisely the following. The
phenomenon of quantum entanglement enables a quantum computer to fully exploit
the representational capacity of Hilbert space. This is impossible for classical
systems, joint states of which must always be representable as product states. Since
the number of distinct product states of n-fold d-dimensional systems is
1Just as with other important problems in computational complexity theory, such as the P =
NP problem, there is currently no proof, though it is very strongly suspected to be true, that the
class of problems efficiently solvable by a quantum computer is larger than the class of problems
efficiently solvable by a classical computer (cf. Appendix A).
2exponentially fewer than the total number of states representable in the
corresponding Hilbert space, a classical computer will, in general, require
exponentially more steps than a quantum computer to solve a computational
problem that requires one to take full advantage of this representational capacity.
1.2 Synopsis of this dissertation
1.2.1 Chapter summaries
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 examines what is arguably the most well-known of the candidate
explanations for quantum speedup: the so-called many worlds explanation of
quantum computation. This explanation of quantum computation draws its
inspiration from the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. According
to this explanation, when a quantum computer effects a transition such as:
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉|0〉 →
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉|f(x)〉, (1.1)
it literally performs, simultaneously and in different physical worlds or universes,
local function evaluations on all of the possible values of x.
The many worlds explanation is, on the one hand, very attractive as an
explanation of quantum speedup. If one takes the transition (1.1) at face value, i.e.,
as exhibiting the fact that the quantum computer is actually physically performing,
somehow, multiple function evaluations of different values of x, then the many
worlds explanation directly answers the question of where this parallel processing is
occurring (i.e., in distinct physical universes) in a way in which other explanations
do not. Thus it is, plausibly, the most intuitive explanation of quantum speedup.
As I argue in this chapter, however, the many worlds explanation, unlike the
many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics from which it is inspired, cannot
avail itself of many of the arguments which appeal to decoherence as a criterion for
distinguishing worlds in order to address the so-called preferred basis objection. The
criterion for world decomposition that is adopted (as a substitute for decoherence)
by advocates of the many worlds explanation, meanwhile, cannot fulfil this role
except in an ad hoc way.
A second, perhaps more significant, problem for the many worlds explanation is
3the relatively recent development of an alternative model of quantum computation:
the cluster state model. The standard network model (also known as the ‘circuit’
model) and the cluster state model are computationally equivalent in the sense that
one can be used to efficiently simulate the other; but while an explanation of the
network model in terms of many worlds seems (prima facie, at least) intuitive and
plausible, this is far from being true for the case of cluster state computation.
Indeed, as I will argue, the many worlds explanation of quantum computing is, in an
important sense, incompatible with the cluster state model.
Based on these considerations I conclude that we must reject the many worlds
explanation.
Chapter 3
Given that we must reject the popular many worlds explanation, the question arises
as to whether any of the other candidate explanations for quantum speedup are
correct. When one examines these apparently disparate explanations, however, one
finds that each of them (and the many worlds explanation as well, in fact) include a
central role for the phenomenon of quantum entanglement. Given this, the question
then arises as to whether entanglement can be said to be a necessary element of any
candidate explanation for quantum speedup.
On the one hand, a positive answer to this question is supported by the well
known theoretical result (Jozsa & Linden, 2003) that when one restricts oneself to
computation over pure states, one requires a quantum computer to be in an
entangled state in order to achieve a quantum speedup over classical computation.
On the other hand it is not clear that the same holds true for mixed states. In
particular, it seems as though it is possible to achieve a modest (sub-exponential)
speedup over classical computation using certain mixed states which are, by
definition, unentangled. Additionally, it seems as though it is possible to achieve a
substantial (i.e., exponential) speedup over classical computation using certain
mixed states that contain only a vanishingly small amount of entanglement. In light
of these results, it is tempting to conclude that one need not appeal to entanglement
after all in order to explain quantum speedup.
Despite these purported counter-examples, I argue in this chapter that such a
conclusion is premature. In the first type of counterexample, where sub-exponential
speedup has been demonstrated with unentangled mixed states, it can be argued,
and I do argue, that when one considers the initially mixed state of the computer as
representing a space of possible pure state preparations for the system, it is evident
4that the speedup obtainable from this system stems from the fact that the quantum
computer evolves some of these possible pure state preparations to entangled states.
As for the second type of counter-example, where exponential speedup is achieved
with only a vanishingly small amount of entanglement (thus bringing into doubt its
efficacy and thus its necessity for enabling quantum speedup), I argue that when
one considers the pure state representation of the initial state of such a system, in
which the system’s correlations with the environment are included as part of the
overall description of the system, then the role that entanglement plays in the
speedup displayed by the system is both clarified and indeed confirmed by recent
research on the physical characteristics of such systems. Since pure states, as I also
argue, represent a more fundamental representation of quantum systems than mixed
states, one should conclude that entanglement is necessary for the speedup
exhibited by such systems.
Chapter 4
If it is concluded that entanglement is a necessary component in any explanation of
quantum speedup, then the natural next question to ask is whether it is also
sufficient. In this chapter I begin to answer this question by first asking whether
entanglement can be said to be a sufficient physical resource for enabling quantum
speedup.
The answer to this question is commonly held to be no. According to the
Gottesman-Knill theorem (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, 464), any quantum algorithm
or protocol which exclusively utilises the elements of a certain restricted set of
quantum operations can be efficiently simulated by classical means. Yet, since some
of the algorithms and protocols falling into this category involve entangled states, it
is usually concluded that entanglement cannot, therefore, be sufficient to enable
quantum speedup.
In this short chapter I argue that this conclusion is misleading. As I explain, the
quantum operations to which the Gottesman-Knill theorem applies are precisely
those which will never yield a violation of the Bell inequalities, for they all involve
rotations of the Bloch sphere representation of the state space for a single qubit
given in multiples of pi/2. It is well known, however, that the correlations present in
entangled quantum systems whose subsystems always take on orientations with
respect to one another that are multiples of pi/2 are reproducible by a classical
hidden variables theory. Thus it should be no surprise that entangled quantum
states which only undergo operations in the Gottesman-Knill group of operations
5are efficiently simulable by a classical computer.
What the Gottesman-Knill theorem shows us, I argue, is that one must use an
entangled quantum state to its full potential in order to achieve a quantum speedup;
if one only utilises the portion of the system’s state space efficiently accessible by a
classical system, no speedup will be achieved, even when the system is entangled.
Nevertheless, there is a meaningful sense in which an entangled quantum state is
sufficient for quantum speedup: an entangled quantum state provides sufficient
physical resources to enable quantum speedup, whether or not one elects to use
these resources to their full potential.
Chapter 5
In this chapter I address the questions of whether and in what sense entanglement is
sufficient to explain quantum computational speedup. I begin by distilling the
argumentation of the previous chapters into the tentative explanation for quantum
speedup that I gave above; i.e., that since the state spaces available to classical
systems are exponentially smaller than those available to quantum systems, one
requires, in general, exponentially more resources to simulate a quantum system by
classical means. I argue that this explanation can be taken as explanatory in the
following sense: just as the essential physical characteristics of classical
computational systems can be taken, in computability theory and in computational
complexity theory, to be explanations of their computational capabilities—of how it
is possible that such systems are able to compute particular classes of problems
using a specified number of resources—, so can the essential physical characteristics
of quantum computational systems be so taken. These essential characteristics are,
just as for classical systems, the properties of the states and state transitions
available to quantum systems.
In the remainder of the chapter I argue that this candidate explanation for
quantum speedup is compatible with accounts of physical explanation that require
explanations to be causal in nature. In particular, I consider a challenge to the view
that entanglement itself can be given a causal physical explanation: an argument,
due to Stachel (1997), that entanglement should not be characterised as essentially
involving physical interactions, but rather as arising from a more abstract set of
requirements. I argue that these abstract requirements themselves can be accounted
for in terms of physical interactions, and that the notion of physical interaction
involved in the description of entangled quantum systems can therefore be made
compatible with a suitably intuitive notion of causation.
61.2.2 Common chapter elements
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 include a “Preliminaries” and a “Next steps” section, which
follow upon the chapter introduction and chapter conclusion, respectively. The
“Preliminaries” section contains some of the technical details that are required in
order to comprehend the argumentation of the chapter. They are placed in this
section for ease of reference, as they will often be referred to in subsequent chapters.
Readers already familiar with these technical details may skim—but not skip—this
section. The purpose of the “Next steps” section is to link the content of the current
chapter to the subject matter and argumentation that are to be pursued in the next.
The reader will also occasionally be referred to the appendices. These contain
more detailed discussions of various technical topics which are useful for
comprehending the overall argument of the dissertation, but inessential to its
exposition.
1.3 Basic terminology and notational conventions
Qubit. A qubit is the basic unit of quantum information, analogous to a classical
bit. It can be physically realised by any two-level quantum mechanical system. Like
a bit, it can be “on” or “off”, but unlike a bit it can also be in a superposition of
these values.
Computational basis. The computational, or classical, basis for a single qubit is
the basis {|0〉, |1〉}, which can be used to represent the classical bit states {↑, ↓},
where |0〉 = ( 10 ) , and |1〉 = ( 01 ) .
+,- basis. An alternative basis for representing qubits is the basis {|+〉, |−〉},
where |+〉 = 1√
2
( 11 ) =
|0〉+|1〉√
2
, and |−〉 = 1√
2
( 1−1 ) =
|0〉−|1〉√
2
.
Bloch sphere. A geometrical representation of the state space of a single qubit.
States on the surface of the sphere represent pure states, while those in the interior
represent mixed states.
Tensor product notation. For brevity, I will usually omit the tensor product
symbol from expressions for states of multi-partite systems; i.e., |αβ〉 and |α〉|β〉
should be understood as shorthand forms of |α〉 ⊗ |β〉. Additionally, all of the
7following should be taken to be equivalent:
|α〉1 ⊗ |α〉2 ⊗ ...|α〉n ≡ |α〉1|α〉2...|α〉n ≡ |αn〉 ≡ |α〉n ≡ |α〉⊗n.
Quantum gates. In the network model of quantum computation, logic gates are
implemented as unitary transformations. Some common gates are:
• the H or Hadamard gate, which takes |0〉 to |0〉+|1〉√
2
and |1〉 to |0〉−|1〉√
2
and
vice-versa;
• the NOT gate, implemented by the Pauli-X transformation, which takes |0〉
to |1〉 and |1〉 to |0〉;
• the CNOT or controlled-not gate. This gate takes two qubits |c〉|t〉 to
|c〉|t⊕ c〉, where |c〉 is the control, |t〉 the target qubit, and ⊕ is addition
modulo 2 (i.e., ‘exclusive-or’). Intuitively, the control qubit determines
whether or not to apply a bit-flip operation (i.e., a NOT operation) to the
target qubit.
Network model of quantum computation. Also called the circuit model, this
is the standard model of quantum computation, in which qubits contained in
quantum registers are used as inputs to quantum gates arranged in a network
structure (analogous to the circuit model of classical computation). For instance, the
following is a network specification of the teleportation protocol (cf. Appendix C):
|ψ〉a • H NM
✌
✌
✌
M1
•

NM
✌
✌
✌
M2
•
|Φ+〉ab {
XM2 ZM1 |ψ〉b
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The Many Worlds Explanation of
Quantum Computation1
2.1 Introduction
The source of quantum computational speedup—the ability of a quantum computer
to achieve, for some problem domains,2 a dramatic reduction in processing time over
any known classical algorithm—is still a matter of debate. On one popular view
(the ‘quantum parallelism thesis’3), the speedup is due to a quantum computer’s
ability to simultaneously evaluate (using a single circuit) a function for many
different values of its input. Thus one finds, in textbooks on quantum computation,
pronouncements such as the following:
[a] qubit can exist in a superposition of states, giving a quantum
1This chapter is a revised version of the previously published work, “Many Worlds, the
Cluster-state Quantum Computer, and the Problem of the Preferred Basis” (Cuffaro, 2012). Full
bibliographic details are given at the end of this dissertation.
2An important example is the factoring problem. Factoring is in the complexity class FNP;
i.e., the class of all function problems associated with languages in NP (cf. Papadimitriou 1994,
§10.3, and also Appendix A). It is also in the class BQP, the class of problems solvable by a
quantum computer in polynomial time, as was shown by Shor (1997). The significance of the latter
is that the quantum solution to factoring represents an exponential speedup over the best known
classical factoring algorithm. Shor’s algorithm has received much attention as a result of its
important practical implications; it demonstrates, for instance, that quantum computers can easily
break certain widely used internet encryption schemes. In this dissertation we will not directly
discuss Shor’s algorithm, however. For our purposes, no generality is lost, and ease of
comprehension is gained, by focusing on simpler algorithms such as the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm.
3I am indebted to Duwell (2007) for this label.
9computer a hidden realm where exponential computations are possible ...
This feature allows a quantum computer to do parallel computations
using a single circuit—providing a dramatic speedup in many cases
(McMahon, 2008, p. 197).
Unlike classical parallelism, where multiple circuits each built to
compute f(x) are executed simultaneously, here a single f(x) circuit is
employed to evaluate the function for multiple values of x
simultaneously, by exploiting the ability of a quantum computer to be in
superpositions of different states (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p. 31).
Among textbook writers, N. David Mermin is, perhaps, the most cautious with
respect to the significance of this ‘quantum parallelism’:
One cannot say that the result of the calculation is 2n evaluations of f ,
though some practitioners of quantum computation are rather careless
about making such a claim. All one can say is that those evaluations
characterize the form of the state that describes the output of the
computation. One knows what the state is only if one already knows the
numerical values of all those 2n evaluations of f . Before drawing
extravagant practical, or even only metaphysical, conclusions from
quantum parallelism, it is essential to remember that when you have a
collection of Qbits in a definite but unknown state, there is no way to
find out what that state is (2007, p. 38).
Mermin’s reservations notwithstanding, the quantum parallelism thesis is
frequently associated with (and held to provide evidence for) the many worlds
explanation of quantum computation, which draws its inspiration from the
Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics. According to the many worlds
explanation of quantum computing, when a quantum computer effects a transition
such as:
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉|0〉 →
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉|f(x)〉, (2.1)
it literally performs, simultaneously and in different physical worlds, local function
evaluations on all of the possible values of x.
It is all well to say that a quantum computer evaluates a function simultaneously
for many different values of its domain; but one should also give some physical
10
explanation of how this occurs. The many worlds explanation attempts to do just
that; it directly answers the question of where this parallel processing occurs: in
distinct physical universes. For this reason it is also, arguably, the most intuitive
physical explanation of quantum speedup. Indeed, for some, the many worlds
explanation of quantum computing is the only possible physical explanation of
quantum speedup. David Deutsch, for instance, writes: “no single-universe theory
can explain even the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment, let alone, say, quantum
computation. That is because any process (hidden variables, or whatever) that
accounts for such phenomena ... contains many autonomous streams of information,
each of which describes something resembling the universe as described by classical
physics” (2010, p. 542). Deutsch issues a challenge to those who would explain
quantum speedup without many worlds: “[t]o those who still cling to a
single-universe world-view, I issue this challenge: Explain how Shor’s algorithm
works” (1997, p. 217).
Recently, the development of an alternative model of quantum
computation—the cluster state model—has cast some doubt on these claims. The
standard network model (which I will also refer to as the ‘circuit’ model) and the
cluster state model are computationally equivalent in the sense that one can be used
to efficiently simulate the other; however, while an explanation of the network
model in terms of many worlds seems intuitive and plausible, it has been pointed
out by Steane (2003, pp. 474-475), among others, that it is by no means natural to
describe cluster state computation in this way.
While Steane is correct, I will argue that the problem that the cluster state
model presents to the many worlds explanation of quantum computation runs
deeper than this. I will argue that the many worlds explanation of quantum
computing is not only unnatural as an explanation of cluster state quantum
computing, but that it is, in fact, incompatible with it.4 I will show how this
4My use of the word ‘incompatible’ might strike some readers as a touch strong. I do not mean
to convey by this any in-principle impossibility, however. Rather, I take it that any worthwhile
explanation of a process should provide some useful insight into its workings, and should be
motivated by the characteristics of the process, not by predilections for a particular type of
explanation on the part of the explainer. My claim here is that, as I will show below, a many
worlds explanation of cluster state quantum computing is completely unmotivated and useless even
as a heuristic device for describing cluster state quantum computation, and is in this sense
incompatible with it. One might call this type of incompatibility ‘for-all-practical-purposes
incompatibility’. Since, as we shall see later, the criterion used for identifying worlds on the many
worlds explanation of quantum computation is a for-all-practical-purposes criterion, this is just the
11
incompatibility is brought to light through a consideration of the familiar preferred
basis problem, for a preferred basis with which to distinguish the worlds inhabited
by the cluster state neither emerges naturally as the result of a dynamical process,
nor can be chosen a priori in any principled way.
In addition, I will argue that the many worlds explanation of quantum
computing is inadequate as an explanation of even the standard network model of
quantum computation. This is because, first, unlike its close cousin, the
neo-Everettian many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics,5 where the
decoherence criterion is able to fulfil the role assigned to it, of determining the
preferred basis for world decomposition with respect to macro experience,6 the
corresponding criterion for world decomposition in the context of quantum
computing cannot fulfil this role except in an ad hoc way. Second: alternative
explanations of quantum computation exist which, unlike the many worlds
explanation, are compatible with both the network and cluster state model.
The quantum parallelism thesis, and the many worlds explanation of quantum
computation that is so often associated with it, are undoubtedly of great heuristic
value for the purposes of algorithm analysis and design, at least with regard to the
network model. This is a fact which I should not be misunderstood as disputing.
What I am disputing is that we should therefore be committed to the claim that
these computational worlds are, in fact, ontologically real, or that they are
indispensable for any explanation of quantum speedup.
The chapter will proceed as follows. I begin, in §2.2, with an example, often used
to motivate the quantum parallelism thesis and the associated many worlds
explanation, of a simple quantum algorithm specified using the network model of
right sort of incompatibility that must prove problematic for the many worlds explanation.
5One should be wary not to treat the ‘Everettian’ interpretation of quantum mechanics as if it
were a unified view. Rather, ‘Everettian’ more properly describes a family of views (see Barrett
2011 for a list and discussion of these), which includes but is not limited to Hugh Everett’s original
formulation (Everett, 1957), ‘many minds’ variants (Albert & Loewer, 1988), and ‘many worlds’
variants. Belonging to the last named class are DeWitt’s (1973 [1971]) original formulation, as well
as the, now mainstream, ‘neo-Everettian’ interpretation with which we will be mostly concerned in
this chapter. I follow Hewitt-Horsman (who attributes the name to Harvey Brown) in calling
‘neo-Everettian’ the amalgam of ideas of Zurek (2003 [1991]); Saunders (1995); Butterfield (2002);
Vaidman (2008), and especially Wallace (2002, 2003, 2010).
6I should not be interpreted here as giving an argument for the neo-Everettian interpretation
of quantum mechanics. My views on the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics are
irrelevant to this discussion. My claim is only that the decoherence basis is prima facie well-suited
for the role it plays in the neo-Everettian interpretation.
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quantum computation. In §2.3, I argue that, despite its intuitive appeal, the many
worlds view of quantum computation is not licensed by, and in fact is conceptually
inferior to, the neo-Everettian version of the many worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics from which it receives its inspiration. In §2.4, I describe the cluster state
model of quantum computation and show how the cluster state model and the many
worlds explanation are incompatible. In §2.5 I argue, based on the conclusions of
§2.3 and §2.4, that we should reject the many worlds explanation of quantum
computation.
2.2 Preliminaries: A simple quantum algorithm
Deutsch’s problem (Deutsch, 1985) is the problem to determine whether a boolean
function taking one bit as input and producing one bit as output (i.e.,
f : {0, 1} → {0, 1},) is either constant or balanced. Such a function is constant if it
produces the same output value for each of its possible inputs. For the functions
f : {0, 1} → {0, 1}, the only possible constant functions are f(x) = 0 and f(x) = 1.
A balanced function, on the other hand, is one for which the output of one half of
the inputs is the opposite of the output of the other half. For the functions
f : {0, 1} → {0, 1}, the only possible balanced functions are the identity and bit-flip
functions. These are, respectively:
f(x) =
{
0 if x = 0
1 if x = 1,
f(x) =
{
1 if x = 0
0 if x = 1.
A generalisation of Deutsch’s problem, called the Deutsch-Jozsa problem,
enlarges the class of functions under consideration so as to include all of the
functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Classically, the only way to determine whether an
arbitrary function from this class is balanced or constant is to test the function for
each of its possible input values. In a quantum computer, however, we can learn
whether such a function is balanced or constant in (neglecting overhead) one
computational step. The quantum solution to the Deutsch-Jozsa problem is given
by the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm, which I present here in the improved version due to
Cleve et al. (1998).
The algorithm begins by initialising the registers of a quantum computer to
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|0n〉|1〉, after which a Hadamard gate is applied to all n+ 1 qubits, so that:
|0n〉|1〉 H−→
(
1
2n/2
(|0〉+ |1〉)n
)( |0〉 − |1〉√
2
)
=
(
1
2n/2
2n−1∑
x
|x〉
)( |0〉 − |1〉√
2
)
. (2.2)
The unitary transformation,
Uf (|x〉|y〉) ≡ |x〉|y ⊕ f(x)〉, (2.3)
representative of the function whose character (of being either constant or balanced)
we wish to determine, is then applied, which has the effect:7
Uf−→
(
1
2n/2
2n−1∑
x
(−1)f(x)|x〉
)( |0〉 − |1〉√
2
)
. (2.4)
Note how the action of the unitary transformation gives the appearance of
evaluating the function over multiple inputs at once.
If f is constant and = 0, this, along with a Hadamard transformation applied to
the first n qubits, will result in:
f = 0 :
(
1
2n/2
2n−1∑
x
|x〉
)
|−〉 Hn⊗I−−−→ |0n〉|−〉,
where |−〉 ≡ |0〉−|1〉√
2
. Otherwise if f is constant and = 1, then this, along with a
Hadamard transformation applied to the first n qubits, will result in:
f = 1 : −
(
1
2n/2
2n−1∑
x
|x〉
)
|−〉 Hn⊗I−−−→ −|0n〉|−〉.
In either case, a measurement in the computational basis on the first n qubits yields
the bit string z = 000 . . . 0 = 0n = 0 with certainty. If f is balanced, on the other
hand, then half of the terms in the superposition of values of x in (2.4) will have
positive phase, and half negative. After applying the final Hadamard transform, the
7Given the state |x〉(|0〉 − |1〉) (omitting normalisation factors for simplicity), note that when
f(x) = 0, applying Uf yields |x〉(|0⊕ 0〉 − |1⊕ 0〉) = |x〉(|0〉 − |1〉); and when f(x) = 1, applying Uf
yields |x〉(|0 ⊕ 1〉 − |1⊕ 1〉) = |x〉(|1〉 − |0〉) = −|x〉(|0〉 − |1〉).
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amplitude of |0n〉 will be zero.8 Thus a measurement of these qubits cannot produce
the bit string z = 000 . . . 0 = 0n = 0. In sum, if the function is constant, then z = 0
with certainty, and if the function is balanced, z 6= 0 with certainty. In either case,
the probability of success of the algorithm is 1, using only a single invocation. This
is exponentially faster than any known classical solution.
2.3 Neo-Everett and quantum computing
Algorithms like the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm provide strong intuitive support for the
view that quantum speedup is due to a quantum computer’s ability to
simultaneously evaluate a function for different values of its input, and from here it
is not a large step to the many worlds explanation of quantum computation. It is
important to note, however, that one’s conception of a world, if one elects to take
this step, cannot be the one that is licensed by the neo-Everettian many worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics. In superpositions such as the following,
1√
2
(|α〉 ⊗ |β〉+ |γ〉 ⊗ |δ〉),
the neo-Everettian interpretation will not, in general, license one to identify each
term of this superposition with a distinct world, for such a simplistic procedure for
world-identification will be vulnerable to the so-called preferred basis objection.
The problem is usually formulated in the context of macro-worlds and
macro-objects; however we can illustrate the basic idea by means of the following
simple example related to quantum computation. The classical value ↑ can be
represented, in the computational basis, by a qubit in the state |0〉. We can also
represent the same qubit from the point of view of the {|+〉, |−〉} basis, however, as9
8 To illustrate, consider the case where n = 2. After applying Uf , the computer will be in the
state: (|00〉 − |01〉+ |10〉 − |11〉)|−〉. Applying a Hadamard transform to the two input qubits will
yield:
(
(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉+ |11〉)− (|00〉 − |01〉+ |10〉 − |11〉)
+ (|00〉+ |01〉 − |10〉 − |11〉)− (|00〉 − |01〉 − |10〉+ |11〉)
)
|−〉
= (0|00〉+ . . .)|−〉.
9Since |+〉 = 1√
2
( 11 ) =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(
1
−1
)
= 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉),
1√
2
(|+〉+ |−〉) = 12 (|0〉+ |1〉+ |0〉 − |1〉) = 12 · 2|0〉 = |0〉.
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1√
2
(|+〉+ |−〉).
Thus depending on the basis one selects, it will be possible to regard the qubit
as either (if we select the computational basis) in the definite state |0〉, existing in
one world only, or (if we select the {|+〉, |−〉} basis), as in a superposition of the two
states, |+〉 and |−〉, and thus as existing in two distinct worlds. Yet there seems to
be no a priori reason why we should elect to choose one basis over the other.
Neo-Everettians (see, for instance, Wallace 2002, 2003) attempt to eliminate the
preferred basis problem by appealing to the dynamical process of decoherence (cf.
Zurek 2003 [1991]) as a way of distinguishing different worlds from one another in
the wave function. Recall that Schro¨dinger’s wave equation governs the evolution of
a closed system. In nature, however, there are no closed systems (aside from the
entire universe); all systems interact, to some extent, with their environment. When
this happens, the terms in the superposition of states representing the system
decohere and branch off from one another. From the point of view of an observer in
a particular world, this gives the appearance of wave-function collapse—of
definiteness emerging from indefiniteness—but unlike actual collapse (i.e., collapse
as per von Neumann’s projection postulate), decoherence is an approximate
phenomenon; thus some small amount of residual interference between worlds always
remains. But from the point of view of our experience of macroscopic objects, this
is, for all practical purposes, enough to give us the appearance of definiteness within
our own world and to distinguish, within the wave-function, macroscopic worlds
that evolve essentially independently and maintain their identities over time. Thus,
a ‘preferred’ basis with which one can define different worlds emerges naturally :
“the basic idea is that dynamical processes cause a preferred basis to emerge rather
than having to be specified a priori” (Wallace, 2003, p. 90).
On the neo-Everettian view, we identify patterns which are present in the
wave-function and which are more or less stable over time in this way with
macroscopic objects such as measurement pointers, cats, and experimenters. But
note that not every such pattern is granted ontological status; whether or not we do
so depends, not just on the process of decoherence, but also on the theoretical
usefulness of including that object in our ontology: “the existence of a pattern as a
real thing depends on the usefulness—in particular, the explanatory power and
predictive reliability—of theories which admit that pattern in their ontology”
(Wallace, 2003, p. 93). Thus, while decoherence is a necessary condition for
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granting ontological status to a pattern, it is not sufficient; we also require that
doing so is theoretically useful and fruitful.
Returning to the quantum computer, it should be clear by now that the
neo-Everettian interpretation, as described above, cannot provide support for the
view that quantum computers simultaneously evaluate functions for different values
of their input in different worlds, for as we have just seen, decoherence determines
the basis according to which we distinguish one world from another on the
neo-Everettian interpretation. The superpositions characteristic of quantum
algorithms, however, are always coherent superpositions. Indeed, the maximum
length of a quantum computation is directly related to the amount of time that the
system remains coherent (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p. 278). According to some, in
fact, it is coherence and not parallel processing which is the real source of quantum
speedup (Fortnow, 2003). Decoherence, in the context of quantum computation,
effectively amounts to noise.
It appears, then, that we require a more general criterion for branching than
decoherence if we are to accommodate quantum computation to a many worlds
picture. Thus the many worlds advocate, Hewitt-Horsman (2009), for instance,
rejects the idea that decoherence is the only possible criterion for distinguishing
worlds. Worlds, for Hewitt-Horsman, are (just as in the neo-Everettian approach),
defined as substructures within the wave-function that ‘for all practical purposes’
are distinguishable and stable over relevant time scales. With regards to macro
experience these relevant time scales are long, and the point of using decoherence as
an identifying criterion for distinct worlds, according to Hewitt-Horsman, is that it
is useful for identifying stable macro-patterns over such long time scales. But the
time scales relevant to quantum computation are generally much shorter: “they
may, indeed, be de facto instantaneous. However, if they are useful then we are
entitled to use them” (Hewitt-Horsman, 2009, p. 876).
In such a situation we may, according to Hewitt-Horsman, consider coherent
superpositions as representing distinct worlds for the purposes of characterising
quantum computation. “Defining worlds within a coherent state in this way is a
simple extension of the FAPP[10] principle ... If our practical purposes allow us to
deal with rapidly changing worlds-structures then we may” (Hewitt-Horsman, 2009,
p. 876). As for the preferred basis problem, it will not arise. Just as with the
neo-Everettian interpretation, in the quantum computer we have a criterion for
selecting a basis with which to decompose the wave function; in this case the basis
10FAPP stands for ‘for all practical purposes’.
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is that in which the different evaluations of the function are made manifest, i.e., the
computational basis.
This fits in well with intuitions that are often expressed about the
nature of quantum computations ... There are frequently statements to
the effect that it looks like there are multiple copies of classical
computations happening within the quantum state. If one classical state
from a decomposition of the (quantum) input state is chosen as an input,
then the computation runs in a certain way. If the quantum input state
is used then it looks as if all the classical computations are somehow
present in the quantum one. ... the recognition of multiple worlds in a
coherent states [sic.] seems both to be a natural notion for a quantum
information theorist, and also a reasonable notion in any situation where
‘relevant’ time-scales are short (Hewitt-Horsman, 2009, p. 876).
Certainly it does look as if the computation is composed of many processes
executing in parallel, and plausibly it can be of some heuristic value to think of these
processes as taking place in many worlds. With this I do not disagree. However,
pace Hewitt-Horsman, I do not believe this is enough to justify treating these worlds
as ontologically real, for unlike the criterion of decoherence with respect to macro
experience, Hewitt-Horsman’s criterion for distinguishing worlds in the context of
quantum computation seems quite ad hoc. Declaring that the preferred basis is the
one in which the different function evaluations are made manifest is like declaring
that the preferred basis with respect to macro experience is the one in which we can
distinguish classical states from one another. But it is, in fact, a rejection of such
reasoning that leads to decoherence as a criterion for world-identification in the first
place. The decoherence basis, on the neo-Everettian view, is not simply picked from
among many possible bases as the one which serves to capture our experience of
definiteness at the macro-level. To do so would be to commit the same sin (by
neo-Everettian lights) that is committed by other interpretations of quantum
mechanics such as Bohmian mechanics or GRW theory. This is the sin of adding
extra elements to the formalism of quantum theory in order to preserve classicality
at the macroscopic level. For the neo-Everettian, in contrast, decoherence is
appealed to as a known physical process that in fact gives rise to—and even then
only approximately—the appearance of distinct classical worlds (cf. Wallace, 2010,
pp. 55, 63-65). The point of using decoherence as a criterion for distinguishing
worlds is not to save the appearance of classicality, but rather to explain why we
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experience the world classically, in this case by appealing to a physical process that
gives rise to our experience. The choice of the computational basis as the basis
within which different worlds are to be distinguished, however, fulfils no such
explanatory role. It does not serve to explain the appearance of parallel classical
computation. It only declares, based on a particular privileged description of the
computation, that parallel computation is occurring in many worlds.11
An advocate of the many worlds explanation might make the following rejoinder:
the computational process, considered as a whole, is just as empirically
well-established as the decoherence process is (we know that a computation has
taken place since we have the result). And just as the decoherence process gives rise
to parallel autonomously evolving decoherent worlds which are (approximately)
diagonal in the decoherence basis, the computational process gives rise to parallel
autonomous computational worlds which are diagonal (at least at the beginning of
the computation) in the computational basis. Thus the computational process gives
rise to and therefore explains the computational worlds that make up the
computation just as well as the decoherence process explains the decoherent worlds
that make up classical experience.
This response is problematic, however, for it is the computation itself, in
particular what distinguishes it from classical computation, that we are seeking an
explanation for. The many worlds explanation of quantum computation promises to
explain quantum computation in terms of many worlds, but on this response it
appears that we need to appeal to the computation in order to explain these many
worlds in the first place. This seems circular, and even if the case can be made that
it is not, the response fails to consider that, as the quote from Mermin with which I
began this chapter makes clear, appearances can be misleading: we must be very
cautious when describing the quantum state characterising a computation. In
particular, we must be cautious when inferring from the form of the state that
describes the computation to the content of that state. For instance, as Steane
11I should mention that Wallace, who I am taking as representative of the neo-Everettian
interpretation of quantum mechanics, does seem to cautiously endorse a many worlds explanation
for some quantum algorithms: “There is no particular reason to assume that all or even most
interesting quantum algorithms operate by any sort of ‘quantum parallelism’ ... But Shor’s
algorithm, at least, does seem to operate in this way” (Wallace, 2010, p. 70, n. 17). Wallace has
also made similar remarks in informal correspondence. But whatever Wallace’s views on quantum
computation are, they are obviously separable from his views on world decomposition for
macro-phenomena.
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(2003, p. 473) has pointed out, according to the Gottesman-Knill theorem,12 an
important class of quantum gates—the so-called Clifford-group gates, which include
the Hadamard, Pauli, and CNOT gates—can be simulated in polynomial time by a
classical probabilistic computer (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p. 464). This is
interesting, since several quantum algorithms utilise gates exclusively from this
class. Thus the appearance of quantum parallelism, in these cases at least, may be
deceiving.
Even if true, the quantum parallelism thesis need not entail the existence of
autonomous local parallel computational processes. Duwell (2007, p. 1008), for
instance, illustrates this by showing how the phase relations between the terms in a
system’s wave function are crucially important for an evaluation of its
computational efficiency. Phase relations between terms in a system’s wave
function, however, are global properties of the system. Thus we cannot view the
computation as consisting exclusively of local parallel computations (within multiple
worlds or not). But if we cannot do so, then there is no sense in which quantum
parallelism uniquely supports the many worlds explanation over other explanations.
Everettian varieties such as the neo-Everettian interpretation of quantum
mechanics and the many worlds explanation of quantum computing take the
branching process seriously : they claim ontological significance for the ‘worlds’ that
arise from this process. They are thus required to confront the preferred basis
problem, for they must determine a criterion for branching. While the
neo-Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics does this admirably well, the
many worlds explanation of quantum computing, I have argued, does not.
Before concluding this section, I should note that not all Everettian varieties do
take branching seriously (in fact, this may have been true of Everett’s own view; see
Barrett 2011 for a discussion). Such views are not confronted with the preferred
basis problem and are thus immune to the objections above. However, since
branching is not a real physical process on such views, it is analytic that they can
provide no physical explanation for the quantum computational process in terms of
branching computational worlds. As an illustration, an Everettian might insist13
that the way in which one chooses to express the state of a system has no particular
significance. On such an interpretation, one should not view the universe as having
any one particular branching structure. Rather, the essential point is that in any
12We will discuss the Gottesman-Knill theorem in further detail in Chapter 4.
13I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer at the journal Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics for pointing this out.
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process such as quantum computation, the fact is that the Schro¨dinger evolution of
all quantum superpositions has been realised. On such a view, however one chooses
to decompose the state of a system, the resulting superposition must be viewed as
real. Thus the superposition of the quantum computational process, as expressed in
the computational basis, is realised, just as is the superposition as expressed in some
other basis.
On this interpretation, however, it cannot be the case that multiple local parallel
computational processes in many worlds are the physical explanation for quantum
speedup; for any decomposition of the state of the computer in any given basis can
provide the ground for an equally legitimate ‘explanation’ of the computer’s
operation. Rather, we should say that any such decomposition constitutes, for one
who finds Everettian language appealing, a legitimate description of the process. I
do not wish to be misunderstood as attempting to deny to those who find
Everettian language appealing the possibility of, when appropriate, describing the
operation of the quantum computer in this way. But again, this does not constitute
a physical explanation.
In any case, the questionable nature of the inference from the heuristic value of
the notion of computational worlds to the ascription of ontological reality to these
worlds is one good reason to, at the very least, be suspicious of the many worlds
explanation of quantum computing. But let us, for the sake of argument, grant the
inference. Let us focus, instead, on the antecedent clause of the conditional; i.e., on
whether it really is true that the many worlds description of quantum computation
is the most useful one available. In the next section I will examine the recently
developed cluster state model of quantum computation. I will argue that a
description of the cluster state model in terms of many worlds is, not only
unnatural, but that such a description is incompatible with the cluster state model.
I will then argue that this undermines the usefulness of the many worlds description
of quantum computation, not just in the cluster state model, but in general.
2.4 Cluster state quantum computing
On the cluster state model (Raussendorf & Briegel, 2002; Raussendorf et al., 2003;
Nielsen, 2006) of quantum computation, computation proceeds by way of a series of
single qubit measurements on a highly entangled multi-qubit state known as the
cluster state.14 The cluster-state quantum computer (QCC) is a universal quantum
14For this reason the model has also been given the name ‘measurement based computation’.
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computer; it can efficiently simulate any algorithm developed within the network
model. In fact it is computationally equivalent to the network model in the sense
that each model may be used to simulate the operation of the other. Each qubit in
the cluster has a reduced density operator of 1
2
I, and thus individual qubit
measurement outcomes are completely random. It is nevertheless possible to process
information on the cluster state quantum computer due to the fact that strict
correlations exist between measurement outcomes. These correlations are
progressively destroyed as the computation runs its course.15
It is helpful to illustrate the operation of the QCC by exhibiting the way one
may use it to simulate a network-based quantum algorithm. In the network model,
single-qubit gates can, in general, be thought of as rotations of the Bloch sphere (for
example, the Pauli X , Y , and Z gates can be thought of as rotations of the Bloch
sphere through pi radians about the x, y, and z axes, respectively). It is possible to
simulate an arbitrary rotation of the Bloch sphere with the QCC by using a chain of
5 qubits as follows (cf. Raussendorf & Briegel 2002, pp. 446-447, Raussendorf et al.
2003, p. 5). First, we consider the Euler representation of an arbitrary rotation.16
This is
URot[ξ, η, ζ ] = Ux[ζ ]Uz[η]Ux[ξ], (2.5)
where the rotations about the x and z axes are given by
Ux[α] = exp
(
−iασx
2
)
, (2.6)
Uz[α] = exp
(
−iασz
2
)
. (2.7)
The first qubit in the chain is called the input qubit; it will contain the state
that we wish to rotate. It is thus prepared in the state |ψin〉, while the other four
qubits in the chain are prepared in the |+〉 state. After applying an
15This gives rise to a third name for this model: ‘one-way computation’.
16The Euler representation is a way to represent the general rotation of a body in three
dimensions. The procedure to achieve such a general rotation consists of three steps: a rotation of
the body about one of its coordinate axes, followed by a rotation about a coordinate axis different
from the first, and then a rotation about a coordinate axis different from the second. We represent
rotations by Rotation operators, and matrix multiplication is used to represent combinations of
rotations. For example, a rotation of α about zˆ followed by a rotation of β about yˆ followed by a
rotation of γ about xˆ is represented by Rx(γ)Ry(β)Rz(α). The analogue of the rotation operator
in a complex state space is the unitary operator.
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entanglement-generating unitary transformation to the qubits,17 the first four qubits
are measured one by one in the following way. We begin by measuring qubit 1 in
basis B1(0), where 0 is the measurement angle, φj, and the basis is calculated as
Bj(φj) =
{ |0〉j + eiφj |1〉j√
2
,
|0〉j − eiφj |1〉j√
2
}
. (2.8)
The result of this measurement is denoted s1, where sj ∈ {0, 1} represents the result
of measuring the jth qubit.
We now use s1 to calculate the measurement basis for qubit 2, which is
B2(−ξ(−1)s1). Qubit 2 is then measured in this basis and the result recorded in s2,
which is then used to determine the measurement basis for qubit 3: B3(−η(−1)s2).
We then use both s1 and s3 to determine the basis to use for the measurement of
qubit 4: B4(−ζ(−1)s1+s3). At the end of this process, the output of the ‘gate’ is
contained in qubit 5 (i.e., qubit 5 is in a state that is equivalent to what would have
resulted if we had applied an actual rotation to |ψin〉), which we then read off in the
computational basis.18
Similarly, it is possible to implement more specific 1-qubit rotations such as the
Hadamard, pi/2-phase, X ,Y , and Z gates. 2-qubit gates, such as the CNOT gate,
can be implemented using similar techniques (Raussendorf et al., 2003, pp. 4-5) and
we can combine all of these gates together in order to simulate an arbitrary network.
To illustrate the general operation of the cluster state computer, imagine, once
again, that we are simulating a network-based quantum algorithm. In each
individual gate simulation there will be, on the one hand, those qubits whose
measurement depends on the outcomes of one or more previous measurements for
the determination of their basis, and on the other hand, those that do not. We
divide these qubits into disjoint subsets, Qt, of the cluster C, as follows. All qubits,
regardless of which gate they belong to, which do not require a previous
measurement for the determination of their basis are added to the class Q0. We
then add to Q1 all qubits which depend solely on the results of measuring qubits in
Q0 for the determination of their basis. Q2 comprises, in turn, all qubits which
depend on the results of measuring qubits in Q0 ∪Q1 for the determination of their
17The procedure for generating entanglement is described in (Raussendorf et al., 2003, pp. 3-4).
18I have simplified this procedure slightly. The gate simulation actually realises, not exactly
URot, but U
′
Rot[ξ, η, ζ] = UΣ,RotURot[ξ, η, ζ], where UΣ,Rot = σ
s2+s4
x σ
s1+s3
z is called the random
byproduct operator and is corrected for at the end of the computation (Raussendorf et al., 2003, p.
5).
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basis. And so on until we reach Qtmax .
We then begin by measuring the qubits in the set Q0. We use the outcomes of
these measurements to determine the measurement bases for the qubits to be
measured in Q1. Once these are measured, the outcomes of Q0 and Q1 together are
used to determine the measurement bases for Q2. The process continues in this
fashion until all the required qubits have been measured (Raussendorf et al., 2003,
p. 19). Note that the temporal ordering of measurements on the cluster state will,
in general, not depend on what role—input, output, etc.—qubits have with respect
to the network model. In fact, those qubits that play the role of gates’ ‘output
registers’ will typically be among the first to be measured (Raussendorf et al., 2003,
p. 19). In general, the temporal ordering of measurements on a QCC that has been
designed to simulate a network does not mirror the temporal ordering the gates
would have had if they had been implemented as a network (Raussendorf & Briegel,
2002, p. 444).
At this point we must ask ourselves whether it is possible to describe the cluster
state model using a many worlds ontology. At first glance there does not seem to be
anything barring such a description in principle. We might view each of the qubits
as existing simultaneously in multiple worlds, for example, while the computation is
being performed. But even if this were possible, it is difficult to see what would be
gained by such a description, for this is neither a natural view of what is happening,
nor a particularly useful one: in the network model it seems natural to conceive of a
unitary gate as effecting a parallel computation by means of a transformation such
as that in equation (2.1). But such a ‘step’ is missing in the cluster state model.
There is nothing corresponding to such a unitary transformation. At best we have a
simulation of such a gate; however, it is a simulation that bears no resemblance, in
terms of its physical realisation, to the corresponding network circuit. In addition,
the temporal ordering of computation in the cluster state has little, if anything, to
do with the temporal ordering present in the simulated network. Thus there is
nothing corresponding to simultaneous function evaluation in the cluster state, for
on the cluster state model gates are only conceptual entities that one may utilise for
algorithm design. When it comes to implementation, the logical division of the
cluster into distinct gates is completely irrelevant. Indeed, in order to characterise
the cluster state model it is not necessary to begin with the logical layout of the
network model at all, for the cluster state model is, arguably, more effectively
characterised by a graph than by a network (Raussendorf et al., 2003, p. 20).
Far from being a natural and intuitive picture of cluster state computation, it
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seems, rather, that one must work against one’s intuition to view the cluster state
model as a model of parallel computation in many worlds, and it is hard to see how
such a description can be useful. Considerations such as these prompt Steane to
write: “[t]he evolution of the cluster state computer is not readily or appropriately
described as a set of exponentially many computations going on at once. It is
readily described as a sequence of measurements whose outcomes exhibit
correlations generated by entanglement” (2003, p. 474). I should note that many
worlds advocates such as Hewitt-Horsman, also, reluctantly reject the view that
cluster state computation need involve an appeal to many worlds (Hewitt-Horsman,
2009, pp. 896-897); though, as we have seen, she still defends the legitimacy and
usefulness of describing network based computation in terms of many worlds and of
treating these worlds as ontologically real (Hewitt-Horsman, 2009, pp. 890-896).
But the main problem, for one who wishes to defend a many worlds description
of the operation of the cluster state computer, is not that such a description is
neither natural nor useful. The problem is deeper than this, for it appears that it is
for all practical purposes impossible to specify a preferred basis in which to
distinguish the worlds in which parallel computations take place in the context of
the cluster state computer. Recall that, in general, measurements in the cluster
state model are adaptive: the basis for each measurement will change throughout
the computation and will differ from one qubit to the next. During each time step
of the computation, the (random) results of the measurements performed in that
step will determine the measurement bases used to measure the qubits in
subsequent steps. But this random determination of measurement bases means that
there is no principled way to select a preferred basis a priori (and even if we did, few
qubits would actually be measured in that basis), and we certainly cannot assert
that there is any sense in which a preferred basis ‘emerges’ from this process. Thus
there is no way in which to characterise the cluster state computer as performing its
computations in many worlds, for there is no way, in the context of the cluster state
computer, to even define these worlds for the purposes of describing the
computation as a whole.
As a possible rejoinder, one might assert that the cluster state model merely
obscures the fact that the computation takes place in many worlds, and that this
would be revealed upon closer analysis by, for instance, considering how one might
go about simulating a cluster-state computation with circuits. In fact it is possible
to simulate a cluster state using classically controlled gates. Classically controlled
gates are gates whose operation is dependent on classical bit values (these are
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typically the results of measurements). To avoid the problem of the continually
changing basis, one might take the additional step of deferring all measurements to
the end of the process. According to the principle of deferred measurement
(Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p. 186), this is always possible.
Such a simulation would require many more qubits and at least one more
two-qubit operation for each single qubit operation in the cluster, however. In
principle, there will be no bound to either the additional memory or to the number
of additional two-qubit gates required to realise the simulation (de Beaudrap, 2009,
p. 2). Practical methods, therefore, for simulating the cluster state with circuits
allow measurement gates to be a part of the computational process (Childs et al.,
2005; de Beaudrap, 2009). They decompose the cluster state into a series of
classically controlled change of basis gates followed by measurement gates in the
standard basis. Thus this will not solve the problem for the many worlds theorist.
But perhaps some day an ingenious theorist will find a way to simulate cluster
state computation in some other model without the use of adaptive measurements
or classically controlled change of basis gates. What should we say then? Even in
this case I think it would be misleading to speak of the cluster state model as
obscuring the fact that many worlds are responsible for the speedup it evinces.
Recall that, for those who adhere to the many worlds explanation of quantum
computation, part of the motivation for describing computation as literally
happening in many worlds is that it is useful for algorithm analysis and design to
believe that these worlds are real. This motivation is absent in the cluster state
model irrespective of whether it can be simulated in some other model. Moreover,
irrespective of whether it can be simulated in some other model, the cluster state
model will, in virtue of its unique characteristics, surely lead to new ways of
thinking about quantum computation that would not have occurred to a theorist
working only with the network model. To dogmatically hold on to the view that, in
actuality, many worlds are, at root, physically responsible for the speedup evinced
in the cluster state model will at best be useless, for, as we have seen, it will not
help our theorist to design algorithms for the cluster state. At worst it will be
positively detrimental if dogmatically holding on to this view prevents our theorist
from discovering the possibilities that are inherent in the cluster state model.
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2.5 The legitimacy of the many worlds
explanation for the network model
We saw, in §2.3, that the many worlds explanation of quantum computing cannot
avail itself of many of the arguments in support of the many worlds interpretation of
quantum mechanics which appeal to decoherence as a criterion for distinguishing
worlds in order to circumvent the preferred basis objection. Further, we saw that
while the decoherence basis is able to fulfil the role assigned to it, in the many
worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, of determining the preferred basis for
world decomposition with respect to macro experience, the corresponding criterion
for world decomposition appealed to by those who defend the many worlds
explanation of quantum computing cannot fulfil this role except in an ad hoc way.
Thus we have one reason to reject many worlds as an explanation of the network
model of quantum computation. Let us put this consideration to one side.
We have just seen, in §2.4, that the cluster state model of quantum computation
is incompatible with a many worlds explanation of it. In spite of this, one might
still wish to maintain the view that network-based computation, at least, is
computation in many worlds. There is nothing wrong in principle with such a
stance. What makes this view problematic, however, is the fact that the
cluster-state model is computationally equivalent to the network model. One must
therefore be committed to the view that an algorithm, when run on quantum
circuits, performs its computation in many worlds; while a simulation of the same
algorithm, run on a cluster-state computer, does not. Moreover, this is in spite of
the fact that there may be no difference in the way in which individual qubits are
physically realised in each computer.
As unfortunate as such a situation would be, it would be forced on us if there
were no other potential unifying explanations of the source of quantum speedup
available. Fortunately, however, there do exist potential physical explanations for
quantum speedup in the network model which, unlike the many worlds explanation,
are compatible with the cluster state model.
One example of such an explanation is due to Lance Fortnow. Fortnow (2003)
develops an abstract mathematical framework for representing the computational
complexity classes associated with classical and quantum computing.19 In Fortnow’s
19These are BPP (bounded-error probabilistic polynomial time) and BQP (bounded error
quantum polynomial time). For more on computational complexity classes, see Appendix A. For a
more detailed overview of Fortnow’s framework, see Appendix E.
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framework, both classes of computation are represented by transition matrices which
determine the possible transitions between the configurations of a nondeterministic
Turing machine. This framework shows, according to Fortnow, that the
fundamental difference between quantum and classical computation is interference:
in the quantum case, matrix entries can be negative, signifying a quantum
computer’s ability to realise good computational paths with higher probability by
having the bad computational paths cancel each other out (Fortnow, 2003, p. 606).
Another example of a unifying explanation is the physical explanation for
quantum speedup that we will develop in the following chapters.
Unlike the many worlds explanation, these explanations of the source of quantum
speedup do not rely on the particular characteristics of the network model and seem
straightforwardly compatible with cluster state computation. But the fact that the
many worlds explanation of quantum speedup is not compatible with the cluster
state model, while these other explanations of quantum speedup are, is a reason to
question its usefulness as a description of network-based quantum computation, and
thus one more reason to reject it as an explanation of quantum speedup tout court.
2.6 Conclusion
I hope to have convinced the reader that, whatever the merits of the neo-Everettian
interpretation of quantum mechanics are, the many worlds explanation of quantum
computing is inadequate as an explanation of either the network or the cluster state
model of quantum computation. We saw above how it depends on a suspect
extension of the the neo-Everettian approach to the interpretation of quantum
mechanics, and we saw how, unlike other explanations of quantum computing, it is
unable to describe the cluster state model of quantum computation. I hope that the
reader agrees that these are convincing reasons to reject the many worlds
explanation of quantum computing.
I do not want to argue that the many worlds explanation of quantum
computation, particularly in regards to the network model, has no heuristic value.
It undoubtedly does, and thinking in this manner has assuredly led to the
development of some important quantum algorithms. Nevertheless we should take
talk of many computational worlds with a grain of salt. Indeed, taking literally the
many worlds view of quantum computation may be positively detrimental if it
prevents us from constructing models of quantum computation, such as the cluster
state model, in the future.
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2.7 Next steps
The many worlds explanation of quantum computation is, arguably, the best known
of the candidate physical explanations for quantum speedup. It is also, perhaps, the
most influential; it has been and continues to be discussed in the popular,
philosophical, and scientific literature on quantum computation. Given this,
thoroughly considering its merits as an explanation for quantum speedup was both
important and appropriate. Now that we have completed this inquiry, however, we
will take a different approach. In lieu of undertaking a case by case critical
examination of the major candidate explanations of quantum computation on offer,
from here on in we will proceed in a more constructive manner.
In almost all of the candidate explanations for quantum speedup (e.g.,
Ekert & Jozsa 1998; Steane 2003; Duwell 2004; Bub 2006, 2010), the fact that
quantum mechanical systems can sometimes exhibit entanglement plays an
important role.20 On Steane’s view, for instance, quantum entanglement allows one
to manipulate the correlations between the values of a function without
manipulating those values themselves. For proponents of the many worlds
explanation, on the other hand, though they consider computational worlds to be
the main component in the explanation of quantum speedup, they nevertheless view
entanglement as indispensable to its analysis (Hewitt-Horsman, 2009, 889). This
circumstance is intriguing, and leads one to wonder whether one must appeal to
entanglement in order to explain quantum speedup; i.e., whether entanglement is a
necessary component of any explanation for quantum speedup. This will be the
topic of the next chapter.
Continuing along in this more positive manner, perhaps we will be fortunate
enough to stumble upon some one, or some set, of necessary and sufficient
conditions for the explanation that we seek—and in this way assemble together an
explanation for quantum speedup, so to speak, ‘from the ground up’.
20One important exception to this is Fortnow’s view (cf. Appendix E), which points to
interference, and not entanglement, as the explanation for quantum speedup. As I will argue in
Chapter 5, however, interference and entanglement can be seen as, so to speak, two sides of the
same coin.
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Chapter 3
Entanglement as a Necessary
Component in a Physical
Explanation for Quantum
Computational Speedup
3.1 Introduction
The significance of the phenomenon of quantum entanglement—wherein the most
precise characterisation of a quantum system composed of previously interacting
subsystems does not necessarily include a precise characterisation of those
subsystems—has been at the forefront of the debate over the conceptual foundations
of quantum theory, almost since that theory’s inception. It is the distinguishing
feature of quantum theory, for some (Schro¨dinger, 1935).1 For others, it is evidence
for the incompleteness of that theory (Einstein, Podolsky, & Rosen, 1935).2 For yet
others, the possibility of entangled quantum systems implies that physical reality is
essentially non-local (Stapp, 1997).3 For almost all, it has been, and continues to
be, an enigma requiring a solution.
Logically, entanglement may play the role of either a necessary or a sufficient
1For some more recent speculation on the the distinguishing feature(s) of quantum mechanics,
see, for instance, Clifton et al. (2003); Myrvold (2010).
2For further discussion, and for Einstein’s later refinements of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) paper’s main argument, see Howard (1985).
3For responses to Stapp’s view and for further discussion, see: Unruh (1999); Mermin (1998);
Stapp (1999).
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condition (or both) in an overall explanation of quantum speedup. The question of
whether entanglement may be said to be a sufficient condition will be addressed in
subsequent chapters. As for the assertion that entanglement is a necessary
component in the explanation of speedup, this seems, prima facie, to be supported4
by a result due to Jozsa & Linden (2003), who prove that for quantum algorithms
which utilise pure states, “the presence of multi-partite entanglement, with a
number of parties that increases unboundedly with input size, is necessary if the
quantum algorithm is to offer an exponential speed-up over classical computation”
(2003, p. 2014). When we consider quantum algorithms which utilise mixed states,
however, then there appear to be counterexamples to the assertion that one must
appeal to quantum entanglement in order to explain quantum speedup. In
particular, Biham et al. (2004) have shown that it is possible to achieve a modest
(sub-exponential) speedup using unentangled mixed states. Further, Datta et al.
(2005, 2008) have shown that it is possible to achieve an exponential speedup using
mixed states that contain only a vanishingly small amount of entanglement. In the
latter case, further investigation has suggested to some that quantum correlations
other than entanglement may be playing a more important role. One quantity in
particular, quantum discord, appears to be intimately connected to the speedup that
is present in the algorithm in question. In light of these results, it is tempting to
conclude that it is not necessary to appeal to entanglement at all in order to explain
quantum computational speedup and that the investigative focus should shift to the
physical characteristics of quantum discord or some other such quantum correlation
measure instead.
In this chapter I will argue that this conclusion is premature and misguided, for
as I will show below, there is an important sense in which entanglement can indeed
be said to be necessary for the explanation of the quantum speedup obtainable from
both of these mixed-state quantum algorithms.
The chapter will proceed as follows. After introducing the concept of
entanglement and how it is quantified in §3.2, I introduce the necessity of
entanglement for explanation thesis in §3.3. In §3.4, I show how what looks like a
counter-example to the necessity of entanglement for explanation thesis for pure
states—the fact that certain important quantum algorithms can be expressed so
that their states are never entangled—is instead evidence for this thesis. Then, in
4What I take to be supported by Jozsa & Linden’s result is the claim that entanglement is
required in order to explain quantum speedup. As we will discuss further in §3.3, this is distinct
from the claim that one requires an entangled quantum state in order to achieve quantum speedup.
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§3.5, I examine the more serious challenges to the necessity of entanglement for
explanation thesis posed by the cases of sub-exponential speedup with unentangled
mixed states (§3.5.1) and exponential speedup with mixed states containing only a
vanishingly small quantity of entanglement (§3.5.2).
Starting with the first type of counter-example, I begin by arguing that pure
quantum states should be taken to provide a more fundamental representation of
quantum systems than mixed states. I then show that when one considers the
initially mixed state of the quantum computer as representing the space of its
possible pure state preparations, the speedup obtainable from the computer can be
seen as stemming from the fact that the quantum computer evolves some of these
possible pure state preparations to entangled states—that the quantum speedup of
the computer can be seen as arising from the fact that it implements an entangling
transformation.
As for the second type of counter-example, where exponential speedup is
achieved with only a vanishingly small amount of entanglement, and where it is held
by some that another type of non-classical correlation, quantum discord, is
responsible for the speedup of the quantum computer: I argue that, first, it is
misleading to characterise discord as indicative of non-classical correlations. I then
appeal to recent work done by Fanchini et al. (2011), Brodutch & Terno (2011), and
Cavalcanti et al. (2011) who show, respectively, that when one considers the
‘purified’ state representation of the quantum computer, there is a conservation
relation between discord and entanglement, and indeed that there is just as much
entanglement in such a representation as there is discord in the mixed state
representation; that entanglement must be shared between two parties in order to
bilocally implement any bipartite quantum gate; and that entanglement is directly
involved in the operational definition of quantum discord.
Given Jozsa & Linden’s proof of the necessary presence of an entangled state for
exponential speedup using pure states, and given the fundamentality of pure states
as representations of quantum systems, the burden of proof is upon those who would
deny the necessity of entanglement for explanation thesis to show either by means of
a counter-example or by some other more principled method that it is false. Neither
of the counter-examples discussed in this chapter succeeds in doing so. We should
conclude, therefore, that the necessity of entanglement for explanation thesis is true.
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3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Quantum entanglement
Pure states
Consider the following representation of the joint state of two qubits:
|ψ〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |0〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |1〉.
This expression for the overall state of the system represents the fact that the two
qubits are in an equally weighted superposition of the four joint states (a)-(d)
below:
q1 q2
(a) |0〉 |0〉
(b) |0〉 |1〉
(c) |1〉 |0〉
(d) |1〉 |1〉.
This particular state is a separable state, for it can, alternatively, be expressed as a
product of the pure states of its component systems, as follows:
|ψ〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)⊗ (|0〉+ |1〉).
Not all quantum mechanical states can be expressed as product states of their
component systems, and thus not all quantum mechanical states are separable. Here
are four such ‘entangled’ states:5
|Φ+〉 = |00〉+ |11〉√
2
|Φ−〉 = |00〉 − |11〉√
2
|Ψ+〉 = |01〉+ |10〉√
2
|Ψ−〉 = |01〉 − |10〉√
2
. (3.1)
5Note that below I have used the shorthand tensor product notation. See §1.3.
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The skeptical reader is encouraged to convince himself that it is impossible to
re-express any of these states as a product state of two qubits. They are called the
Bell states, and I will refer to a pair of qubits jointly in a Bell state as a Bell pair.6
Maximally entangled states,7 such as these, completely specify the correlations
between outcomes of experiments on their component qubits without specifying
anything regarding the outcome of a single experiment on one of the qubits. For
instance, in the singlet state (i.e., |Ψ−〉), outcomes of experiments on the first and
second qubits are perfectly anti-correlated with one another. If one performs, say, a
zˆ experiment on one qubit of such a system, then if the result is |0〉, a zˆ experiment
on the other qubit will, with certainty, yield an outcome of |1〉, and vice versa. In
general, the expectation value for joint measurements on the two qubits is given by
−mˆ · nˆ = − cos θ, where mˆ, nˆ are unit vectors representing the orientations of the
two experimental devices, and θ is the difference in these orientations. Any single zˆ
experiment on just one of the two qubits, however, will yield |0〉 or |1〉 with equal
probability.
The phenomenon of entanglement has deep implications for our understanding
of the physical world. Consider an alternative theory of quantum mechanics in
which λ is an assignment to a set of hidden variables determining the outcomes of
experiments on the two subsystems of a Bell pair. Suppose λ satisfies the condition
that it assigns probabilities to experimental outcomes on the first subsystem that
are independent of experimental outcomes on the second subsystem (and vice
versa); i.e.,
paλ(xa|a, b) = paλ(xa|a, b, xb). (3.2)
This condition has variously been called completeness (Jarrett, 1984), outcome
independence (Shimony, 1993), and separability (Howard, 1985). Bell’s inequalities
imply that any theory consistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics which
satisfies (3.2) must assign different probabilities to outcomes of experiments on the
first subsystem depending on the choice of test that is performed on the second
subsystem; i.e., it must violate the condition that
paλ(xa|a, b) = paλ(xa|a, b′). (3.3)
6These are also sometimes referred to as ‘EPR pairs’. EPR stands for Einstein, Podolsky, and
Rosen. In their seminal 1935 paper, EPR famously used states analogous to the Bell states to
argue that quantum mechanics is incomplete.
7Note that not all entangled states are maximally entangled states. We will discuss this in
more detail in the next section.
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Jarrett and Howard call this second condition locality, while Shimony calls it
parameter independence. Together, outcome and parameter independence yield
factorisability :
pabλ (xa, xb|a, b) = paλ(xa|a) · pbλ(xb|b). (3.4)
It turns out that Bell’s inequalities imply that any theory that is consistent with
the predictions of quantum mechanics must violate (3.4) and thus violate either
(3.2) or (3.3). In particular, a fully deterministic hidden variables theory, which the
reader should convince herself must necessarily satisfy (3.2), must therefore
necessarily violate (3.3). On the other hand, standard quantum mechanics obviously
violates (3.2), but satisfies (3.3). It is worthwhile to note that a violation of (3.3)
necessarily brings one into conflict with special relativity, but that it is at least not
obvious that a mere violation of (3.2) does so; i.e., that ‘peaceful coexistence’
between the two theories is impossible.8
We will consider the physical significance of quantum entanglement in more
detail in subsequent chapters, but for the time being we will put such interpretive
questions to one side. For the purposes of this chapter my intention will be to
characterise entanglement as neutrally and uncontroversially as possible.
Mixed states
The concepts of separability and of entanglement are also applicable to so-called
‘mixed states’. To illustrate the concept of a mixed state, imagine that one draws a
ball from an urn into which balls of different types have been placed, and that the
probability of drawing a ball of type i is pi. Corresponding to the outcome i, we
then prepare a given system S in the pure state |ψi〉, representable by the density
operator ρSi = |ψi〉〈ψi|. After preparing ρSi , we then discard our record of the result
of the draw. The resulting state of the overall system will be the mixed state:
ρ =
∑
i
piρ
S
i . (3.5)
A mixed state is separable if it can be expressed as a mixture of pure product
8For further discussion of peaceful coexistence, see Shimony (1993). For a more specific defence
of the possibility of peaceful coexistence between special relativity and theories which characterise
quantum mechanical wave function collapse as a real physical process, see Myrvold (2002).
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states, and entangled otherwise. In general, determining whether a mixed state of
the form (3.5) is an entangled state is difficult, because in general the decomposition
of mixtures is non-unique. For instance, the reader can verify that a mixed state
represented by the density operator ρ, prepared as a mixture of pure states in the
following way:
ρ =
3
4
|0〉〈0|+ 1
4
|1〉〈1|,
can also be equivalently prepared as:
ρ =
1
2
|ψ〉〈ψ|+ 1
2
|φ〉〈φ|,
where
|ψ〉 ≡
√
3
4
|0〉+
√
1
4
|1〉, |φ〉 ≡
√
3
4
|0〉 −
√
1
4
|1〉.
This is so because both state preparations yield an identical density matrix
representation (in the computational basis); i.e.,:
(
3/4 0
0 1/4
)
.
As we will see in more detail later, a system that is prepared as a mixture of
entangled states will sometimes yield the same density operator representation as a
system prepared as a mixture of pure product states.
3.2.2 Quantifying entanglement
The four Bell states that we encountered in section 3.2.1 are examples of maximally
entangled states. Not all entangled states are maximally entangled states, however.
For instance, as will be clear later, the state
|φ〉 =
√
1
3
|01〉+
√
2
3
|10〉, (3.6)
though entangled, is not maximally entangled.
Entanglement is a potentially useful resource for quantum information
processing. Masanes (2006) has shown, for instance, that for any non-separable
state ρ, some other state σ is capable of having its teleportation fidelity enhanced
by ρ’s presence.9 Given this, it will be useful to be able to quantify the amount of
9The teleportation fidelity (cf. Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, §9.2.2) is a measure of the ‘closeness’
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entanglement contained in a given state. In order to do this, we employ so-called
entanglement measures, the theory of which is outlined below.10
Local operations and classical communications
Perhaps the most basic concept of the theory of entanglement measures is that of
Local Operations and Classical Communications (LOCC). Roughly, LOCC refers to
local quantum operations (LO) that can be performed on a quantum system at a
given site, and coordinated with other local operations at other sites using classical
communications links (CC). For instance, in the quantum teleportation protocol (cf.
Appendix C), after the two parties to the protocol have been spatially separated
from one another, all of their subsequent actions can be classified as LOCC.
LOCC provides the key, within the theory of entanglement measures, for
distinguishing classical from non-classical correlations (which, for now, we simply
identify with entanglement).11 Recall the discussion which preceded Eq. (3.5)
above. Now imagine that, upon drawing a ball of type i from the urn, not only
Samantha, but Alice, Bob, and Charles also create their own individual quantum
states, ρAi , ρ
B
i , ρ
C
i , based on the shared information about the outcome i. In that
case, the resulting state of the overall system will be the mixed state:
ρSABC =
∑
i
piρ
S
i ⊗ ρAi ⊗ ρBi ⊗ ρCi . (3.7)
This procedure with urn and balls is an example of a procedure involving LOCC
operations. And since (3.7) is, in fact, the general form of a separable state, we may
conclude from this that every separable state is such that it can be created using
LOCC operations alone. Further, since correlations generable using only LOCC
operations can always be described as the result of some common classical cause
(this is built into the very definition of LOCC), it is reasonable to conclude that a
quantum state ρ can be generated perfectly using LOCC alone if and only if it is
of the input and output states in the teleportation protocol (cf. Appendix C).
10In the exposition which follows, I draw substantially from Plenio & Virmani (2007).
11Since communication (for instance, of the results of previous measurements) between the
parties to a quantum informational protocol may occur often and at any time during the process,
this will, in general, introduce highly complex dependencies into our description of the process.
These make it extraordinarily difficult, if not practically impossible, to give a precise mathematical
characterisation of the set of possible LOCC operations. As a workaround, larger more easily
characterisable classes of operations, which are sufficiently ‘LOCC-al’, are used as imperfect proxies
for the LOCC class. One such class is the class of separable operations, described in Appendix D.
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separable.
Note that one cannot increase the amount of entanglement contained in a given
state using LOCC operations (including combinations of local unitaries) alone. To
see why this is true, note first that, since only separable states can be created using
LOCC operations, it follows that one cannot generate an entangled state from an
unentangled one. Second, imagine transforming some entangled state ρ into another
state ρ′ using LOCC operations. Since ρ′ was obtained using only LOCC
operations, anything that can be done with ρ′ + LOCC operations can also be done
with ρ + LOCC. Hence, in terms of the resources made available for information
processing, ρ′ is (at best) no more entangled than ρ; ρ′ and ρ, therefore, will (at
best) contain an equal amount of entanglement.
Maximally entangled states
Consider bipartite (i.e., two-party) systems of ‘qudits’; i.e., d-dimensional quantum
systems (a qubit, for instance, is a qudit for which d = 2). Any pure state that is
local unitarily equivalent to
|Φ+d 〉 =
|0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |1〉+ · · ·+ |d− 1〉 ⊗ |d− 1〉√
d
(3.8)
is a maximally entangled state. We describe it as such because from this state +
LOCC operations it is possible to prepare (with certainty) any desired two-party
d-dimensional qudit state. And since LOCC operations cannot increase the amount
of entanglement in a system, it follows that all states local unitarily equivalent to
(3.8) are also maximally entangled. This statement is absolute; i.e., states of the
form (3.8) are maximally entangled irrespective of which entanglement measure (to
be discussed in the next section) is used to impose an ordering on states.
For instance, consider the simple case of two qubits. For d = 2, a state of form
(3.8) is the Bell state |Φ+〉. We claim that |Φ+〉 is a maximally entangled state; i.e.,
that, with certainty, beginning with |Φ+〉 (or a state local unitarily equivalent to
|Φ+〉), we can prepare any arbitrary bipartite state |φ〉. To see why this is so,
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consider an arbitrary bipartite pure state in Schmidt decomposed form:12
|φ〉 = α|00〉ab + β|11〉ab. (3.9)
(here a and b refer to Alice’s and Bob’s qubits, respectively). We will now show how
to obtain |φ〉 from |Φ+〉 using exclusively LOCC transformations.
First, to the Bell state,
|Φ+〉 = |00〉ab + |11〉ab√
2
,
add an ancilla qubit in state |0〉 at Alice’s location:
1√
2
(|00〉aa|0〉b + |01〉aa|1〉b).
Now perform the unitary transformation |00〉 → α|00〉+ β|11〉; |01〉 → β|01〉+ α|10〉
on Alice’s system. This yields:
(α|00〉+ β|11〉)aa|0〉b + (β|01〉+ α|10〉)aa|1〉b√
2
=
α|00〉aa|0〉b + β|11〉aa|0〉b + β|01〉aa|1〉b + α|10〉aa|1〉b√
2
=
|0〉a(α|00〉ab + β|11〉ab) + |1〉a(β|10〉ab + α|01〉ab)√
2
(3.10)
We now instruct Alice to perform a local measurement on her ancilla system. If it
yields |0〉 then Bob need not do anything, else if Alice’s measurement yields |1〉, Bob
applies an X (i.e. a “NOT”) transformation to his qubit. In either case, the result is
|φ〉, as desired. Note that although we limited ourselves to the pure state case, it is
easy to show that any mixed state, ρ, can also be obtained from (3.8).
12It is a fact that any bipartite pure state can be expressed as:
|ψ〉 = Ua ⊗ Ub
N∑
i=1
√
αi|i〉a|i〉b,
where the αi are positive real numbers called the Schmidt-coefficients of |ψ〉 (Plenio & Virmani,
2007). Since the local unitaries do not affect the entanglement properties of the state, we omit
them in (3.9).
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Entanglement measures
As we have just seen, a bipartite state ρ is said to be maximally entangled if we can
use it and LOCC operations to prepare any arbitrary bipartite state σ with
certainty. In the more general case, where ρ is not necessarily maximally entangled,
we will, in similar fashion, say that the amount of entanglement contained in ρ is
greater than or equal to the amount of entanglement contained in σ if the
transformation ρ→ σ can be performed using only LOCC operations.
Because of the limitations inherent in determining an ordering on entangled
states in the single copy setting (cf. Plenio & Virmani, 2007), entanglement
measures are sometimes defined with respect to the asymptotic regime. Here, the
basic idea is that we do not ask whether we may use the single state ρ in order to
exactly prepare the single state σ. Rather, we ask whether it is possible to achieve
the transformation ρ⊗n → σ⊗m, for large integers m and n; and we use the ratio,
m/n, as the basis for a measure of the relative entanglement contained in the two
states.13
We now consider a few specific entanglement measures.
Entanglement cost and distillable entanglement. Consider a bipartite qubit
state, ρ and a maximally entangled bipartite state Φ(K) ≡ |Φ+K〉〈Φ+K | of
K-dimensions. The entanglement cost, EC(ρ), associated with ρ quantifies the
amount of entanglement required in order to approximate n copies of ρ, starting
from the maximally entangled state. More formally, it is defined as the lowest rate r
for which the trace norm distance14 between Ψ(Φ(2rn)) and ρ⊗n approaches 0 for
large n, where Ψ is a trace preserving (series of) LOCC-al operation(s) performed
on Φ(2rn) with the object of obtaining ρ⊗n; i.e.,
EC(ρ) ≡ inf
{
r : lim
n→∞
[
inf
Ψ
tr|ρ⊗n −Ψ(Φ(2rn))|
]
= 0
}
. (3.11)
13In fact, even this condition is usually relaxed; i.e., rather than ask whether it is possible to
achieve the transformation ρ⊗n → σ⊗m, typically we ask only whether it is possible to achieve the
transformation ρ⊗n → σm, where σm is an approximation of σ⊗m. In this case, if, for some fixed
r = m/n, as n→∞, we can bring the state σm arbitrarily close to σ⊗m, then we say that the rate
r = m/n is achievable for this transformation.
14We use the trace norm distance, tr|σ − η|, for the sake of mathematical convenience, as a
measure of the distance between quantum states. Any suitable measure of distance, D(σ, η), could
have been used instead, however, as the definition of entanglement cost is independent of our
choice of distance function (cf. Plenio & Virmani, 2007).
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We would also like to know about the reverse process; i.e., we would like to know
the greatest rate r for which the distance between ρ⊗n and Φ(2rn) approaches 0 for
large n, where Ψ is now a LOCC operation on ρ⊗n performed in order to obtain Φ.
This process is known as entanglement distillation,15 and the measure associated
with it is distillable entanglement :
ED(ρ) ≡ sup
{
r : lim
n→∞
[
inf
Ψ
tr|Ψ(ρ⊗n)− Φ(2rn)|
]
= 0
}
. (3.12)
The distillable entanglement can be thought of as a measure of the ‘entanglement
potential’ of a state; it tells us the maximum possible rate at which many copies of a
‘noisy’ entangled state may be converted back into a maximally entangled state
using LOCC.
For pure states, these transformations are reversible in the asymptotic limit;
further, for pure states EC and ED are both equal to the entropy of entanglement
(Bennett et al., 1996), defined, for a pure state |ψ〉, as
E(|ψ〉〈ψ|) ≡ S(trA|ψ〉〈ψ|) = S(trB|ψ〉〈ψ|), (3.13)
where S is the von Neumann entropy: S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log2 ρ).16 Thus for pure states,
there is a unique total ordering of entangled states in the asymptotic regime17
(yielded by the entropy of entanglement), while the reversibility of EC(ρ) and ED(ρ)
allows us to determine the optimal asymptotic rate of transformation:
E(|ψ1〉〈ψ1|)/E(|ψ2〉〈ψ2|) between any two pure states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 (cf.
Plenio & Virmani, 2007).
Entanglement of formation. Unfortunately, the situation is more complicated
for mixed states, where measures of entanglement are not equivalent to the entropy
of entanglement, and where we do not have reversibility in general (Vidal & Cirac,
15It is also sometimes referred to as entanglement concentration, though this name is generally
reserved for the pure state case. Note that the fact that Ψ produces an approximation of Φ(K) is
particularly important for this case; for, recalling our earlier discussion, no exact transformation
from ρ⊗n to even one maximally entangled state is in general possible.
16For more on the von Neumann entropy, as well as on the other concepts of classical and
quantum information theory, see Appendix B.
17It should now be evident why the state (3.6) is not a maximally entangled state (indeed, any
state of the form |φ〉 = u|01〉+ v|10〉 is non-maximally entangled for u, v 6= 1√
2
). The reader who
doubts this should compare the entropy of entanglement of such a state with the entropy of
entanglement of any maximally entangled state.
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2001). For mixed states, in fact, the distillable entanglement and entanglement cost
are in general extraordinarily difficult to compute. Very little progress has been
made on solving this problem directly; however an alternative measure, the
entanglement of formation, offers some hope in this regard.
Given a mixed state, ρ, the entanglement of formation, EF (ρ), represents the
(lowest possible) average entanglement (as measured by the entropy of
entanglement) for pure state decompositions of ρ; i.e.,
EF (ρ) ≡ inf
{∑
i
piE(|ψi〉〈ψi|) : ρ =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|
}
. (3.14)
Given that EF is expressed in terms of the entropy of entanglement associated with
the pure states making up particular decompositions of ρ, one should expect EF to
be closely related to EC and ED. Indeed, in its asymptotic version,
E∞F (ρ) ≡ lim
n→∞
EF (ρ
⊗n)
n
, (3.15)
the entanglement of formation has been shown to be equal to the entanglement cost
(Hayden et al., 2001). While this, by itself, is of little help in computing
entanglement cost (the asymptotic entanglement of formation is no less difficult to
calculate), there are indications (but no proof as of yet) that the entanglement of
formation is additive; i.e., that EF (ρ) = E
∞
F (ρ). Since the non-asymptotic version of
EF is not very difficult to calculate, then if the entanglement of formation is truly
additive, it would follow that EC is easily calculable as well. Whether or not EF is
additive, therefore, is an important open question.
Negativity. The negativity (cf. Vidal & Werner, 2002) is an entanglement
measure based on the trace norm of the partial transpose of a bipartite mixed state
ρAB. It measures the degree to which the partial transpose of ρAB:
ρTA ≡ (T ⊗ I)ρAB fails to be positive definite; i.e., the degree to which ρAB is
entangled on Peres’s criterion of separability (Peres, 1996); and it vanishes for
separable states. It is given by
N (ρAB) ≡ ‖ρ
TA‖1 − 1
2
. (3.16)
42
A variant of the negativity is the multiplicative negativity (Datta et al., 2005):
M(ρAB) ≡ 1 + 2N (ρAB). (3.17)
This quantity is multiplicative in the sense that for a state which is a product state
of pairs of states, M for the overall system is equal to the product of the individual
values of M for each pair.
The negativity is not difficult to calculate, and in its logarithmic form,
EN (ρAB) ≡ log2‖ρTA‖1, (3.18)
the negativity is additive: EN (ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) = EN (ρ1) + EN (ρ2) (likewise for the
logarithmic form of the multiplicative negativity). The logarithmic negativity and
logarithmic multiplicative negativity, unfortunately, are not monotonic (i.e., they
increase under some LOCC operations).18
Multi-partite entanglement
The theory of entanglement measures extends beyond bipartite entanglement to the
more general case of multi-partite entanglement (i.e., entangled systems that are
shared between n parties). Unsurprisingly, moving from the bipartite to the
multi-partite setting introduces complications. For instance, in the multi-partite
setting there is no straightforward analogue of a bipartite maximally entangled state
from which all other bipartite states can be prepared using LOCC operations. In
the tripartite setting, for example, a natural candidate for a maximally entangled
state is the GHZ-state:
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A|0〉B|0〉C + |1〉A|1〉B|1〉C). (3.19)
Unfortunately some states are unobtainable from the GHZ-state using LOCC alone;
one example is the W-state:
|W〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉A|0〉B|1〉C + |0〉A|1〉B|0〉C + |1〉A|0〉B|0〉C). (3.20)
While we will make use of the concept of multi-partite entanglement in what
18A bipartite entanglement measure E(ρ) mapping density matrices to positive real numbers is
monotonic if (i) ρ is separable whenever E(ρ) = 0 and (ii) E does not increase when LOCC
operations are applied to ρ.
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follows, we will not need to specifically consider multi-partite entanglement
measures. For a more in-depth treatment, see Plenio & Virmani (2007).
3.2.3 Purification
Every mixed state can be thought of as the result of taking the partial trace of a
pure state acting on a larger Hilbert space. In particular, for a mixed state ρA
acting on a Hilbert space HA, with spectral decomposition
∑
k pk|k〉〈k| for some
orthonormal basis {|k〉}, a purification (in general non-unique) of ρA may be given
by
|ψAB〉 =
∑
k
√
pk|kA〉 ⊗ |kB〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB,
where HB is a copy of HA. We then have ρA = trB(|ψAB〉〈ψAB|), with |ψAB〉 an
entangled state.
3.3 The necessity of entanglement for
explanation thesis
Recall our discussion of the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm in §2.2. In the literature on
quantum computation (cf. Ekert & Jozsa 1998; Steane 2003) it is often suggested
that entanglement, such as that present in states like (2.4), is required if a quantum
algorithm is to be capable of achieving a speedup over its classical alternatives. I
will call this the necessity of an entangled state thesis (NEST). I will call the related
claim that entanglement is a necessary component of any explanation for quantum
speedup the necessity of entanglement for explanation thesis (NEXT).19
Note that although the NEXT is related to the NEST, these two claims are not
strictly speaking identical. As we will see in §3.5.1, it is possible for the NEXT to
be true even if the NEST is false (in the technical sense of §3.2.1), and it is not
incoherent to argue that the NEXT is false by citing, as a counter-example, a
quantum computer whose state is always entangled, as we shall see in §3.5.2.
19The attentive reader who has noticed that there is actually no entanglement in (2.4) when
n = 1 will be somewhat puzzled by both of these theses. In fact, as we will see, entanglement will
only appear for n ≥ 3. In what follows I will argue, however, that this turns out to be evidence for,
not against, the NEXT, and indeed does not contradict the NEST. This will be clarified in the
next section.
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3.4 De-quantisation
At first sight the following consideration seems problematic for both the NEST and
the NEXT. Consider the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm (cf. §2.2) for the special case of
n = 1. This case is essentially a solution for Deutsch’s problem. Deutsch’s (1985)
original solution to this problem is regarded as the first quantum algorithm ever
developed and as the first example of what has since come to be known as quantum
speedup. If one considers the steps of the algorithm as given in §2.2, however, then
the reader can confirm that, when n = 1, at no time during the computation are the
two qubits employed actually entangled with one another. The thesis that
entanglement is a necessary condition for quantum speedup thus seems false. But
the situation is not as dark for the NEST and the NEXT as it appears, since for the
case of n = 1, it is also the case that the problem can be ‘de-quantised’, i.e., solved
just as efficiently using classical means.
One method for doing this (cf. Abbott, 2012) is with a computer which utilises
the complex numbers {1, i} as a computational basis in lieu of {|0〉, |1〉}. A complex
number z ∈ C can be written as z = a+ bi, where a, b ∈ R, and thus can be
expressed as a superposition of the basis elements in much the same way as a
qubit.20 The algorithm proceeds in the following way. We first note that the action
of Uf on the first n qubits in Eq. (2.4) can, for the case of n = 1, be expressed as:
21
1√
2
(
(−1)f(0)|0〉+ (−1)f(1)|1〉
)
=
(−1)f(0)√
2
(
|0〉+ (−1)f(0)⊕f(1)|1〉
)
.
We now define an operator Cf , analogously to Uf , that acts on a complex number
as follows:
Cf(a+ bi) = (−1)f(0)
(
a + (−1)f(0)⊕f(1)bi
)
.
When f is constant, the reader can verify that Cf(z) = ±(a+ bi) = ±z. When f is
balanced, Cf(z) = ±(a− bi) = ±z∗. Multiplying by z/2 so as to project our output
back on to the computational basis, we find, for the elementary case of z = 1 + i,
20Regarding the physical realisation of such a computer, note that complex numbers can be
used, for instance, to describe the impedances of electrical circuits and that we can apply the
superposition theorem to their analysis.
21Note that, since f(0) = f(0), (−1)f(0)⊕f(0)⊕f(1) = (−1)f(1).
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that
f constant : 1
2
z · ±z = ±i
f balanced : 1
2
z · ±z∗ = ±1.
Thus for any z, if the result of applying Cf is imaginary, then f is constant, else if
the result is real, then f is balanced (indeed, by examining the sign we will even be
able to tell which of the two balanced or two constant functions f is). This
algorithm is just as efficient as its quantum counterpart.
It can similarly be shown (cf. Abbott, 2012) that no entanglement is present in
(2.4) when n = 2, and that for this case also it is possible to solve the problem
efficiently using classical means. When n ≥ 3, however, (2.3) is an entangling
evolution and (2.4) is an entangled state. Unsurprisingly, it is no longer possible to
define an operator Cf analogous to Uf that takes product states to product states,
and it is no longer possible to produce an equally efficient classical counterpart to
the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm (cf. Abbott, 2012).
Indeed, for the general case, Abbott has shown that a quantum algorithm can
always be efficiently de-quantised whenever the algorithm does not entangle the
input states. Far from calling into question the role of entanglement in quantum
computational speedup, the fact that the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm does not require
entanglement to succeed for certain special cases actually provides (since in these
cases it can be de-quantised) evidence for both the NEST and the NEXT.
3.5 Challenges to the necessity of entanglement
for explanation thesis
In their own analysis of de-quantisation, Jozsa & Linden (2003) similarly find that,
for pure quantum states, “the presence of multi-partite entanglement, with a
number of parties that increases unboundedly with input size, is necessary if the
quantum algorithm is to offer an exponential speed-up over classical
computation.”22 In the same article, however, Jozsa & Linden speculate as to
whether it may be possible to achieve exponential speedup, without entanglement,
using mixed states. In fact, as we will now see, it is possible to achieve a modest
22For some earlier results relating to specific classes of algorithms, see Linden & Popescu
(2001); Braunstein & Pati (2002). For a review, see Pati & Braunstein (2009).
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(i.e., sub-exponential) speedup using unentangled mixed states. As I will argue,
however, entanglement nevertheless plays an important role in the computational
ability of these states, despite their being unentangled in the technical sense of
§3.2.1. Thus, while such counter-examples demonstrate the falsity of the NEST,
they do not demonstrate the falsity of the NEXT.
3.5.1 The mixed-state Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm
We will call a ‘pseudo-pure-state’ of n qubits any mixed state that can be written in
the form:
ρ
{n}
PPS ≡ ε|ψ〉〈ψ|+ (1− ε)I ,
where |ψ〉 is a pure state on n qubits, and I is defined as the totally mixed state
(1/2n)I2n . It can be shown that such a state is separable (cf. §3.2.1) and remains so
under unitary evolution just so long as
ε <
1
1 + 22n−1
.
Now consider the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm once again (cf. §2.2). This time,
however, let us replace the initial pure state |0n〉|1〉 with the pseudo-pure state:
ρ = ε|0n〉|1〉〈0n|〈1|+ (1− ε)I . (3.21)
The algorithm will continue as before, except that this time our probability of
success will not be unity.
To illustrate: assume that the system represented by ρ has been prepared in the
way most naturally suggested by (3.21); i.e., that with probability ε, it is prepared
as the pure state |0n〉|1〉, and with probability 1− ε, it is prepared as the completely
mixed state I . Now imagine that we write some of the valid Boolean functions
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} onto balls which we then place into an urn, and assume that
these consist of an equal number of constant and balanced functions. We select a
ball from the urn and then test the algorithm with this function to see if the
algorithm successfully determines f ’s type.
Consider the case when f is a constant function. In this case, we will say the
algorithm succeeds whenever it yields the bit string z = 0. We know, from §2.2, that
the algorithm will certainly succeed (i.e., with probability 1) when the system is
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actually in the pure state |0n〉|1〉 initially. Given our particular state preparation
procedure, the system is in this state with probability ε. The rest of the time (i.e.,
with probability 1− ε), the system is in the completely mixed state I . In this
latter case, since there are 2n possible values that can be obtained for z, the
probability of successfully obtaining z = 0 will be 1/2n. Thus the overall probability
of success associated with the system when f is constant is:
P (z = 0|f is constant) = ε+ (1− ε)/2n. (3.22)
The probability of failure is:
P (z 6= 0|f is constant) = 2
n − 1
2n
· (1− ε). (3.23)
In the case where f is balanced, a result of z 6= 0 represents success, and the
respective probabilities of success and failure are:
P (z 6= 0|f is balanced) = ε+ 2
n − 1
2n
· (1− ε), (3.24)
P (z = 0|f is balanced) = (1− ε)/2n. (3.25)
Note that as I mentioned in §3.2.1, mixed states can in general be prepared in a
variety of ways. What I have above called the ‘most natural’ state preparation
procedure associated with (3.21), in particular, is only one of many possible state
preparations that will yield an identical density matrix ρ. For ease of exposition,
and in order to see clearly why Eqs. (3.22-3.25) hold, it was easiest to assume, as I
did above, that the system has been prepared in the way most naturally suggested
by (3.21). But note that there is no loss of generality here; the identities (3.22-3.25)
do not depend on the fact that we have used this particular preparation procedure.
In any case, consider the alternative to the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm of
performing classical function calls on f with the object of determining f ’s type.
The reader should convince herself that a single such call, regardless of the result,
will not change the probability of correctly guessing the type of the function f .
Thus the amount of information about f ’s type that is gained from a single classical
function call is zero.23 On the other hand, as we should expect given (3.22-3.25), for
the mixed-state version of the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm, it can be shown that the
23This information gain is referred to as the mutual information between two variables (in this
case, between the type of the function and the result of a function call). For more on the mutual
information and other information-theoretic concepts, see Appendix B.
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information gained from a single invocation of the algorithm is greater than zero for
all positive ε, and that this is the case even when ε < 1
1+22n−1
; i.e., the threshold
below which ρ no longer qualifies as an entangled state. Indeed, this is the case even
when ε is arbitrarily small (cf. Biham et al., 2004), although the information gain in
this case is likewise vanishingly small.
Explaining speedup in the mixed-state Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm
The first question that needs to be answered here is whether the sub-exponential
gain in efficiency that is realised by the mixed-state Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm should
qualify as quantum speedup at all. On the one hand, from the point of view of
computational complexity theory (cf. Appendix A), the solution to the
Deutsch-Jozsa problem provided by this algorithm is no more efficient than a
classical solution: from a complexity-theoretic point of view, a solution S1 to a
problem P is deemed to be just as efficient as a solution S2 so long as S1 requires at
most a polynomial increase in the (time or space) resources required to solve P as
compared with S2. From this point of view, only an exponential reduction in time
or space resources can qualify as a true increase in efficiency. Clearly, the
mixed-state Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm does not yield a speedup over classical
solutions, in this sense, when ε is small. In fact it can be shown (Vedral, 2010, 1148)
that exponential speedup, and hence a true increase in efficiency from a
complexity-theoretic point of view, is achievable only when ε is large enough for the
state to qualify as an entangled state.
On the other hand, there is a very real difference, in terms of the amount of
information gained, between one invocation of the black box (3.21) and a single
classical function call—which is all the more striking since the amount of
information one can gain from a single classical function call is actually zero.
Further, one should not lose sight of the fact that the complexity-theoretic
characterisation of efficient algorithms is artificial and, in a certain sense, arbitrary.
For instance, on the complexity-theoretic characterisation of computational
efficiency, a problem, which for input size n, requires ≈ n1000 steps to solve is
polynomial in terms of time resources in n and thus tractable, while a problem that
requires ≈ 2n/1000 steps to solve is exponential in terms of time resources in n and
therefore considered to be intractable. In this case, however, the ‘intractable’
problem will typically require much less time to compute than the ‘tractable’
problem, for all but very large n.24 Such extraordinary examples aside, for most
24For example, for n = 1, 000, 000, the easy problem requires (106)1000 = 106000 steps to
49
practical purposes the complexity-theoretic characterisation of efficiency is a good
one. Nevertheless it is important to keep in mind that this is a practical definition
of efficiency which does not reflect any deep mathematical truth or make any deep
ontological claim about what is and is not efficient in the common or pre-theoretic
sense of that term.
But let us come back now from this slight digression to our main discussion, and
let us consider the question of whether entanglement plays a role in the speedup
exhibited by this mixed state. The strongest argument in favour of a negative
answer to this question is, I believe, the following. Recall that what I have called
the ‘most natural’ state preparation procedure associated with (3.21) is only one of
many possible ways to prepare the system represented by ρ. It is possible to prepare
the system in an alternate way if we so desire. Likewise, when ε is sufficiently small,
it is possible to prepare the final state of the computer, ρfin, as a mixture of
product states. This, in fact, is the significance of asserting that ρfin is unentangled.
Thus while the state preparation most naturally suggested by (3.21) may well
function as a conceptual tool for finding mixed quantum states that display a
computational advantage (i.e., by enabling a facile derivation of the identities
(3.22-3.25)), once found, it seems as though we may do away with this way of
thinking of the system entirely. Hence there seems to be no need to invoke
entanglement in order to explain the speedup obtainable with this state.
I believe this line of reasoning to be misleading, however, for it emphasises the
abstract density operator representation of the computational state at the cost of
obscuring the nature of the computational process that is actually occurring in the
computer. To the point: the density operator corresponding to a quantum system
should not be understood as a representation of the actual physical state of the
system. Rather, the density operator representation of a quantum system should be
understood as a representation of our knowledge of the space of physical states that
the system can possibly be in, and of our ignorance as to which of these physical
states the system is actually in.
From the point of view of quantum mechanics, it is pure states of quantum
systems which should be seen as representations of the ‘actual’ physical states of
such systems, for pure states represent the most specific description of a system that
is possible from within the theory. I have enclosed the word actual within inverted
commas in the preceding sentence in order to emphasise the weakness of the claim I
am making. This claim is not intended to rule out that there may be a deeper
complete while the hard problem requires 21000 steps.
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physical theory underlying quantum mechanics, within which quantum mechanical
pure states can be seen as merely derivative representations. Nor is it intended to
rule out that quantum mechanics only incompletely (as a matter of principle)
specifies the nature of the physical world. I am only making what should be the
uncontroversial claim that relative to quantum mechanics itself, pure states should
be interpreted as those which are most fundamental, in the sense that they
represent a maximally specific description, within the theory, of the systems in
question—i.e., they represent the best grasp available, from within that theory, of
the real physical situation.
Physics is the science of what is real, in the very minimal sense that physical
concepts purport to give us some idea of what the world is like. And if pure states
represent the best possible, i.e., the most specific, representation of the physical
situation from the point of view of a theory, then with right should they be treated
as the more fundamental concepts of the theory. Mixed states, on the other hand,
should be seen as derivative in the sense that they are abstract characterisations of
our knowledge of the space of pure states a system may be possibly in,25 and of our
ignorance of precisely which state within this space the system is actually in.
If the reader accepts this difference in fundamental status that I have accorded
to pure and mixed quantum states,26 then she should agree that if it is an
explanation of the physical process actually occurring in the computer that we
desire, then it will not do to limit ourselves to analysing the characteristics of the
computer’s ‘black box’ mixed state; rather, we should attempt to give a more
detailed ‘white box’ characterisation of the operation of the computer in terms of its
25If one prefers, one can think of a mixed state as a statistical state, representing the mean
values of a hypothetical ensemble of systems. The difference is inessential to this discussion.
26My claim is intended to be weak enough to be compatible with interpretations of the
quantum state such as Spekkens’s, in which quantum states are analogous to the state descriptions
of his toy theory (cf. Appendix F), in that they represent maximal, though in principle incomplete,
knowledge of the system in question. It is also intended to be compatible with Fuchs’s statement
that “... the quantum state represents a collection of subjective degrees of belief about something
to do with that system ...” (Fuchs, 2003, 989-990). Nevertheless, the compatibility of my claim
with Fuchs’s and Spekkens’s views may be doubted by some. This is not the place to attempt to
give a reading of either Fuchs’s or Spekkens’s opinions on the interpretation of the quantum state
description, however. While I may be incorrect as regards the compatibility of my claim with their
views, I hope that most readers will, regardless, appreciate the benign nature of and be agreeable
to the claim that I am making here. In any case I will be assuming it in the remainder of this
dissertation. (For a more in-depth treatment of Fuchs’s and Spekkens’s interpretation of the
quantum state description, see: Tait 2012.)
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underlying pure states. Recall the fact—which we noted in our earlier discussion of
de-quantisation—that the unitary evolution (2.3) is, in general, an entangling
evolution; i.e., it will take pure product states, such as, for instance, |0n〉|1〉, to
entangled states. Now imagine that the computer is initially prepared in the most
natural way suggested by the pseudo-pure state representation (3.21). Call this
‘most natural’ state preparation: sini. Imagine further that the computer evolves in
accordance with the entangling unitary transformation Uf . This will yield the
transformation
|0n〉|1〉 Uf−→ |φ〉
with probability ε, and the transformation
I
Uf−→ I
with probability 1− ε, where |φ〉 is an entangled state. Thus at the end of the
computation, the system will be in the state |φ〉 with probability ε and in the state
I with probability 1− ε. Call this combination of possible states for the system
sfin. Now at the end of the computation, the state of the computer will be
expressible by means of the density operator
ρfin = ε|φ〉〈φ|+ (1− ε)I .
The most natural way that suggests itself for preparing the system represented by
ρfin is sfin. However, one may instead imagine a state preparation procedure s
′
fin
involving only product states that would result in an equivalent density operator
representation. Because of this, it is concluded by some that entanglement plays no
role in the computational advantage exhibited by the computer in this case.
The significance of the fact that Uf is an entangling evolution, however, is that
sini, evolved in accordance with Uf , will not result in the combination of states
s′fin—rather, it will result in the combination of states sfin. Since both state
preparations, sfin and s
′
fin, yield the same density matrix representation, they are,
from this point of view, equivalent, but one cannot directly obtain s′fin from an
application of Uf to sini.
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27I am indebted to Wayne Myrvold for suggesting this line of thought, and for helping to clear
up the conceptual confusions regarding this issue that have plagued me to date. I am also indebted
to the discussion in Jozsa & Linden (2003, §5). I should note, also, that Long et al. (2002) make a
similar point to the one made here; but in making it they unnecessarily rely on interpreting the
density matrix of a system as representing the average values of a physical ensemble (i.e. of an
52
What of the fact, however, that ε in the state preparation sfin may be
vanishingly small in principle and yet still lead to a computational advantage—does
not this tell against attributing the speedup exhibited by the computer to
entanglement? I do not believe it does. One must not lose sight of the fact that
“vanishingly small” 6= 0. If ε were actually equal to zero, it is evident that there
would, in fact, be no performance advantage.
It is interesting, nevertheless, to consider the question of what can happen in the
quantum computer when ε = 0; i.e., when the state of the computer initially just is
the totally mixed state I . Note that this does not signify that it is impossible for
the computer to actually have been prepared in the pure state |0n〉|1〉 initially.
Rather, it represents the circumstance where we are completely ignorant of the
initial state preparation of the quantum computer; for instance, if the computer has
been prepared as an equally weighted mixture of the basis states:
ρini = I =
1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉〈x|. (3.26)
Suppose then, that the quantum computer, represented by the density operator
ρini = I , actually is in |0n〉|1〉 at the start of the computation. Is a computational
process occurring which would enable quantum speedup? From one point of view,
the answer is yes, for the entangling unitary evolution Uf evolves the computer to
an entangled state which is then capable of being utilised in principle in order to
solve the problem under consideration with fewer computational resources than a
classical computer. In fact, it is not even necessary for the computer to actually be
in the state |0n〉|1〉 initially to enable a performance advantage. As long as we know,
or at least are not completely ignorant of, the actual initial pure state of the
computer, any of the basis states can, with suitable manipulation, be used to obtain
a performance advantage.
From another point of view, however, the answer is no, for because we are
completely ignorant as to the actual initial state of the computer, we will be
completely ignorant as to which operation to perform in order to take advantage of
this resource. This sounds paradoxical, but I think it rather illustrates a distinction
that needs to be drawn here which will recur more than once in this dissertation:
between what is actually occurring in a physical system, on the one hand, and the
actual collection of physical systems). The objection is equally forceful, however, whether one
thinks of the mixed state as representing a physical or a statistical ensemble, and whether one
thinks of the probabilities as ignorance probabilities or as representing relative frequencies.
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use which can be made of it by us, who are attempting to achieve some particular
end. In the example we are considering here there assuredly is a process occurring
in the computer that is of the right sort to enable a quantum speedup, but because
we are completely ignorant of the computer’s initial state—i.e., because there is too
much ‘noise’ in the computer—we are unable to take advantage of it to achieve the
end of solving the Deutsch-Jozsa problem using fewer computational resources than
a classical computer.
3.5.2 The power of one qubit
In the last subsection we saw that it is possible to achieve a sub-exponential
speedup for the Deutsch-Jozsa problem with an unentangled mixed-state. We
concluded that while this does disprove the NEST, it does not constitute a
counter-example to the NEXT, since the computational algorithm in question is
successful only when the evolution of the state of the computer is an entangling
evolution; therefore the underlying final state of the computer will always contain
some entanglement despite the fact that the density operator representation of the
final state will be unentangled.
We now consider another purported counter-example to the NEXT. This is the
deterministic quantum computation with one qubit (DQC1) model of quantum
computation, which utilises a mixed quantum state to compute the trace of a given
unitary operator and displays an exponential speedup over known classical solutions.
As we will see, the claim sometimes made to the effect that the DQC1 achieves this
speedup without the use of entanglement is unsubstantiated. The NEXT, however,
is not the claim that any state that displays quantum computational speedup must
be entangled. That is the NEST. The NEXT is, rather, the different claim that
entanglement must play a role in any physical explanation of quantum speedup. We
saw in the last section how it is possible for the NEST to be false28 and the NEXT
to be true. In this section I will address the objection that the NEXT is false even if
it is the case that the state of the quantum computer is always entangled. Those
defending such a view claim that another measure of quantum correlations, quantum
discord, is far better suited for the explanatory role. In what follows I will argue
that this conclusion is misguided. Quantum discord is indeed an enormously useful
theoretical quantity for characterising mixed-state quantum computation—perhaps
even more useful than entanglement. Nevertheless, more than just pragmatic
28I mean false in the technical sense explained in §3.2.1.
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Figure 3.1: The DQC1 algorithm for computing the trace of a unitary operator.
considerations must be appealed to if one is to make the case that a particular
feature of quantum systems explains quantum speedup. Thus I will argue that when
one looks deeper, and considers the quantum state from the multi-partite point of
view, one finds that entanglement is involved in the production, and even in the
very definition, of quantum discord; indeed, there are some preliminary indications
that quantum discord is, in fact, but a manifestation of and not conceptually
distinct from entanglement.
The DQC1
In the DQC1, or as it is sometimes called: ‘the power of one qubit’, model of
quantum computation (cf. Knill & Laflamme, 1998),29 a collection of n ‘unpolarised’
qubits in the completely mixed state In/2
n is coupled to a single ‘polarised’ control
qubit, initialised to 1/2(I + αZ). When the polarisation, α, is equal to 1, the
control qubit is in the pure state |0〉〈0| = 1/2(I + Z), otherwise it is in a mixed
state. The problem is to compute the trace of an arbitrary n-qubit unitary operator,
Tr(Un). To accomplish this, we begin by applying a Hadamard gate to the control
qubit,30 which is then forwarded as part of the input to a controlled unitary gate
that acts on the n unpolarised qubits (see Figure 3.1). This results in the following
state for all of the n+ 1 qubits:
ρn+1 =
1
2n+1
(|0〉〈0| ⊗ In + |1〉〈1| ⊗ In + α|0〉〈1| ⊗ U †n + α|1〉〈0| ⊗ Un)
=
1
2n+1
(
In αU
†
n
αUn In
)
. (3.27)
29In this exposition of the DQC1, I am closely following (Datta et al., 2005).
30This will yield, for instance, when the control qubit is pure,
|0〉〈0| H−→ 12
(|0〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|).
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The reduced state of the control qubit is
ρc =
(
1 αTr(Un)
†
αTr(Un) 1
)
,
thus the trace of Un can be retrieved by applying the X and Y Pauli operators to
ρc. In particular, the expectation values of the X and Y operators will yield the real
and imaginary parts of the trace, 〈X〉 = Re[Tr(Un)]/2n and 〈Y 〉 = −Im[Tr(Un)]/2n,
respectively; so in order to determine, for instance, the real part, we run the circuit
repeatedly, measuring X on the control qubit at the end of each run, while assuming
that the results are part of a distribution whose mean is the real part of the trace.
Classically, the problem of evaluating the trace of a unitary matrix is believed to
be hard, however for the quantum algorithm it can be shown that the number of
runs required does not scale exponentially with n, yielding an exponential
advantage for the DQC1 quantum computer. When α < 1, the expectation values,
〈X〉 and 〈Y 〉, are reduced by a factor of α and it becomes correspondingly more
difficult to estimate the trace. However as long as the control qubit has non-zero
polarisation, the model still provides an efficient method for estimating the trace
(and thus an exponential speedup over any known classical solution) in spite of this
additional overhead.
We might ask whether, in a way analogous to the mixed-state Deutsch-Jozsa
algorithm, we can make α small enough so that the overall state of the DQC1 is
demonstrably separable. The answer seems to be no. On the one hand, for any
system of n+ 1 qubits there is a ball of radius r (measured by the Hilbert-Schmidt
norm and centred at the completely mixed state), within which all states are
separable (Braunstein et al., 1999; Gurvits & Barnum, 2003). On the other hand,
the state of the DQC1 is at all times at a fixed distance α2−(n+1)/2 from the
completely mixed state. Unfortunately the radius of the separable ball decreases
exponentially faster than 2−(n+1)/2 (Datta et al., 2005, 2).
Thus, as (Datta et al., 2005, 2) assert, there appears to be good reason to
suspect that the state (3.27) is an entangled state, at least for some Un; but it is not
obvious where this entanglement is. On the one hand, there is no bipartite
entanglement among the n unpolarised qubits. On the other hand the most natural
bipartite split of the system, with the control qubit playing the role of the first
subsystem and the remaining qubits playing the role of the second, reveals no
entanglement between the two subsystems, regardless of the choice of Un. When
α > 1/2, entanglement can be found when we examine other bipartite divisions
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Figure 3.2: Some of the bipartite splits possible in the DQC1 for n = 4. No
entanglement can ever occur amongst the n unpolarised qubits (a) or between the
polarised qubit and the rest (b); however, bipartite splits such as (c), (d), and (e) can
exhibit entanglement (Datta et al., 2005).
amongst the n+ 1 qubits (see Figure 3.2), however, besides being exceedingly
difficult to detect, the amount of entanglement in the state (as measured by the
multiplicative negativity; cf. §3.2.2) becomes vanishingly small as n gets large.
Commenting on this circumstance, Datta et al. (2005, 13) write “This hints that the
key to computational speedup might be the global character of the entanglement,
rather than the amount of the entanglement. ... what happier motto can we find for
this state of affairs than Multam ex Parvo, or A Lot out of A Little.”
Others have expressed a different viewpoint on the matter. In fact, both the
DQC1 and the mixed-state version of the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm have led many
(see for instance, Vedral 2010) to seriously question whether entanglement plays a
necessary role in the explanation of quantum speedup. The result has been a shift
in investigative focus from entanglement to other types of quantum correlations.
One alternative in particular, quantum discord (which I will explain in more detail
shortly), has received much attention in the literature in recent years (see, e.g.,
Merali, 2011).
On the one hand, the following facts all seem to run counter to the NEXT: there
is no entanglement in the DQC1 circuit between the polarised and unpolarised
qubits—the most natural bipartite split that suggests itself—during a computation;
tests to detect entanglement along other bipartite splits in the DQC1 when α ≤ 1/2
have thus far been unsuccessful;31 and finally, even when α is relatively large, only a
vanishingly small amount of entanglement can be found in the state of the DQC1
(3.27). On the other hand, when we consider the correlations between the polarised
31The criterion used by Datta et al. (2005) to detect entanglement is the Peres-Horodecki, or
Positive Partial Transpose (PPT) criterion (Peres, 1996; Horodecki et al., 1996). The partial
transpose of a bipartite system,
∑
ijkl p
ij
kl|i〉〈j| ⊗ |k〉〈l| acting on HA ⊗HB is defined (with respect
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and unpolarised qubits from the point of view of quantum discord, it turns out that
the discord at the end of the computation is always non-zero along this bipartite
split for any α > 0 (Datta et al., 2008). Datta et al. (2008, 4) therefore write, and I
agree, that “for some purposes, quantum discord might be a better figure of merit
for characterizing the quantum resources available to a quantum information
processor.” All the same, as I will argue below, it is a mistake to conclude as they
and others do that the NEXT is false; i.e., that entanglement may play no role in
the explanation of the quantum speedup of the DQC1 (Datta et al., 2008; Vedral,
2010; Merali, 2011); for the NEXT is compatible with all of these facts.
Quantum discord
Quantum discord (Zurek, 2000; Henderson & Vedral, 2001; Ollivier & Zurek,
2002)32 quantifies the difference between the quantum generalisations of two
classically equivalent measures of mutual information,33
Ic(A : B) = H(A) +H(B)−H(A,B), (3.28)
Jc(A : B) = H(A)−H(A|B). (3.29)
to the system B) as:
ρTB ≡ (I ⊗ T )ρ =
∑
ijkl
pijkl|i〉〈j| ⊗ (|k〉〈l|)T =
∑
ijkl
pijkl|i〉〈j| ⊗ |l〉〈k|,
where T is the transpose map on matrices. The PPT criterion states that, if ρ is a separable state,
then the partial transpose of ρ has non-negative eigenvalues. Satisfying the PPT criterion is a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the joint density matrix of two systems to be separable.
While Datta et al. were unable to detect entanglement in the DQC1 (along any bipartite split) for
the case of α ≤ 1/2, they nevertheless note that it is very likely that both entanglement and bound
entanglement are present in the state. A state exhibits bound entanglement (cf. Hyllus et al., 2004)
when, in spite of the fact that it is entangled, no pure entangled state can be obtained from it by
means of LOCC operations. One important characteristic of bound entangled states is that they
(at least sometimes) satisfy the PPT criterion despite the fact that they are entangled.
32Quantum discord was introduced independently by both Henderson & Vedral and by
Ollivier & Zurek, with slight differences in their respective formulations (Henderson & Vedral
consider not just projective measurements but positive operator valued measures more generally).
These and other alternative formulations of quantum discord do not differ in essentials. The
definition of discord I introduce here is Ollivier & Zurek’s.
33See Appendix B for an overview of the basic concepts of classical and quantum information
theory.
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These two expressions are not equivalent quantum mechanically, for while (3.28) has
a straightforward quantum generalisation in terms of the von Neumann entropy S:
Iq(A : B) = S(A) + S(B)− S(A,B), (3.30)
things are more complicated for the quantum generalisation of (3.29). The quantum
counterpart, S(A|B), to the conditional entropy requires a specification of the
information content of A given a determination of the state of B. Determining the
state of B requires a measurement, however, which requires the choice of an
observable. But in quantum mechanics observables are, in general, non-commuting.
Thus the conditional entropy will be different depending on the observable we
choose to measure on B. If, for simplicity, we consider only perfect measurements,
represented by a set of one dimensional projection operators, {ΠBj }, this yields, for
the quantum version of (3.29), the expression:
Jq(A : B) = S(A)− S(A|{ΠBj }). (3.31)
We now define discord as the minimum value (taken over {ΠBj }) of the difference
between (3.30) and (3.31):
D(A,B) ≡ min{ΠBj }Iq(A : B)−Jq(A : B). (3.32)
Discord is, in general, non-zero for mixed states, while for pure states it effectively
becomes a measure of entanglement (Datta et al., 2008, 3); i.e., for pure states it is
equivalent to the entropy of entanglement (cf. §3.2.2).
Interestingly, there are some mixed states which, though separable, exhibit
non-zero quantum discord. For instance, consider the following bipartite state:
ρdisc =
1
2
(|0〉〈0|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B) + 1
2
(|1〉〈1|A ⊗ |+〉〈+|B). (3.33)
This state is obviously separable. Since |0〉 and |+〉 are non-orthogonal states,
however, Jq(A : B) will yield a different value depending on the experiment
performed on system B; and thus this state will yield a non-zero quantum discord.
Note that this is impossible for a classical state: classically, it is always possible to
prepare a state as a mixture of orthogonal product states.
In most of the literature on this topic, one is introduced to quantum discord as a
quantifier of the non-classical correlations present in a state which are not
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necessarily identifiable with entanglement. Such an interpretation of the significance
of this quantity is supported by the fact that, in the classical scenario at least, the
mutual information contained in a system of two random variables is held to be
representative of the extent of the correlations between them. Since the quantum
generalisations of the two classically equivalent measures of mutual information
Ic(A : B) and Jc(A : B) are not equivalent, then, this is taken to represent the
presence of non-classical correlations over and above the classical ones, some, but
not all of which may be accounted for by entanglement, and some by ‘quantum
discord’.
Interpreting discord as a type of non-classical correlation is nevertheless
puzzling. Consider, for instance, a classically correlated state represented by the
following probability distribution:
1
2
([+]l, [+]r) +
1
2
[−]l[−]r. (3.34)
Here, let [·]l represent the circumstance that Linda (in Liverpool) finds a letter in
her mailbox today containing a piece of paper on which is inscribed the specified
symbol (+ or −), and let [·]r represent the occurrence of a similar circumstance for
Robert (in Ravenna). According to the probability distribution, it is equally likely
that they both receive a letter today inscribed with + as it is that they both receive
one inscribed with −, but it cannot happen that they each today receive letters with
non-matching symbols. These correlations are easily explainable classically, of
course. It so happens that yesterday I flipped a fair coin. I observed the result of
the toss and accordingly jotted down either + or − on a piece of paper, photocopied
it, and sent one copy each to Robert in Ravenna and Linda in Liverpool (by
overnight courier, of course).
A quantum analogue for classically correlated states such as (3.34) is a mixed
state decomposable into product states:
∑
ij
pij|i〉〈i| ⊗ |j〉〈j| (3.35)
such that the |i〉 and |j〉 are mutually orthogonal sub-states of the first and second
subsystem, respectively. For such a state it is easy to provide a ‘hidden variables’
explanation, similar to the one above, that will account for the observed
probabilities of joint experiments on the two subsystems.
We can equally give such a local hidden variables account of the discordant state
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ρdisc: tossing a fair coin, I prepare the state |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B if the coin lands heads,
and |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |+〉〈+|B if it lands tails. Let Pr(X, Y |a, b, λ) refer to the probability
that Alice’s a-experiment and Bob’s b-experiment determine their qubits to be in
states X and Y , respectively, given that the result of the coin toss is λ. Then
(omitting bras and kets for readability):
Pr(0, 0|zˆ, zˆ, H) = Pr(0, ·|zˆ, ·, H)× Pr(·, 0|·, zˆ, H) = 1,
P r(1, 1|zˆ, zˆ, T ) = Pr(1, ·|zˆ, ·, T )× Pr(·, 1|·, zˆ, T ) = 1/2,
P r(0,+|zˆ, xˆ, H) = Pr(0, ·|zˆ, ·, H)× Pr(·,+|·, xˆ, H) = 1/2,
P r(1,+|zˆ, xˆ, T ) = Pr(1, ·|zˆ, ·, T )× Pr(·,+|·, xˆ, T ) = 1,
and so on. More generally, Pr(X, Y |a, b, λ) = Pr(X, ·|a, ·, λ)× Pr(·, Y |·, b, λ). Thus
once we specify the value of λ there are no remaining correlations in the system and
the probabilities for joint experiments are factorisable. This should be unsurprising.
Given a specification of λ, the state of the system is in a product state, after all, and
thus can be prepared (as we saw earlier) using only LOCC operations.
Contrast this with an entangled quantum system such as, for instance, the one
represented by the pure state
|Φ+〉 = |00〉+ |11〉√
2
.
Bell’s theorem (to be discussed in more detail in the following chapters)
demonstrates that the correlations between subsystems present in such a state
cannot be reproduced by any local hidden variables theory in the manner described
above. These correlations are non-classical.
There is certainly something non-classical about a state such as ρdisc; viz., a
quantum state such as ρdisc, though separable, cannot be prepared as a mixture of
orthogonal product states. Yet it is always possible to so prepare classical states. As
a result, the information one can gain about Alice’s system through an experiment
in the {+,−} basis on Bob’s system will be different from the information one can
gain about Alice’s system through an experiment in the computational basis on
Bob’s system. On the one hand, in the absence of a specification of a hidden
parameter such as λ, given an experiment on B in the computational basis which
determines B to be in state |0〉, it is still unclear, because of the way in which
system B was prepared, whether the joint system is in the state |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 or in the
state |1〉 ⊗ |+〉. Given an experiment on B in the {+,−} basis which yields |+〉, on
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the other hand, it is perfectly clear which product state the joint system is in. But
these facts by themselves are certainly not indicative of the presence of non-classical
correlations between the two subsystems.
There is one indirect sense, however, in which ρdisc can be said to contain
non-classical correlations. Recall from §3.2.3 that any mixture can be considered as
the result of taking the partial trace of a pure entangled state on a larger Hilbert
space. Given that, as I argued in §3.5.1, the pure state representation of a quantum
system should be taken as fundamental, we can consider the bipartite state ρdisc as
in reality but a partial representation of a tripartite entangled quantum system,
where the third party is an external environment with enough degrees of freedom to
purify the overall system. And since entangled systems do not admit of a
description in terms of local hidden variables (or, if one prefers, in terms of LOCC),
it follows that the system partially represented by ρdisc can legitimately be said to
contain non-classical correlations.
Even so it is unclear how these non-classical correlations per se can have
anything to do with the quantum discord exhibited by ρdisc, for it is also the case
that a classically correlated mixture of orthogonal product states, i.e. one of the
form (3.35), can be purified in just the same way as a discordant one and hence also
the case that it can be given a multi-partite representation in which entanglement is
present.
As we will now see, however, there is in fact a tight relationship between the
amount of discord associated with a bipartite mixed state and the amount of
entanglement associated with a tripartite representation of that state. And,
interestingly from our point of view, what emerges from this is a correspondingly
tight relationship between the quantum speedup exhibited by the DQC1 and the
amount of entanglement associated with its purified tripartite representation, and
thus a confirmation, not a refutation, of the NEXT.
Explaining speedup in the DQC1
Quantum discord was introduced independently by Henderson & Vedral and by
Ollivier & Zurek in 2001 and 2002, respectively; however, it was only recently given
an operational interpretation, independently by Madhok & Datta (2011) and by
Cavalcanti et al. (2011).34 On both characterisations, quantum discord is
operationally defined in terms of the entanglement consumed in an extended version
34I present here the definition given by Cavalcanti et al., although the conclusion I will draw is
the same regardless of which definition is used.
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of the quantum state merging protocol (cf. Horodecki et al., 2005).
In the quantum state merging protocol, three parties: Alice, Bob, and
Cassandra, share a state |ψABC〉. Quantum state merging characterises the process,
|ψABC〉 → |ψB′BC〉,
by which Alice effectively transfers her part of the system to Bob while maintaining
its coherence with Cassandra’s part. It turns out that in order to effect this protocol
a certain amount of entanglement must be consumed (quantified on the basis of the
quantum conditional entropy, S(A|B); cf. Appendix B.). When we add to this the
amount of entanglement needed (as quantified by the entanglement of formation; cf.
§3.2.2) to prepare the state |ψABC〉 to begin with, the result is a quantity identical
to the quantum discord between the subsystems belonging to Alice and Cassandra
at the time the state is prepared.
The foregoing operational interpretation of discord has an affinity with an
illuminating analysis of the DQC1 circuit due to Fanchini et al. (2011).
Fanchini et al. show that a relationship between quantum discord and entanglement
emerges when we consider the DQC1 circuit, not as a bipartite system composed of
polarised and unpolarised qubits respectively, but as a tripartite system in which
the environment plays the role of the third subsystem. Fanchini et al. note that an
alternate way of characterising the completely mixed state of the unpolarised
qubits, In/2
n, is to view it as part of a bipartite entangled state, with the second
party an external environment having enough degrees of freedom to purify the
overall system. This yields a tripartite representation for the DQC1 circuit as a
whole (see Figure 3.3).
Fanchini et al. show that, for an arbitrary tripartite pure state, there is a
conservation relation between entanglement of formation and quantum discord. In
particular, the sum of the bipartite entanglement that is shared between a
particular subsystem and the other subsystems of the system cannot be increased
without increasing the sum of the quantum discord between this subsystem and the
other subsystems as well (and vice versa). In the DQC1, after the application of the
controlled not gate (see Figure 3.1), there is an increase in the quantum discord
between B and A. This therefore necessarily involves a corresponding increase in
the entanglement between A and the combined system BE. All of this accords with
what we would expect given the above operational interpretation of quantum
discord: an increase in quantum discord requires an increase in the entanglement
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.3: A (pure) tripartite representation of the elements of the DQC1 protocol
before (a) and after (b) the application of the controlled not gate. Black and grey
thunderbolts represent entanglement and discord, respectively. After the application of
the controlled not gate, there is an increase in the discord between A and B and a
corresponding increase in the entanglement between A and the combined system BE.
available for consumption in a potential quantum state merging process.
Note also that from this tripartite point of view, there is just as much
entanglement in the circuit as there is discord; in particular, exactly as for quantum
discord, there is entanglement in the circuit whenever it displays a quantum
speedup, i.e., for any α > 0.
Fanchini et al. speculate that it is not the presence of entanglement or discord
(however the latter is interpreted) per se that is necessary for the quantum speedup
of the DQC1, but rather the ability of the circuit to redistribute entanglement and
discord. This thought seems to be confirmed by a theoretical result of
Brodutch & Terno (2011), who show that shared entanglement is required in order
for two parties to bilocally implement35 any bipartite quantum gate—even one that
operates on a restricted set L of unentangled input states and transforms them into
unentangled output states. This means, in particular, that entanglement is required
in order to implement a gate that changes the discord of a quantum state.
By themselves, these considerations already amount to confirmations of the
NEXT, for entanglement appears to be involved in the very definition of discord,
and it appears that we require entanglement even for the production of discord in a
quantum circuit. But in addition, there are indications that quantum discord need
not be appealed to at all to give an account of quantum speedup (though such a
characterisation will of course be less practical, as I have already mentioned), in
light of one other recent theoretical result. Devi et al. (2008; 2011) have pointed out
that more general measurement schemes than the positive operator valued measures
(POVM) used thus far exist for characterising the correlations present in bipartite
quantum systems.
POVMs are associated with completely positive maps and are well suited for
35Bilocal implementation means, in this context, an implementation in which Alice and Bob are
limited to LOCC operations.
64
describing the evolution of a system when we can view the system as uncorrelated
with its external environment. When the system is initially correlated with the
environment, however, the reduced dynamics of the system may, according to
Devi et al., be ‘not completely positive’. But as Devi et al. show, from the point of
view of a measurement scheme that incorporates not completely positive maps in
addition to completely positive maps, all quantum correlations reduce to
entanglement.
In sum, it is, I believe, unsurprising that on the standard analysis the DQC1
circuit displays strange and anomalous correlations in the form of quantum discord,
for the DQC1 is typically characterised as a bipartite system, and from the point of
view of a measurement framework that incorporates only completely positive maps.
As Fanchini et al. have shown, however, the DQC1 circuit is more properly
characterised, not as an isolated system, but as a system initially correlated with an
external environment. The evolution of such a system is best captured by a
measurement framework incorporating not completely positive maps, and within
such a framework, the anomalous correlations disappear and are subsumed under
entanglement. From this point of view the equivalence of entanglement and discord
for pure bipartite states is also unsurprising, for it is precisely pure states for which
the correlation with the environment can be ignored and for which a framework
incorporating only completely positive maps is appropriate.
The use of not completely positive maps to characterise the evolution of open
quantum systems is not wholly without its detractors. The question of whether such
not completely positive maps are ‘unphysical’ is an interesting and important one,
though I will not address it here.36 But regardless of the answer to this question, it
should be clear, even without the appeal to this more general framework, that
entanglement has not been shown to be unnecessary for quantum computational
speedup. Far from being a counter-example to the NEXT, the DQC1 model of
quantum computation rather serves to illuminate the crucial role that entanglement
plays in the quantum speedup displayed by this computer.
3.6 Conclusion
Quantum entanglement is considered by many to be a necessary resource that is
used to advantage by a quantum computer in order to achieve a speedup over
36For a more detailed discussion, and qualified defence of the use of not completely positive
maps, see Cuffaro & Myrvold (2012).
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classical computation. Given Jozsa & Linden’s and Abbott’s general results for pure
states, and given that, as I argued in §3.5.1, a pure state should be considered as
the most fundamental representation of a quantum system possible in quantum
mechanics, the burden is upon those who deny the NEXT to either produce a
counter-example or to show, in some other more principled way, why the view is
false. We examined two such counter-examples in this chapter. Upon closer
examination we found neither of these, neither the sub-exponential speedup of the
unentangled mixed-state version of the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm, nor the
exponential speedup of the DQC1 model of quantum computation, demonstrate
that entanglement is unnecessary for quantum speedup; they rather make clearer
than before the role that entanglement does play, and point the way to a fuller
understanding of both entanglement and quantum computation.
3.7 Next steps
We have just concluded that entanglement is a necessary component of any
explanation of quantum speedup—that the NEXT is true. The natural next
question to ask is whether entanglement is also sufficient. This question, in turn,
can be divided into two sub-questions. First: is entanglement a sufficient resource to
enable quantum speedup? And second: does entanglement suffice to explain
quantum speedup. The answer to both of these questions, I will argue, is yes. We
will consider the first question in Chapter 4 and the second in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
Entanglement as a Sufficient
Resource to Enable Quantum
Computational Speedup
4.1 Introduction
The answer to the question of whether entanglement is a sufficient resource to
enable quantum computational speedup is commonly held to be no. To support this
conclusion, appeal is usually made to the Gottesman-Knill theorem
(Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, §10.5.4). According to this theorem, any quantum
algorithm or protocol which exclusively utilises the elements of a restricted set of
quantum operations can be re-expressed using an alternative formalism which shows
us how the algorithm can be efficiently simulated by classical means. It so happens
that among the quantum computational algorithms and informational protocols
which exclusively utilise operations from this set are some that are interesting and
important—for instance, the teleportation and superdense coding protocols. And
both of these, and others, involve the use of entangled quantum states.
Reflecting on this circumstance, Jozsa & Linden write, in their influential (2003)
article, in a section entitled Is entanglement a key resource for computational
power? :
Recall that the significance of entanglement for pure-state computations
is derived from the fact that unentangled pure states ... of n qubits have
a description involving poly(n) parameters (in contrast to O(2n)
parameters for a general pure state). But this special property of
67
unentangled states (of having a ‘small’ descriptions [sic.]) is contingent
on a particular mathematical description, as amplitudes in the
computational basis. If we were to adopt some other choice of
mathematical description for quantum states (and their evolution), then,
although it will be mathematically equivalent to the amplitude
description, there will be a different class of states which will now have a
polynomially sized description; i.e. two formulations of a theory which
are mathematically equivalent (and hence equally logically valid) need
not have their corresponding mathematical descriptions of elements of
the theory being [sic.] interconvertible by a polynomially bounded
computation. With this in mind we see that the significance of
entanglement as a resource for quantum computation is not an intrinsic
property of quantum physics itself, but is tied to a particular additional
(arbitrary) choice of mathematical formalism for the theory. ... An
explicit example of an alternative formalism and its implications for the
power of quantum computation is provided by the so-called stabilizer
formalism and the Gottesman-Knill theorem ... Thus, in a fundamental
sense, the power of quantum computation over classical computation
ought to be derived simultaneously from all possible classical
mathematical formalisms for representing quantum theory, not any
single such formalism and associated quality (such as entanglement), ...
(Jozsa & Linden, 2003, 2029-2030).
Similar considerations, presumably, lead Datta et al. to write: “the
Gottesman-Knill theorem ... demonstrates that global entanglement is far from
sufficient for exponential speedup.” (2005, 1). Nielsen & Chuang (2000, ibid.)
writing some years earlier, are, perhaps, more cautious: “The Gottesman-Knill
theorem highlights how subtle is the power of quantum computation. It shows that
some quantum computations involving highly entangled states may be simulated
efficiently on classical computers. ... There is much more to quantum computation
than just the power bestowed by quantum entanglement!” I say that this statement
is more cautious because while Nielsen & Chuang correctly point out that an
entangled quantum state will not, so to speak, yield a quantum speedup of its own
accord, they (intentionally or not) decline to make the stronger claim, suggested in
my above quote of Jozsa & Linden, that further (or perhaps some other) physical
resources besides entanglement (which are, according to Jozsa & Linden, hidden by
the formalism) are required in order to make quantum speedup possible.
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Two distinct claims must be distinguished here. The first is this: the mere
presence of an entangled quantum state is sufficient to realise quantum
computational speedup. The Gottesman-Knill theorem shows, conclusively, that
this claim is false. The second, for our purposes more interesting claim is the
following: quantum entanglement is a resource sufficient to enable, or make possible,
quantum computational speedup; i.e., no other physical resources are required to
make quantum speedup possible if one begins with an entangled quantum system.
This claim, or so I will argue, is true. As I will explain in the remainder of this
chapter, the quantum operations to which the Gottesman-Knill theorem applies are
precisely those which will never cause a qubit to take on an orientation, with respect
to the other subsystems comprising the total system of which it is a part, that
yields a violation of the Bell inequalities. The fact that the Gottesman-Knill
theorem holds should therefore come as no surprise. Given this, I will argue that it
is misleading to conclude that more than entanglement is required to enable
quantum computational speedup.
There is, of course, one sense in which more than just entanglement is required:
in order to outperform a classical computer, a quantum computer realising an
entangled quantum state must utilise more than the relatively small portion of its
state space that is accessible from the Gottesman-Knill group of transformations
alone. It is for this reason that the first thesis which I referred to above is false.
Nevertheless, if one is asked what physical resources are required in order to make
quantum speedup possible, then one can legitimately answer, or so I will argue, that
the answer is no more than quantum entanglement.
The chapter will proceed as follows. After introducing the Gottesman-Knill
theorem and its implications for the classical simulability of certain quantum
algorithms involving quantum entanglement, in §4.2, I then consider Bell’s theorem,
in §4.3, drawing particular attention to the circumstances in which the Bell
inequalities are satisfied by classical hidden variables theories of the quantum state.
In §4.4, I then argue that the possibility of an efficient classical simulation of the
quantum algorithms in question is equally evident from a reflection on Bell’s
theorem as it is from a reflection on the Gottesman-Knill theorem, and I discuss the
implications of this for our understanding of the resources involved in quantum
speedup, coming to the conclusion that I have already mentioned.
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4.2 Preliminaries: The Gottesman-Knill theorem
Call1 an operator A a stabiliser of the state |ψ〉 if
A|ψ〉 = |ψ〉. (4.1)
For instance, consider the Bell state of two qubits:
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉).
For this state we have
(X ⊗X)|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉|1〉+ |0〉|0〉)
=
1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉) = |Φ+〉,
(Z ⊗ Z)|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ (−|1〉)(−|1〉))
=
1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉) = |Φ+〉.
X ⊗X and Z ⊗Z are thus both stabilisers of the state |Φ+〉. Here, X and Z are the
Pauli operators:
X ≡ σ1 ≡ σx ≡
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Z ≡ σ3 ≡ σz ≡
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (4.2)
The remaining Pauli operators, I (the identity operator) and Y , are defined as:
I ≡ σ0 ≡ σI ≡
(
1 0
0 1
)
, Y ≡ σ2 ≡ σy ≡
(
0 −i
i 0
)
. (4.3)
The Pauli group, Pn, of n-fold tensor products of Pauli operators (for instance, for
n = 2, P2 ≡ {I ⊗ I, I ⊗X, I ⊗ Y, I ⊗Z,X ⊗ I,X ⊗X,X ⊗ Y, ...}) is an example of a
group of operators closed under matrix multiplication.
Call the set, VS, of states that are stabilised by every element in S, where S is
some group of operators closed under matrix multiplication, the vector space
stabilised by S. Consider a state |ψ〉 ∈ VS. From the definition of a unitary
1The exegesis of the Gottesman-Knill theorem given here is indebted to that given in
Nielsen & Chuang (2000).
70
operator, we have, for any s ∈ S and any unitary operation U ,
U |ψ〉 = Us|ψ〉 = UsU †U |ψ〉. (4.4)
Thus UsU † stabilises U |ψ〉 and the vector space UVS is stabilised by the group
USU † ≡ {UsU †|s ∈ S}. Consider, for instance, the state |0〉, stabilised by the Z
operator. To determine the stabiliser of this state after it has been subjected to the
(unitary) Hadamard transformation H|0〉 = |+〉 we simply compute HZH†. Thus
the stabiliser of |+〉 is X .
Now let s1, ..., sn be elements of S. s1, ..., sn are said to generate the group S if
every element of S can be written as a product of elements from s1, ..., sn. For
instance, the reader can verify that the subgroup, A, of P3, defined by
A ≡ {I⊗3, Z ⊗ Z ⊗ I, I ⊗ Z ⊗ Z,Z ⊗ I ⊗ Z} can be generated by the elements
{Z ⊗Z ⊗ I, I ⊗Z ⊗Z} (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, §10.5.1). We may thus alternately
express A in terms of its generators as follows: A = 〈Z ⊗ Z ⊗ I, I ⊗ Z ⊗ Z〉.
In order to compute the action of a unitary operator on a group S it suffices to
compute the action of the unitary operator on the generators of S. For instance,
|0〉⊗n is the unique state stabilised by 〈Z1, Z2, ..., Zn〉 (where the latter expression is
a shorthand form of 〈Z ⊗ I⊗n−1, I ⊗ Z ⊗ I⊗n−2, ..., I⊗n−1 ⊗ Z〉). Consequently, the
stabiliser of the state H⊗n|0〉⊗n is 〈X1, X2, ..., Xn〉. Note that this state, expressed in
the standard state vector formalism,
H⊗n|0〉⊗n =
(
1
2n/2
(|0〉+ |1〉)n
)
=
(
1
2n/2
2n−1∑
x
|x〉
)
,
specifies 2n different amplitudes. Contrast this with the stabiliser description of the
state in terms of its generators 〈X1, X2, ..., Xn〉, which is linear in n and thus
capable of an efficient classical representation.
Using the stabiliser formalism, it can be shown that all (as well as all
combinations) of the following gates are capable of an efficient classical
representation: Pauli gates, Hadamard gates, phase gates (i.e.,pi/2 rotations of the
Bloch sphere for a single qubit about the zˆ-axis), and CNOT gates; as well as state
preparation in the computational basis and measurements of the Pauli observables.
This is the content of the Gottesman-Knill theorem (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000,
§10.5.4).
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What is especially notable about this theorem from the point of view of our
discussion is that some of the states which may be realised through the operations
in this set are actually entangled states. In particular, by combining a Hadamard
and a CNOT gate, one can generate any one of the Bell states (which one is
generated depends on the value assigned to the input qubits); i.e.,
|0〉|0〉 H⊗I−−→ |0〉|0〉+ |1〉|0〉√
2
CNOT−−−−→ |0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉√
2
= |Φ+〉,
|0〉|1〉 H⊗I−−→ |0〉|1〉+ |1〉|1〉√
2
CNOT−−−−→ |0〉|1〉+ |1〉|0〉√
2
= |Ψ+〉,
|1〉|0〉 H⊗I−−→ |0〉|0〉 − |1〉|0〉√
2
CNOT−−−−→ |0〉|0〉 − |1〉|1〉√
2
= |Φ−〉,
|1〉|1〉 H⊗I−−→ |0〉|1〉 − |1〉|1〉√
2
CNOT−−−−→ |0〉|1〉 − |1〉|0〉√
2
= |Ψ−〉.
In fact many quantum algorithms utilise just such a combination of gates. One of
these, for instance, is the well-known teleportation algorithm (see Appendix C). If
all of the operations from this set are efficiently classically simulable, however, then
it appears as though entanglement, by itself, cannot be a sufficient resource for
realising quantum speedup, for evidently there are quantum algorithms utilising
entangled states that are efficiently simulable classically.
In what follows I will argue that this conclusion is not warranted. An entangled
state, I will contend, provides sufficient resources to enable quantum computational
speedup. What the Gottesman-Knill theorem actually shows, I will argue, is that,
in certain special cases, the resources provided by an entangled state are not utilised
to their full potential. This becomes especially clear when we consider Bell’s
theorem, and in particular, the circumstances under which the Bell inequalities are
satisfied by classical hidden variables theories of the quantum state. As we will see,
the possibility of an efficient classical simulation of certain quantum algorithms is
equally evident from a consideration of Bell’s theorem as it is from a consideration
of the Gottesman-Knill theorem, and that reflecting on Bell’s theorem helps us to
understand better exactly how quantum entanglement is not being fully exploited in
the quantum algorithms we are considering.
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4.3 Bell’s theorem
For a system in the singlet state (|Ψ−〉), the expectation value for joint experiments
on its subsystems is given by the following expression:
〈σm ⊗ σn〉 = −mˆ · nˆ = − cos θ. (4.5)
Here σm, σn represent spin-m and spin-n experiments on the first (Alice’s) and
second (Bob’s) subsystem, respectively, with mˆ, nˆ the unit vectors representing the
orientations of the two experimental devices, and θ the difference in these
orientations. Note, in particular, that when θ = 0, 〈σm ⊗ σn〉 = −1 (i.e.,
experimental results for the two subsystems are perfectly anti-correlated), when
θ = pi, 〈σm ⊗ σn〉 = 1 (i.e., experimental results for the two subsystems are perfectly
correlated), and when θ = pi/2, 〈σm ⊗ σn〉 = 0 (i.e., experimental results for the two
subsystems are not correlated at all).
Consider the following attempt (Bell, 2004 [1964]) to reproduce the quantum
mechanical predictions for this state by means of a hidden variables theory. Let the
hidden variables of the theory assign, at state preparation, to each subsystem of a
bipartite quantum system, a unit vector λˆ (the same value for λˆ is assigned to each
subsystem) which determines the outcomes of subsequent experiments on the system
as follows. Let the functions Aλ(mˆ), Bλ(nˆ) represent, respectively, the outcome of a
spin-m and a spin-n experiment on Alice’s and Bob’s subsystem. Define these as:
Aλ(mˆ) = sign(mˆ · λˆ),
Bλ(nˆ) = −sign(nˆ · λˆ). (4.6)
where sign(x) is a function which returns the sign (+, -) of its argument.
The reader can verify that the probability that both Aλ(mˆ) and Bλ(nˆ) yield the
same value, and the probability that they yield values that are different (assuming a
uniform probability distribution over λˆ), are respectively:
Pr(+,+) = Pr(−,−) = θ/2pi,
Pr(+,−) = Pr(−,+) = 1
2
(
1− θ
pi
)
, (4.7)
with θ the (positive) angle between mˆ and nˆ. This yields, for the expectation value
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of experiments on the combined state:
〈σm ⊗ σn〉 = 2θ
pi
− 1. (4.8)
When θ is a multiple of pi/2, this expression yields predictions identical to the
quantum mechanical ones: perfect anti-correlation for θ ∈ {0, 2pi, ...}, no correlation
for θ ∈ {pi/2, 3pi/2, ...}, and perfect correlation for θ ∈ {pi, 3pi, ...}. However, for all
other values of θ there are divergences from the quantum mechanical predictions.
It turns out that this is not a special characteristic of the simple hidden
variables theory considered above. No hidden variables theory is able to reproduce
the predictions of quantum mechanics if it makes the very reasonable assumption
that the probabilities of local experiments on Alice’s subsystem (and likewise Bob’s)
are completely determined by Alice’s local experimental setup together with a
hidden variable taken on by the subsystem at the time the joint state is prepared.
Consider the following2 expression relating different spin experiments on Alice’s and
Bob’s respective subsystems for arbitrary directions mˆ, mˆ′, nˆ, nˆ′:
|〈σm ⊗ σn〉+ 〈σm ⊗ σn′〉|+ |〈σm′ ⊗ σn〉 − 〈σm′ ⊗ σn′〉|. (4.9)
As before, let Aλ(mˆ) ∈ {±1}, Bλ(nˆ) ∈ {±1} represent the results, given a
specification of some hidden variable λ, of spin experiments on Alice’s and Bob’s
subsystems. We make no assumptions about the nature of the ‘common cause’ λ
this time—it may take any form. What we do assume is that, as I mentioned above,
the outcomes of Alice’s experiments depend only on her local setup and on the value
of λ; i.e., we do not assume any further dependencies between Alice’s and Bob’s
local experimental configurations. This ‘factorisability’ (cf. Eq. 3.4) allows us to
substitute 〈Aλ(mˆ) · Bλ(nˆ)〉 for 〈σm ⊗ σn〉, thus yielding:
∣∣〈Aλ(mˆ)Bλ(nˆ)〉+ 〈Aλ(mˆ)Bλ(nˆ′)〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈Aλ(mˆ′)Bλ(nˆ)〉− 〈Aλ(mˆ′)Bλ(nˆ′)〉∣∣
=
∣∣〈Aλ(mˆ)(Bλ(nˆ) +Bλ(nˆ′))〉∣∣ + ∣∣〈Aλ(mˆ′)(Bλ(nˆ)− Bλ(nˆ′))〉∣∣
≤ 〈∣∣Aλ(mˆ)(Bλ(nˆ) +Bλ(nˆ′))∣∣〉+ 〈∣∣Aλ(mˆ′)(Bλ(nˆ)− Bλ(nˆ′))∣∣〉, (4.10)
2In this exposition of the CHSH inequality I have followed Myrvold (2008).
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which, since |Aλ(·)| = 1, is
≤ 〈∣∣Bλ(nˆ) +Bλ(nˆ′)∣∣〉 + 〈∣∣Bλ(nˆ)−Bλ(nˆ′)∣∣〉
≤ 2, (4.11)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Bλ(·) can also only take on
values of ±1. This expression, a variant of the ‘Bell inequality’ (2004 [1964]), is
known as the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality (cf. Clauser et al.,
1969; Bell, 2004 [1981]).
Quantum mechanics violates the CHSH inequality for some experimental
configurations. For example, let the system be in the singlet state; i.e., such that its
statistics satisfy (4.5); and let the unit vectors mˆ, mˆ′, nˆ, nˆ′ (taken to lie in the same
plane) have the orientations 0, pi/2, pi/4,−pi/4 respectively. The differences, θ,
between the different orientations (i.e., mˆ− nˆ, mˆ− nˆ′, mˆ′ − nˆ, and mˆ′ − nˆ′) will all
be in multiples of pi/4 and we will have:
〈σm ⊗ σn〉 = 〈σm ⊗ σn′〉 = 〈σm′ ⊗ σn〉 =
√
2/2, (4.12)
〈σm′ ⊗ σn′〉 = −
√
2/2, (4.13)
|〈σm ⊗ σn〉+ 〈σm ⊗ σn′〉|+ |〈σm′ ⊗ σn〉 − 〈σm′ ⊗ σn′〉| = 2
√
2 6≤ 2. (4.14)
The predictions of quantum mechanics for arbitrary orientations mˆ, mˆ′, nˆ, nˆ′
cannot, therefore, be reproduced by a hidden variables theory in which all
correlations between subsystems are due to a common parameter endowed to them
at state preparation. They can, however, be reproduced by such a hidden variables
theory for certain special cases. In particular, the inequality is satisfied (as the
reader can verify) when mˆ and nˆ, mˆ and nˆ′, mˆ′ and nˆ, and mˆ′ and nˆ′ are all
oriented at angles with respect to one another that are given in multiples of pi/2.
4.4 Entanglement as a sufficient resource
Recall the content of the Gottesman-Knill theorem: Pauli gates, Hadamard gates,
phase gates, and CNOT gates; as well as state preparation in the computational
basis and measurements of the Pauli observables are efficiently simulable by a
classical computer. It is commonly concluded, from this, that entanglement cannot
therefore be sufficient to enable a quantum algorithm to achieve a speedup over its
classical counterpart. When one notes that all of the operations which comprise this
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set involve rotations of the Bloch sphere that are multiples of pi/2, however, the fact
that algorithms restricted to just these operations are classically simulable should
come as no surprise. In an entangled quantum system, no amount of kpi/2
transformations of one of the constituent systems will cause it to take on an
orientation with respect to the other subsystems that is not a multiple of pi/2 (unless
it was so oriented initially). And as we have seen above, the statistics of compound
states for which the difference in orientation between subsystems is a multiple of pi/2
are capable in general of being reproduced by a classical hidden variables theory.
In light of this it is misleading, I believe, to conclude, on the basis of the
Gottesman-Knill theorem, that entanglement is not a sufficient resource to enable
quantum computational speedup. What the Gottesman-Knill theorem shows us is
that simply having an entangled state is not enough to enable one to outperform a
classical computer; one must also use such a state to its full potential; i.e., one must
not limit oneself to transformations which utilise only a small portion of the
system’s allowable state space. In this sense, it is indeed correct to say that
entanglement is insufficient to enable quantum speedup. However, if one intends by
the claim that entanglement is insufficient—something very different—that further
physical resources are required to enable speedup, then I submit that this
claim—which is the one most relevant to us—is incorrect.
Consider the individual state spaces of two quantum mechanical systems, Hd11
and Hd22 , where d1 and d2 are the dimensionality of the first and second system,
respectively. In quantum mechanics, the overall state space of the combined system
is given by the tensor product of the two systems, Hd11 ⊗Hd22 , with dimensionality
d1 · d2. Thus the state space of a combined system of n two-dimensional qubits is
⊗nH2, with overall dimensionality 2n. In classical mechanics, on the other hand, the
total state space of two individual subsystems ωd11 , ω
d2
2 is given by the Cartesian
product, ωd11 × ωd22 , with dimensionality d1 + d2. Thus the dimensionality of the
state space of a classical system of n two-dimensional subsystems is 2n.
As Ekert & Jozsa (1998) note, the possibility of entangled quantum systems is
what is responsible for this difference in the allowable state space. To illustrate,
consider how one would go about representing a general superposition of n
two-dimensional values classically. It is possible to describe certain classical systems
in terms of superpositions; for instance, the state of motion of a vibrating string can
be characterised as a superposition of its two lowest energy modes, in the same way
that the state of a qubit can be characterised as a superposition of the states |0〉
and |1〉. The joint state of a system of n strings, however, will always be a product
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state; general superpositions which include, in particular, values representable by
entangled quantum states, cannot be physically represented using n classical
systems in this way.
It is, of course, possible to classically represent a general superposition of n
two-dimensional values in a more roundabout way; one may use, for instance, a
single classical system which allows for the discrimination of 2n resource levels
within it. The cost of such a representation scales exponentially with n, however,
either (if the spacing between resource levels is kept fixed) in terms of the total
amount of resource required, or (if the total amount of the resource is kept fixed) in
terms of the increasing precision required to discriminate the different resource
levels.
Quantum systems, in contrast, are not subject to this limitation; because of the
possibility of entanglement, a superposition of n d-dimensional quantum systems
can be used to represent a general superposition of n d-dimensional values directly ;
i.e., without incurring the cost associated with the roundabout classical method.3
Quantum mechanical systems, therefore, allow us to efficiently exploit the full
representational capacity of Hilbert space. Classical systems do not; they require
exponentially more resources in order to do so. If we have an n-fold entangled
quantum system, therefore, it follows straightforwardly that the possibilities for
representation associated with such a system cannot, in general, be efficiently
simulated classically. (And note that from this point of view it is quite unsurprising
that the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm can be classically simulated (§3.4) for n < 3:
notice that for n < 3, 2n = 2n.)4
Evidently, it is possible to utilise only a small portion of the state space of a
quantum system—exactly that portion of the state space which, as the Bell
inequalities demonstrate, is accessible efficiently by an n-fold classical system—but
this has no bearing on the nature of the actual physical resources that are provided
by the quantum system. Analogously, a life vest may be said to be sufficient to keep
me afloat on liquid water. I must actually wear it if it is to perform this function, of
course; but that is not a fact about this piece of equipment’s capabilities, only
3Duwell (2004, Ch. 8) calls this ‘well-adaptedness’.
4There is the caveat, of course, that a quantum computer will never be found, when
experimented upon, to be in one of these ‘extra’, nonseparable, states, and thus the final ‘readout’
of a quantum computer will never be one of those states. Any problem, therefore, whose solution
requires such a representation cannot be solved efficiently by a quantum computer. Nevertheless,
such states represent a wealth of resources that are capable of being used as intermediaries in the
calculation of a solution which is representable as a separable final state.
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about my choice whether to use it or not.
What if the waves are rough? It may be that in this case my life vest will not be
sufficient to save me. Analogously, in the presence of noise, as noted by
Linden & Popescu (2001), entanglement may not be sufficient to enable one to
achieve exponential quantum speedup. Nevertheless, even in rough weather I will at
least have a better chance of surviving with my life vest on than I will without it.
Likewise, as we saw in our discussion of the mixed state Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm
(§3.5.1), even in the presence of noise, an entangled quantum state will be sufficient
to enable some (though perhaps only a very small) quantum speedup.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that there is an important sense—the most important
sense, for our purposes—in which entanglement may be said to provide sufficient
physical resources to enable a quantum computer to achieve quantum
computational speedup. In support of this conclusion, I argued that claims to the
contrary rest on a misunderstanding of the implications of the Gottesman-Knill
theorem—that indeed, far from being a problem for the view that entanglement is a
sufficient resource, the Gottesman-Knill theorem serves to highlight the role that is
actually played by entanglement in the quantum computer and to clarify exactly in
what sense it is sufficient.
As is well known, quantum speedup has not been conclusively proven. It may be
that in every case of purported quantum speedup, there actually is some hitherto
unknown classical algorithm that is capable of achieving an exponential speedup
over its currently known classical alternatives. From this point of view, therefore, I
cannot have conclusively shown in this chapter that quantum entanglement is
sufficient for quantum speedup; for it may be the case that quantum speedup is
impossible.5 I hope, however, that the considerations that I have brought to the fore
in this chapter may serve to do the following: first, I hope that they will lend weight
to the claim that quantum computers can outperform classical computers, second, I
hope that they will clarify exactly why it is that they should be able to do so, and
finally, I hope that they will point the way to a proof, in the not too distant future,
5It is worthwhile to note, however, that even if quantum speedup is impossible, the—still
interesting—question as to why it is that quantum computers are able to solve certain
computational problems in polynomial time remains. I am indebted to Filippo Annovi for this
observation.
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of this conjecture.
4.6 Next steps
In the last chapter I argued that entanglement is a necessary component of any
explanation of quantum speedup, while in this chapter I argued that, as a physical
resource, it is sufficient to enable quantum computational speedup. One is tempted,
therefore, to end our investigation here. Our task is not done yet, however, for even
if one is convinced by all of the arguments I have given thus far, it will still be
possible to object that entanglement is insufficient in the following sense. What we
have been seeking for is an explanation of quantum speedup, and while it may be
true that entanglement is a sufficient resource to enable quantum computational
speedup, it does not follow that entanglement is sufficient to explain quantum
speedup. The interpretation of quantum mechanics and of entanglement in
particular has long been a topic of very controversial debate. It may therefore be
objected that, even after determining entanglement to be a necessary and sufficient
resource for enabling quantum speedup, we have not explained quantum speedup
until we have explained quantum entanglement itself. We will address this issue in
the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Entanglement as the Physical
Explanation of Quantum
Computational Speedup
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I argued that, in the sense most relevant to our
investigation, entanglement should be seen as a sufficient resource for quantum
computational speedup; I argued that when the implications of the Gottesman-Knill
theorem are properly understood, they do not contradict the claim that
entanglement is sufficient, but rather highlight precisely the sense in which this
claim is true. In this chapter I will address the issue of whether entanglement is
sufficient to explain quantum speedup as well.
To this purpose I will now proceed in the following way. I will begin, in §5.2, by
formulating a tentative explanation for quantum speedup in terms of quantum
entanglement, while at the same time outlining the way in which I take
entanglement to be explanatory; viz., the type of explanation that is being offered
when one appeals to entanglement. I will then consider, beginning in §5.3, a possible
challenge to the view that entanglement is the explanation of quantum speedup, to
the effect that one has not explained quantum speedup until one has explained why
quantum systems may sometimes become entangled, where one assumes that the
answer to a why? question of this kind must involve a causal-mechanical description.
The envisioned argument begins by considering that, according to John Stachel,
entanglement should not be characterised as essentially involving physical
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interactions, but rather as arising from a more abstract set of requirements known
as ‘Feynman’s rules’. But since entanglement should not, according to this
reasoning, be construed as essentially involving physical interactions, it cannot be
explained as arising from some cause, and therefore, according to this objection,
cannot form the essential part of a physical explanation for quantum speedup. In
§5.6 I argue, in response, that these abstract requirements themselves can be
accounted for in terms of physical interactions, and that Feynman’s rules and
quantum entanglement are, in one sense, but two sides of the same coin.
5.2 A physical explanation for quantum speedup:
Answering the how-possibly? question
5.2.1 Physical explanation
If we consider, in a general way, the ‘act’ of explanation, one way to characterise it
is in terms of the following distinctions. First, there is that for which an explanation
has been requested: some thing or process which is the object of the explanation.
Second, there is the person to whom the explanation is addressed: the recipient of
the explanation. Finally, there is the explanatory text itself. An ideal explanatory
text will represent the object for which an explanation has been requested with
perfect accuracy (relative to a theory of such objects), and at the same time, it will
do so in a way which results in a perfect comprehension of the object on the part of
the recipient of the explanation.1
While an ideal explanation of this sort would be desirable, in practice (and
perhaps even in principle) we must settle for far less. For on the side of the object,
we are not possessed with the perfect knowledge of its state (its detailed structural
features or detailed initial conditions) which we require in order to produce a perfect
description of it. On the other side, the cognitive limitations of the recipient must
also be taken into account. For even if a perfect description of the object were
available, it would likely be impossible for a finite agent to comprehend such a
description in its entirety. Further, a perfectly detailed description will invariably
contain information that is irrelevant, for the agent, to the question being asked; it
may thus serve only to distract the recipient. For us, therefore, explanation involves
1The notion of ‘perfect comprehension’ is, of course, a vague one, but it will not be necessary,
for our purposes, to elaborate upon it further.
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a choice. Given an explanatory question, one must aim at an explanatory text
which strikes the right balance between these two aspects of the act of explanation.
In some cases, we will choose to place most (but never all) of the emphasis on
describing the object itself. Call this an ‘ontic’ explanation, where we are to
understand by this only that such an explanatory text attempts to represent the
grasp of the objective features of the object provided to us by our best theory of
such objects. In other cases, for reasons of expediency and ease of comprehension,
we will place less emphasis on the more immediate features of the object in question
and situate the explanatory text at a level removed from the object. In these cases,
it will be understood that such higher-level descriptions are reducible in principle to
lower-level descriptions; thus that these higher-level descriptions are translatable in
principle into ‘ontic language’.
Finally, there will be some cases in which high-level descriptions of a different
sort will be employed, either simply for ease of exposition or, in certain situations,
because high-level descriptions of the reducible sort are not to be had. We may call
this last sort of explanation ‘analogical’, where this is not intended in any particular
technical sense of that term. Here, we can imagine those useful heuristics which
help us to understand certain aspects of phenomena. And while such analogical
descriptions can be explanatory, in the sense that they help to illuminate certain
aspects of the behaviour of the objects of our investigation, they cannot (and are
not intended to) be construed by the explanatory recipient as revealing the
objective features of these objects. These are not ontic explanations, in the sense
just described.
Now I mentioned that what we are to understand as ontic with respect to a
certain class of objects should be understood to be relative to whatever theory of
such objects we take to be true. Our own investigation concerns the physical
explanation of quantum speedup. Such an explanation should therefore describe the
features of quantum systems, as described by physical theory, which enable them to
outperform classical systems. A physical explanation for quantum speedup,
therefore, will be an example of ontic explanation, in the sense in which I have just
characterised that mode of explanation.
There are yet further distinctions among the varieties of explanation, along a
different dimension than the distinctions discussed in the current section. Here I
mean the differences that can be identified with respect to the characterisation of
the explanatory question itself. We will consider these next.
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5.2.2 Why? questions and how-possibly? questions
Scientific explanations are typically taken to be answers to why? questions. As
Hempel & Oppenheim (1948, 135), for instance, write:
To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the
question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the
foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific
research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description
of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it
investigates.
Hempel and Oppenheim’s own Deductive-Nomological (D-N) model of scientific
explanation, along with Hempel’s later Inductive-Statistical (I-S) model, were, for
many years, enormously influential in the debate over exactly what it means to
properly answer a why? question of this sort. Explanations, for Hempel and
Oppenheim, are arguments. They involve the subsumption of a particular set of
initial conditions under a law or a set of laws. Together, the set of initial conditions
and laws form the explanans (the premises of the argument). Given the explanans,
the explanandum statement (a statement of the fact to be explained, which is the
conclusion of the argument) follows either deductively (in the case of D-N) or
inductively (in the case of I-S). The explanans is the answer, in just this sense, to
the question of why the event expressed by the explanandum statement occurred.
The counter-examples to Hempel and Oppenheim’s characterisation of scientific
explanation which later began to emerge are well-known and I will not rehearse all
of them here (for a survey, see: Salmon 1989). But let us pause, for a moment, on
the so-called ‘flagpole’ counter-example to the D-N model, where we are asked to
imagine a flagpole standing in a field on a level stretch of ground under a clear blue
sky. It is evident that, from the relevant set of initial conditions and physical laws, a
D-N argument can be formulated to infer that (and hence explain why) the flagpole
casts a shadow of a particular length. Problematically, however, an equally good
explanation (by D-N lights) of the height of the flagpole that appeals to the length
of its shadow can be given. Thus, it was argued that even if it is admitted that the
amenability to D-N form is necessary for explanation, it does not appear to be
sufficient to capture exactly what we mean when we say that an answer has been
given to (at least some) of the why? questions we may want to ask.
With respect to just what those further aspects of explanation might be,
however, there is no consensus. One central debate is over exactly where the ‘right
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balance’ between the object and the recipient of explanation should be struck;
particularly, over whether any scientific explanation worthy of the name must be
ontic in nature, in the sense in which I alluded to in the previous section.
Proponents of this view are motivated in part by considerations such as the flagpole
example, which seem to suggest that what is required in a model of explanation is a
way to capture the asymmetrical cause-effect relationship between the facts cited in
the explanans and the fact cited in the explanandum.
Sylvain Bromberger’s (1966) and Bas van Fraassen’s (1980) work on why?
questions did much to clarify the issues. Not content to focus solely on the proper
characterisation of the answers to such questions, Bromberger and van Fraassen
investigated the proper way to analyse these questions themselves. Van Fraassen, in
particular, argued that what in certain contexts may seem like an inappropriate
answer to a request for explanation will, in other contexts, constitute a perfectly
good one. In some contexts, for instance, the length of a structure’s shadow may be
taken to explain its height:
That tower marks the spot where he killed the maid with whom he had
been in love to the point of madness. And the height of the tower? He
vowed that shadow would cover the terrace where he first proclaimed his
love, with every setting sun—that is why the tower had to be so high
(van Fraassen, 1980, 133-134).
For van Fraassen, all explanations are answers to why? questions, where these
are of the form “Why (is it the case that) P in contrast to (other members of) X?”,
and where the second half of this schema is taken as implicit in context and
typically left unstated. X is the contrast class: a set of alternatives to P . Thus
“Why did you dye your hair black?” is, absent an explicit or implicit contrast class,
ambiguous. It can be interpreted, for example, as either “Why did you dye your hair
black, as opposed to blond or blue or orange?”, or alternatively, “Why did you dye
your hair black, as opposed to not dying it at all?”. An answer to a why? question
will be one that favours P over any of its alternatives in the given contrast class.
I will not go through, in detail, the impressive machinery of van Fraassen’s
theory of why? questions. It is sufficient to point out that van Fraassen’s theory
convincingly shows (at least for this author) that what we take as the appropriate
answer to a particular why? question will depend in large part on the context in
which the question is asked. Thus, while in some contexts it may be that the
appropriate answer to a why? question should be ontic in nature, in other contexts
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this may not be the case, even when the context is broadly scientific. In the former
cases, we should expect an answer to appeal to actual causes and causal histories of
phenomena, while in the latter cases we may be satisfied with formal or informal
analogies.
As illuminating as van Fraassen’s theory of why? questions has been with
respect to these issues, however, if it is taken as a comprehensive analysis of
explanatory questions as such, then it cannot succeed, for there are other questions
in addition to why? questions that one may wish to have answered.2
Of these other types of explanatory question, one of these is the so-called
how-possibly? question. For instance: “How can Santa Claus possibly manage to
deliver all of those toys in just one evening?”. Such a question does not ask for the
reason why Santa Claus does this, but for a description of how he is able to do it. A
good answer to this question will consist of an account of the special characteristics
of the sled and of the reindeer (and especially of Rudolph’s nose), it will discuss the
circumference of the earth, the number of deliveries to be made, and the properties
of the chimneys in use in various parts of the globe, among other things.
As Wesley Salmon notes, the answer to a how-possibly? question need not
involve a reference to actual events :
... a DC-9 jet airplane recently crashed upon takeoff at Denver’s
Stapleton Airport during a snowstorm. One peculiar feature of this
accident is that the plane flipped over onto its back. There are many
explanations of a crash under the circumstances, but I wondered how it
could have flipped over. Two how-possibly explanations were mentioned
in the news reports. One is that it encountered wing-tip turbulence from
another airplane just after it became airborne. Another was suggested
by the report of a survivor, who claimed that the plane was de-iced three
times during its wait for departure, but that on the latter two of these
occasions one wing, but not the other, was treated. If one wing had an
accumulation of ice on its leading edge while the other did not, the
difference in lift provided by the two wings might have been sufficient
cause for the plane to flip over. As I write this paragraph I have not yet
2Note that while van Fraassen (1980) takes explanatory questions to be exhausted by why?
questions, Bromberger (1966, 90) (who nevertheless focuses exclusively on why? questions in his
essay) does not: ““explanation” may refer to the answers of a huge variety of questions besides
why-questions, the only requirement being that their oratio obliqua form fit as grammatical object
of the verb “to explain” and its nominalization “explanation of,” ...”
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heard the final determination regarding the cause of this crash. Both
potential explanations I have mentioned are satisfactory answers to the
how-possibly question, but we do not know the correct answer to the
why-question (Salmon, 1989, 137).
Of course, one might always attempt to reframe a how-possibly? question as a
why-possibly? question: “Why is it that Santa Claus can deliver all of those toys in
just one night, Mommy?” is an example of such an attempted reformulation. This
is not the place to venture into a debate over the proper use of English
interrogatives, and the difference between how-possibly? and why-possibly? is less
important, for our purposes, than the difference between how-possibly? and why?.
But that being said I do not think this reformulation of the Santa Claus question
will quite do. There is clearly a difference in emphasis between the two questions,
for the why-possibly? question can always be answered with: “because he can afford
to buy the proper equipment,” while the how-possibly? question, in contrast, seems
to demand that we explain exactly how it is that his equipment is ‘proper’ (or, in a
different context, exactly how he is able to afford it).
5.2.3 The question regarding the source of quantum
speedup
Consider the case in which we would like to explain the fact that a computer has
solved a particular problem. Such an explanation can be given from either of two
points of view: from the ‘software’ point of view, in which the emphasis is placed on
accommodating, what in §5.2.1 we called the recipient of explanation, or from the
‘hardware’ point of view: the point of view we referred to in §5.2.1 as ontic, in
which the emphasis is on accurately describing the state of the object (the
computer). Thus, imagine sitting at a computer terminal and being presented with
the following prompt:
Please input a series of integers:
Upon entering, for instance, 23, 45, 199, and 17, you receive the following message:
Your integers in sorted order are: 17, 23, 45, 199.
What is the explanation for the fact that the computer has given the correct
answer? We may, on the one hand, attempt to answer this question by
reverse-engineering some set of high-level instructions that could have been given to
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✞
void s e l e c t i o n S o r t ( int i n t sToSor t [ ] , int l engthOfL i s t ) {
// Declare l i s t i nd i c e s :
int i , j , indexOfLowestNum ;
// For each pos i t i on in the l i s t ,
for ( i = 0 ; i < l engthOfL i s t − 1 ; i++) {
// p r o v i s i o n a l l y a s s e r t t ha t i t po in t s to the lowes t number ,
indexOfLowestNum = i ;
// and then f o r each of the other l i s t po s i t i on s ,
for ( j = l engthOfL i s t − 1 ; j > i ; j−−) {
// i f t he number poin t ed to by i t i s l e s s than the number
// poin t ed to by indexOfLowestNum ,
i f ( i ntsToSor t [ j ] < i n t sToSor t [ indexOfLowestNum ] ) {
// then make t h i s t he new prov i s i ona l miniumum index .
indexOfLowestNum = j ;
}
}
// At the end of the i t h i t e r a t i on , put the number t ha t i s in the
// indexOfLowestNum pos i t i on in to the i t h pos i t i on ( and v i c e versa ) .
swap(&intsToSor t [ i ] , &intsToSor t [ indexOfLowestNum ] ) ;
}
}
✡✝ ✆
Figure 5.1: A set of instructions (in C) implementing the ‘selection sort’ solution to the
problem of sorting a list of given integers. The algorithm first puts the lowest integer into
position 0 of the list, then puts the lowest of the remaining integers into position 1, and so
on.
the computer, as in Figure 5.1. This is not an explanation from the ontic point of
view. Characteristic of the point of view represented by this sort of explanation is
that a solution to a computational problem is described in terms of a series of
high-level black-box (typically function) evaluations.3 No account is taken of the
way in which these instructions are actually implemented in a computer.
From the ontic point of view, on the other hand, one may attempt to explain the
fact that the computer has solved a computational problem by imagining a set of
possible state transitions of the computer. We thus imagine a process by which the
computer begins in an initial state A, undergoes a series of state transformations,
and ends, finally, in a state B, which can then be interpreted as a resolution to the
problem under consideration. Now within the ontic point of view, there are varying
levels of detail which can be employed to produce such an explanation. We can, for
instance, provide a detailed description of the machine-level instructions required to
implement the algorithm. These instructions will be different, according to the
architecture of the computer on which the algorithm has been run. Still within the
ontic point of view, we can descend some levels lower, by describing the detailed
physical implementation of the register and memory locations, the bus, etc., of the
3I am using ‘function’ here in a rather loose sense. I do not mean to exclude, of course,
object-oriented and procedural programming models.
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Figure 5.2: A state diagram representation of a finite state machine. Binary strings of
variable length are input to the automaton. They are ‘accepted’ if the machine is found to
be in the state a after the last character has been read. This particular machine will
accept any string ending in ‘10’.
particular computer on which the algorithm has been run. We can also ascend
higher in the hierarchy of levels. Perhaps the highest point in this hierarchy which
can still be considered as exemplifying the ontic point of view is the level of the
so-called state transition diagram (see, e.g., Figure 5.2). Though abstract, state
transition diagrams can be considered as exemplifying the ontic point of view in
that they purport to describe the essential characteristics of the states and state
transitions associated with a machine capable of implementing the algorithm.
Some explanatory questions effectively admit of only one type of answer. For
instance, if we have been asked to explain the detailed operation of a modern day
computer operating system (i.e., why it is able to perform the operations that it
does), we will typically employ the software point of view. We will, for instance
(though it may take some time) print out and examine the high-level computer
code; or, alternately, if this is judged to be too cumbersome, we may employ even
higher level descriptions: high-level flowcharts, ‘use case’ diagrams, and so on. The
hardware, or ontic, point of view, on the other hand, is usually not employed to
answer questions of this type. It is extraordinarily difficult (though not impossible
in principle for an idealised finite being) to explain the detailed workings of an
operating system using a state transition diagram in which the state of the
computer is kept track of at each computational step. Thus the hardware point of
view is more limited in this respect: above a certain level of complexity it becomes
too difficult to give an explanatory account, from the hardware point of view, of
exactly why a computational process has solved (i.e., what steps were taken by it to
solve) a particular instance of a computational problem.
Yet as we saw in §5.2.2, why? questions of this sort are not the only types of
questions that one may ask in the computational context. In fact there are other
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types of explanatory questions that are also appropriate to ask from the ontic point
of view. Consider, again, the state machine depicted in Figure 5.2. This is an
example of a deterministic finite automaton: a state machine implementing a finite
set of states and deterministic transitions between states. Now, there are, of course,
other types of state machine. For instance, there are nondeterministic finite
automata, deterministic and nondeterministic ‘pushdown’ automata, and
deterministic and nondeterministic Turing machines, to name a few (cf. Martin,
1997). And these are all described essentially in terms of the possible states and
state transitions which they are capable of.
One type of question we can ask, from the ontic point of view, concerns the
characteristics of particular classes of automata. We can ask, for instance, about the
class of problems computable by the machines of a particular class. It turns out that
finite automata are severely limited with respect to the class of problems they are
capable of solving, while Turing machines, in contrast, are capable of solving any
effectively calculable function. As another example, we can ask about the resources
required to solve certain classes of computational problems by automata of a
particular sort. We can ask, for instance, about the class of problems solvable by a
deterministic Turing machine in ‘polynomial time’, those solvable by a
nondeterministic Turing machine in ‘exponential time’, and so on (cf. Appendix A).
In order to answer these and other similar questions, we will appeal to the essential
characteristics of the hardware: to the states and state transitions which can be
realised and which are possible for a particular class of automata, and if we are asked
how is it possible that a particular class of problems is solvable by, for instance, a
nondeterministic Turing machine in polynomial time, we will explain that this is so
because of the state space and state transitions that are possible for the machine.
All of these, and other, questions, are examples of how-possibly? questions.
Let us now come back to the characterisation of quantum computation. The
question, ‘what is the physical source of quantum speedup?’, is a request for ontic
explanation that can be framed as either a why? or a how-possibly? question. In
the former case we can understand it as asking ‘why did this particular quantum
computer solve this computational problem in O(n) steps, as opposed to O(2n)
steps?’ Answering this question will involve describing the actual causal history of
the quantum computer—each individual transition undertaken by it to solve the
computational problem. While such a causal history may be interesting for some
purposes, it does not strike me as the appropriate answer to give to the question
which is actually being asked; for this question, I believe, is more appropriately
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characterised as a how-possibly? question: a request for the structural features of
quantum computers which make it possible for them to outperform classical
computers. And here, just as with the question, ‘why are Turing machines more
powerful than finite automata?’, it is appropriate to answer by appealing to the
state space and state transitions that are possible for a quantum as opposed to a
classical machine.
Now as I explained in detail in §4.4, because of the possibility of quantum
entanglement, n-fold, d-dimensional quantum systems are capable of efficiently
representing the possibilities associated with a dn-dimensional Hilbert space, while
n-fold d-dimensional classical systems are capable of efficiently representing a space
of only d · n dimensions. The quantum computer has exponentially more resources
at its disposal than a classical computer, therefore, which it may use in order to
solve a particular computational problem: there are ‘shortcuts’ through state space,
accessible to a quantum computer, which are inaccessible to classical systems. Thus
I submit that it is the possibility of entanglement—i.e., the fact that compound
states of quantum systems may sometimes transition to entangled states—which is
the explanation for quantum computational speedup (if quantum speedup is, in
fact, possible) from the physical or ontic point of view. As I argued in Chapter 3,
entanglement is necessary for explaining quantum speedup, and as I argued in
Chapter 4, it is sufficient as a resource (if anything is) as well. And as I have just
argued, the states and state transitions made possible by entanglement are sufficient
to explain quantum speedup from the ontic point of view. In the context of physical
theory, ontic explanation just is physical explanation. Thus I claim that this
explanation of quantum speedup is the physical explanation that we have been
seeking.
A higher-level explanation—one that is closer to the level of the recipient of
explanation but still reducible in principle to the physical level—would be desirable
and would serve to illuminate much, for us, about the nature of the physical world.
This is what I take to be the aim of explanations of quantum speedup that appeal,
for instance, to the fact that quantum computers are capable of massively parallel
function evaluation using a single circuit (Duwell, 2004, 2007; Hewitt-Horsman,
2009), or accounts of quantum speedup that explain it as arising from the
manipulation of the correlations between these function evaluations instead of the
results of the evaluations themselves (Steane, 2003), or those which describe
quantum computers as computing the global properties of functions (Bub, 2006,
2010).
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In §5.2.1 I made a distinction between i) properly ontic explanations, ii)
higher-level explanations that are directly translatable (at least in principle) into
ontic language, and finally iii) higher-level explanations that are not so
translatable—what I there called ‘analogical’ explanations. The explanations of
quantum computation just referred to seem to fall within the first subdivision, for in
these explanations, quantum algorithms are usually described by something very
similar to what I have, above, characterised as state transition diagrams. And I
previously described these diagrams as belong to the ontic point of view. When one
interprets the action of the unitary gates employed in quantum algorithms as
implementing function evaluations, however (or perhaps: operations on the
correlations between these evaluations, or perhaps: global properties of functions),
one is, strictly speaking, employing a concept (‘function’) that properly belongs to a
higher-level—the ‘software’-level—of description.
For the case of a classical computer, one can typically translate talk of functions
to talk of their low-level implementation without loss of content. Thus in the
classical case, explanations such as these could still claim to be ontic despite their
added emphasis on the recipient of explanation; i.e., despite being at a level
removed from properly ontic explanation. Thus in the classical case, such
explanations would be classed within the second subdivision. As was made clear in
Chapter 2, however, a description of a quantum state transformation such as
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉|0〉 →
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉|f(x)〉, (5.1)
should not necessarily be taken at face value. Regarding the state resulting from
such a transformation, one cannot say, for instance, and despite appearances, that
2n evaluations of the function f are therein represented. Reiterating Mermin: “One
cannot say that the result of the calculation is 2n evaluations of f , ... All one can
say is that those evaluations characterize the form of the state that describes the
output of the computation. One knows what the state is only if one already knows
the numerical values of all those 2n evaluations of f .” (2007, p. 38). This is to say
nothing of the existence of alternative models of quantum computation such as the
cluster state model which, as we have seen in Chapter 2, complicate the situation
yet further with respect to the significance of a state such as (5.1).
The project of providing an answer to the question of the explanation for
quantum speedup from a higher-level, but still reducible, point of view is both an
interesting and important one, and I should not be here understood as denying that
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this project may ultimately prove successful. Nor should I be understood as
claiming that all existing attempts at such an explanation must fail. While the
many worlds explanation of quantum speedup, as we saw in Chapter 2, may be
untenable, other high-level explanations of this sort may still succeed. But I hope it
is clear that any explanation from this point of view which is unable to resolve these
interpretational problems must be seen as, at best, analogical in the sense in which I
defined that term above—as belonging to the third subdivision. Of course, even
here, the label ‘analogical’ should not be taken in a derogatory sense; explanations
of this sort have been and are enormously useful for the development of our
fundamental theories. Even if such explanations are not ontic, in the sense in which
I have defined that term above, they undoubtedly illuminate a great deal about the
objects of our investigations.
But regardless of whether such a project has any hope of success, an
investigation of the ‘lower-level’ sort—one undertaken from a point of view that
remains as close to the ‘hardware’ as is both possible and appropriate—will be
useful, both for its own sake and also because it may prove informative for the
higher-level project. It is just such an investigation which I have undertaken here.
5.3 Ontic Why? questions and causal
explanation
Yet there will be those who still remain unsatisfied. They will counter that an
explanation for quantum speedup from the physical point of view has not truly been
given, for I have not answered the question of what entangled quantum states
fundamentally represent; i.e., I have not answered the question of why quantum
systems sometimes become entangled—of what underlying causes give rise to the
observed probabilities for outcomes of experiments and allowed state transitions
associated with entangled states.
The claim that the only appropriate answer to a why? question in the scientific
context is a causal explanation—that we can be said to have explained ‘why X?’
only when we have answered that it is be-cause of Y—is, I believe, unlikely to be
correct for the general case.4 Though it will not be necessary to defend this claim
here, I do believe, for instance, that mathematics is a science, that there are such
4For a time at least (Salmon, 1984), defended such a view, as have Humphreys (1989), and
Ruben (1990).
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things as mathematical explanations, and that the case cannot be made that
mathematical explanations are causal, unless one means by ‘causal’ something very
far removed from its ordinary signification.
The claim that all answers to why? questions must be causal is more plausible,
however, if one restricts one’s attention to physics, or at any rate to physical
processes (such as the quantum computational process). Whether or not one agrees
with this claim, it must be admitted that it is at least not absurd to insist that an
explanatory account of a physical process must include an account of how a
particular kind of state of the process comes about or is caused by the process’s
immediately prior state. And for those who hold such a view, a non-causal physical
explanation is no physical explanation at all.
It is common to view quantum entanglement as essentially arising from the prior
physical interaction of two or more quantum systems (cf. Schro¨dinger, 1935). From
this point of view, it is possible to give something like a causal or mechanistic
explanation of the possibility of quantum state transitions to entangled states. Such
an explanation can be construed as causal, at least in the minimalistic sense that
quantum entanglement is explained as having determinately arisen from the
physical interactions of physical systems.
Such a view has been challenged, however. According to John Stachel, quantum
entanglement should not most generally be understood as the result of prior
physical interactions. Rather, for Stachel, quantum entanglement should be
understood as the manifestation of the effects consequent upon a set of abstract
requirements for determining the probabilities associated with quantum systems,
while these abstract requirements themselves, according to Stachel, are mechanically
inexplicable and ‘mysterious’. If this is correct, then it will lead us to doubt whether
a causal characterisation of entanglement (and hence a physical explanation for
quantum speedup) is possible.
In the sequel I will argue that Stachel is perfectly correct to maintain that the
statistics associated with entangled quantum systems are characterisable in terms of
a set of abstract requirements. I will also argue, however, that it is possible to
characterise these abstract requirements as themselves arising from physical
interactions, and thus that a causal characterisation of entanglement, at least in this
minimalistic sense, can be given. Thus our explanation of quantum speedup should
not be objectionable to those who insist on the essentially causal nature of physical
explanation (at least as it relates to why? questions such as the ‘why do quantum
systems become entangled?’ question).
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Figure 5.3: Conjunction of two C gates. Internal line labels represent probabilities for
transitions.
5.4 The mystery of self-interference
5.4.1 Interfering quantum gates
A classical gate C which flips its input bit with probability 1/2 (e.g., a very noisy
NOT gate) will have the following transition probabilities:
pC00 = p
C
01 = p
C
10 = p
C
11 = 1/2. Since | 1√2 |2 = | i√2 |2 = 1/2, it follows from the Born rule
that a quantum gate Q will yield the same transition probabilities as C if it is
defined to act on a qubit in the following way:
|0〉 Q−→ i√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉,
|1〉 Q−→ 1√
2
|0〉+ i√
2
|1〉. (5.2)
Let us now consider the effect of concatenating two instances of C and two
instances of Q, respectively. Transition probabilities for the former (see Figure 5.3)
are:
pC1C200 = p
C1
00 × pC200 + pC101 × pC210
= pC1C201 = p
C1
01 × pC211 + pC100 × pC201
= pC1C210 = p
C1
10 × pC200 + pC111 × pC210
= pC1C211 = p
C1
10 × pC201 + pC111 × pC211
= 1/4 + 1/4 = 1/2. (5.3)
Transition probabilities for a concatenation of the two quantum gates, on the other
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Figure 5.4: Conjunction of two Q gates. Internal line labels represent probability
amplitudes for transitions.
hand, are:
pQ1Q200 = p
Q1Q2
11 = 0,
pQ1Q201 = p
Q1Q2
10 = 1. (5.4)
In other words, these two quantum gates, which by themselves yield equal
probabilities for each of the two possible outcomes, together yield an outcome that
is anti-correlated with the input value with certainty.5 That this is so is evident if
we consider, for example, the action of Q1 and Q2 on a qubit in the initial state |0〉:
|0〉 Q1−→ i√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉
Q2−→ i√
2
(
i√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉
)
+
1√
2
(
1√
2
|0〉+ i√
2
|1〉
)
. (5.5)
This may be re-expressed as:
(
i√
2
· i√
2
+
1√
2
· 1√
2
)
|0〉+
(
i√
2
· 1√
2
+
i√
2
· 1√
2
)
|1〉. (5.6)
Eq. (5.6) illustrates the fact, visualised in Figure 5.4, that in order to derive the
probability for the outcome of a particular quantum mechanical experiment we
must first calculate the total probability amplitude corresponding to that particular
outcome, by summing the probability amplitudes for all of the possible paths
through the state space of the system which yield that particular result. Some of
5It is no accident that I have chosen to describe the relation between input and output values
in terms of correlations. I do so in order to highlight the affinities between the phenomena of
interference and entanglement that are present even in simple examples such as this. This will be
discussed in more depth in the following sections.
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these paths may ‘interfere’ with one another. In the current example, the
probability amplitudes for the two possible paths yielding |0〉 are (i/√2)2 = −1/2
and (1/
√
2)2 = 1/2. Since these are of opposite sign, they destructively interfere
with one another, yielding, in this case, a total probability amplitude of 0. The
probability amplitudes for the two possible paths which yield |1〉, on the other hand,
constructively interfere to yield a total probability amplitude of i. By the Born rule,
the probability that the result is |1〉 is |i2| = 1. Similarly, the reader can verify that
the action of the combined gate on an initial state of |1〉 will yield an outcome of |0〉
with certainty.
It is worthwhile to note, here, a fact which I did not call explicit attention to in
my earlier exposition of the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm: recall (cf. §2.2, n. 8.) that
when the function encoded in the unitary transformation is balanced, the amplitude
of |0n〉 in the superposition (2.4) representing the first n qubits, owing to destructive
interference, will be zero. Thus a measurement of these qubits cannot produce the
bit string z = 0, and this fact allows us to distinguish constant functions, which
always yield the bit string z = 0, from balanced functions, which always result in a
bit string z 6= 0. Indeed, based on such considerations, Lance Fortnow has gone so
far as to claim that interference, in this sense, and not entanglement, is the true
source of quantum speedup. We will not have to consider Fortnow’s claim in detail
here (though the interested reader is encouraged to consult Appendix E), for as I
will argue later, in §5.5 and §5.6, entanglement and interference can be considered
as but two sides of one and the same coin.
5.4.2 The two-slit experiment
For Richard Feynman, the phenomenon (introduced in the last section) of
‘self-interference’,6 which we can more abstractly characterise as—a consequence of
the superposition principle—the need to sum the probability amplitudes over all of
the possible paths through a system’s state space, “has in it the heart of quantum
mechanics. In reality, it contains the only mystery” (Feynman et al., 1964, vol. 3,
1-1). What makes this phenomenon so mysterious is the fact that classically,
interference is typically associated exclusively with wave propagation, but many of
the objects which exhibit interference effects in quantum mechanics also exhibit
characteristically particle-like effects.
6Though in the context of his discussion, Feynman only mentions electron self-interference, I
believe we can charitably take him to be be referring to quantum self-interference in general.
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Figure 5.5: A two-slit experiment with, left: a classical wave source, and right: a
classical particle emitter.
Consider, for instance, an experimental setup consisting of a classical wave
source, a diaphragm into which two openings have been cut, and a movable (in the
vertical direction) detector, arranged as in Figure 5.5. The detector measures the
intensity of the wave motion at that location. We find that in general this intensity
can take on a continuous range of values whose distribution for different positions of
the detector reflects the constructive and destructive interference of the waves
emanating from the apertures. Consider, on the other hand, a similarly arranged
experimental setup with, in lieu of a classical wave source, a classical particle
emitter (also depicted in Figure 5.5), which emits, one at a time, particles of
identical shape and size in random directions. Since the particles are fired from the
gun one at a time we will of course find no interference effects. As for the detector,
it will either detect a particle or it will not, thus the distribution of intensity values
will decidedly not be continuous.
When we come to perform similarly arranged experiments with quantum
objects, however, things begin to get more puzzling. For instance, suppose that,
analogously to our experiment with the classical particle emitter, we set up an
experimental apparatus consisting of a diaphragm with two apertures, a movable
detector, and an electron gun. In this case we find that, on the one hand, as we
would expect on the assumption that electrons are particles, they arrive at the
detector one at a time and are registered with equal intensity. On the other hand,
the probability that an electron will arrive at any given position on the back wall is
distributed analogously to the intensity distribution for a classical wave—i.e., the
probability distribution displays interference effects, as we saw in our comparison of
classical and quantum computer gates above. Quantum objects like electrons,
therefore, manifest both particle and wave effects.
This is extremely counter-intuitive. It is difficult if not impossible to imagine
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how particles, shot one at a time through a slitted diaphragm can interfere with one
another. For Feynman, this phenomenon is simply a brute fact—one which “is
impossible, absolutely impossible, to explain in any classical way” (1964, vol. 3, 1-1).
It is possible, of course, to account for these statistics by appealing to the formal
requirement of which Eq. (5.6) is an example; however, Feynman does not consider
such an account to be explanatory; for him it is only an account: “We cannot make
the mystery [of self-interference] go away by ‘explaining’ how it works. We will just
tell you how it works” (1964, vol. 3, 1-1). For Feynman, what is missing from such
an account is precisely a causal or mechanistic description of the process by which
self-interference phenomena arise. Feynman is of the opinion that explanations of
physical phenomena should account for the mechanisms that give rise to
them—something which he adamantly believes cannot be done in the case of
self-interference phenomena:7
One might still like to ask: “How does it work? What is the machinery
behind the law?” No one has found any machinery behind the law. No
one can “explain” any more than we have just “explained.” No one will
give you any deeper representation of the situation. We have no ideas
about a more basic mechanism from which these results can be deduced
(1964, vol. 3, 1-10).
5.5 Accounting for correlations in EPRB
composite systems8
Consider two fermions (spin-1/2 systems) initially brought into interaction with one
another to form a composite system with zero total spin in every direction. The
system is said to be in the ‘singlet state’.9 Since fermions may only take on spin
values of ±1/2, this requires that the spins of the individual subsystems be
7I should note that implicit in this is a denial, by Feynman, of the possibility that a classical
description can associate a wave with a single particle. This presupposition is denied by
proponents of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation.
8An EPRB system is a system analogous to that utilised in the gedankenexperiment of
Einstein, Podolsky, & Rosen (1935), which was designed to demonstrate the incompleteness of the
standard quantum mechanical state description. The ‘B’ is for Bohm, whose conceptually
streamlined version (1951) of the gedankenexperiment will be the one referred to in the remainder
of this chapter.
9This is the Bell state |Ψ−〉 from Eq. (3.1).
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oppositely correlated with one another; i.e., the only possibilities for their respective
spins are: (a) 1/2,−1/2; (b) −1/2, 1/2. Conservation of angular momentum
dictates that as long as there are no further interactions, the subsystems must
maintain their correlation with one another even if, after some elapsed time, they
become spatially separated. In particular, if we perform, for instance, a σz
experiment on one subsystem and receive a positive result, then a σz experiment on
the second subsystem must yield a negative result with certainty, and vice versa.
This will be the case regardless of the orientation of the experimental device; i.e., we
have the following relation for the expectation value of experiments on the joint
system for any direction mˆ:
〈σm ⊗ σm〉 = −1. (5.7)
On the other hand, if we perform a σz experiment on the first system and a σx
experiment on the second we will find no correlation between the respective results.
In general, for unit vectors mˆ, nˆ:
〈σm ⊗ σn〉 = −mˆ · nˆ, (5.8)
where the scalar product mˆ · nˆ ≡ ‖m‖‖n‖cosθ = cosθ for unit vectors mˆ, nˆ. States
such as the singlet state are examples of entangled states. As we have already
discussed (§3.2.1, §4.3), there is no local hidden variables theory which can
reproduce all of the predictions of quantum mechanics for states such as these.
Physically, entanglement is usually given a characterisation essentially similar to
the one I have just given; i.e., when two (or more) quantum systems, existing
independently of one another in different parts of space, are brought into temporary
physical interaction to form a composite system, then if after a time the subsystems
become spatially separated once again, it may happen that as a result of their
interaction, probabilities for outcomes of experiments on the individual subsystems
are no longer independent of one another.10 Once entered into, this situation will
persist indefinitely and will only cease when the subsystems undergo further
interactions with other (external) systems.
10Compare: “When two systems, of which we know the states by their respective
representatives, enter into temporary physical interaction due to known forces between them, and
when after a time of mutual influence the systems separate again, then they can no longer be
described in the same way as before, viz. by endowing each of them with a representative of its
own” (Schro¨dinger, 1935, 555).
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Key in the foregoing account are the ideas of spatially distinct quantum systems
and of the physical interactions between them. Yet spatially separated ensembles
are not the only quantum systems to display statistical dependence. The two-slit
experiment with electrons, which we considered in §5.4.2, for instance, can be
thought of as a series of experiments on a collection of identically prepared quantum
systems which together comprise a temporally separated ensemble.
As we saw, the results of experiments on such systems may display statistical
correlations with one another, which we normally conceive of as arising from
self-interference. Self-interference, meanwhile, is typically considered to be an aspect
of quantum mechanics that is fundamentally distinct from whatever gives rise to the
statistical correlations observed in EPRB experiments (these, as we have just seen,
are usually conceived of as being due to the physical interaction between spatially
distinct subsystems).
According to John Stachel, however, quantum entanglement just is a species of
statistical dependence, and is exhibited by both of these phenomena. Stachel
attributes no special significance, in particular, to physical interactions between
quantum systems: “Rather than a physical interaction, it is precisely the quantum
entanglement of their members—non-interacting or interacting—that distinguishes
quantum from classical ensembles” (1997, 246).
Ultimately, for Stachel, the statistical dependence observed in both cases is due
to the requirement, illustrated by Eq. (5.6), that probability amplitudes for all of
the possible paths through a system’s state space be summed in order to derive the
probabilities for outcomes of experiments on that system. Let us call the collection
of rules that encapsulate this requirement the ‘Feynman rules’ for short.11 We saw
an example of how to apply these rules to single systems in §5.4.1. As for EPRB
(and similar) systems composed of more than one subsystem, Stachel argues that
one can think of experiments on such systems as composed of two steps. The first
step, consisting of an experiment on the first subsystem, yields a non-maximal
experimental outcome for the system as a whole. It is followed by an experiment on
the second subsystem, which together with the first experiment can be considered as
yielding a maximal experimental outcome for the total system. Given such a
description of the experiment, Feynman’s rules can be shown to correctly account
11Specifically, they are: the Born rule, the quantum law of superposition of amplitudes, the
classical law for addition of probabilities, the quantum law of multiplication of amplitudes, and the
classical law of multiplication of probabilities (Stachel, 1986, §5.5).
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for the observed statistics.12
5.6 Accounting for the Feynman rules
5.6.1 Physical interactions
In the last section we saw that it is possible to characterise the statistics manifested
by EPRB-type composite systems as stemming from the need to sum the
probability amplitudes for all of the paths a system may take through its state
space (i.e., from Feynman’s rules). From this, Stachel has concluded that
EPRB-type effects, usually taken as a paradigm example of the effects consequent
upon physically interacting quantum systems, are in reality just consequences of
Feynman’s rules. The requirement expressed by Feynman’s rules, in fact, for Stachel
(just as for Feynman himself) is the true and only quantum mystery.
This would seem to undercut my claim that the explanation of quantum speedup
I have given above can be construed in a causal way. But before we accept this
conclusion, let us see if something rather more subtle may be at work. In particular,
let us determine whether it is possible to characterise the requirements expressed by
Feynman’s rules as themselves stemming from physical interactions of some sort. If
we could show this, we might then conclude that characterising quantum systems in
terms of the requirements imposed by Feynman’s rules, on the one hand, and in
terms of physical interactions, on the other, are merely two different ways of
regarding one and the same quantum mystery. Those with a predilection for
causal-mechanical descriptions, of course, will prefer the latter.
12Lu¨ders’ rule (cf. Bub, 1977),
ρ→ ρ′ = PaiρPai
tr(PaiρPai)
,
an alternative form of the von Neumann projection postulate applicable to non-maximal
experiments, gives us the updated state of a system consequent upon a possibly non-maximal
projective measurement of some observable A yielding the experimental outcome ai. We can use
Lu¨ders rule to obtain the correct probabilities for maximal experimental outcomes conditional
upon non-maximal experimental outcomes, and Lu¨ders rule can be shown to follow from
Feynman’s rules (Stachel, 1986, 331-333). Note that Lu¨ders rule is a special case (for projection
operators) of the more general measurement rule
ρ→ ρ′ = MαiρM
†
αi
tr(MαiρM
†
αi)
,
where M is in general not a projection operator (cf. Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, §2.4.2).
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In fact, we can provide such a characterisation if we focus on the system’s
interaction with the state preparation device. In particular, the common source of
fermions in the EPRB experiment may be taken to represent a physical source for
the entanglement present in a system in (for instance) one of the Bell states—a
physical source, moreover, that is in the common causal past of both subsystems.
That is all well and good for an experimental setup such as the EPRB. But, one
might object, if we are to answer Stachel’s challenge we must provide a physical
source for the entanglement present in temporal ensembles as well as in spatial
ensembles, for the entanglement present in single particle experiments as well as in
the EPRB-type experiments.
The following consideration should allay this concern. Imagine a spin-1/2 particle
that has been sent through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus oriented in the zˆ direction
(see Figure 5.6). Once it has passed through the apparatus, there is, henceforward,
an important sense in which only joint experiments on the system are possible, for
now an experiment to determine whether the particle occupies a particular spatial
region is implicitly also an experiment to determine whether the particle is in a
complementary spatial region. For supposing that the effect of the magnet is that
the particle is now in a superposition of being in the spatial regions occupied by the
z+ and z− detectors. Then in that case the combined state of the two spatial
regions will be expressible in the occupation number formalism (cf. Mattuck, 1976,
Ch. 7) as follows:
|ψ〉 = a|1〉z+|0〉z− + b|0〉z+|1〉z−. (5.9)
Here, |1〉α signifies that one particle occupies the spatial region inhabited by the α
detector, while |0〉α signifies that no particles occupy the spatial region inhabited by
the α detector. Eq. (5.9) expresses the fact that if we perform a σz experiment on ψ
and detect a particle at the z+ detector, then we cannot also detect a particle at
the z− detector, and vice versa. Thus we can think of the statistics associated with
a single particle as, from another point of view, the statistics associated with an
entangled state of two spatial regions,13 where this entangled state has been brought
13It is worth noting that the situation described here is essentially similar to the situation
described by Einstein in the argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics which he gave
at the Solvay Congress of 1927 (cf. Jammer, 1974, 115-121), and also to the situation described in
his letter to Schro¨dinger of 19 June, 1935. Norsen (2005) has argued that this argument is in fact a
conceptually simpler and superior version of the more well-known EPR argument. The EPR
argument figures prominently, of course, in almost all discussions of entanglement. For more on
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Figure 5.6: A Stern-Gerlach-like experimental setup (implementing a σz experiment) in
which a two-dimensional quantum system is sent through a state preparation device, after
which it impinges on one of two detectors.
about via the influence of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus, which we can think of as
representing “an influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of
predictions regarding the future behaviour of the system” (Bohr, 1935, 700).14 In
this vein one recalls Shimony: “It must be emphasized that the concept of
entanglement is inseparable from the role of potentiality in quantum mechanics”
(Shimony, 1993, 142-143). In an entangled state such as (5.9), Shimony writes, the
two observables involved are “... merely potential, but in an interlocked manner”
(ibid.).
Considering the state of a system from varying points of view is all very well,
one might interject at this point, but the proof is in the pudding: do such states
manifest detectable correlations between their subsystems? The, perhaps surprising,
answer seems to be yes; the state of a single system, such as a photon, can give rise
to EPRB-type correlations that are detectable in principle by experiment. This was,
in fact, illustrated with a gedankenexperiment, some time ago, by Lucien Hardy
(1994). We will consider this gedankenexperiment in the next section.
5.6.2 Entanglement of a single photon
Hardy’s thought experiment consists of three 50:50 beam splitters15 each
implementing the following state transformations, expressed in the occupation
this topic, see Shimony (2005); Norton (2011).
14This entire passage is emphasised in the original, thus there is no harm in not reproducing the
emphasis, as I have done here.
15The experiment is conducted with photons, which unlike the spin-1/2 qubits we considered in
the previous section, are spin-1 systems. The difference is inessential.
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Figure 5.7: The experimental setup for Hardy’s gedankenexperiment. A photon in the
state q|0〉+ r|1〉 is incident on the s mode; the vacuum state is incident on the t mode;
|α1〉 and |α2〉 are incident on the a1 and a2 modes, respectively. Source: Hardy (1994).
number formalism as:
|0〉a|0〉b → |0〉c|0〉d, (5.10)
|0〉a|1〉b → 1√
2
(|0〉c|1|〉d + i|1〉c|0〉d), (5.11)
|1〉a|0〉b → 1√
2
(i|0〉c|1|〉d + |1〉c|0〉d). (5.12)
Here a, b are the input and c, d are the output modes, and it is assumed for
simplicity that the a mode is transmitted into the c mode and likewise for b and d.
A photon, prepared in the state q|0〉s + r|1〉s, is directed at the s input of one of the
beam splitters (see Figure 5.7), while the input to t is the vacuum state |0〉t. The
outputs of this splitter, u1 and u2, are fed as inputs to two further beam splitters,
where they are each mixed with the coherent states |α1〉a1 and |α2〉a2 . The outputs
of these beam splitters, c1, d1, c2, d2 are then fed to photon number detectors,
C1, D1, C2, D2. Additionally, two more detectors, U1, U2, may be optionally inserted
into the paths u1, u2, respectively.
It turns out that (cf. Hardy, 1994) when neither U1 nor U2 are removed from
paths u1 and u2, it is impossible for both U1 and U2 to register a photon; writing
Xi = n to indicate that n photons were detected at detector Xi, we have:
U1 = 1 and U2 = 1 never happens. (5.13)
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When U1 is removed, we have the result that:
if F1 = 1 then U2 = 1, (5.14)
where we have written F1 = 1 as shorthand for C1 = 0, D1 = 1. Similarly, when U2
is removed:
if F2 = 1 then U1 = 1, (5.15)
where F2 = 1 is shorthand for C2 = 0, D2 = 1. When U1 and U2 are both removed,
we find that
F1 = 1 and F2 = 1 happens sometimes. (5.16)
To appreciate the significance of these results, imagine that Alice and Bob are at
ends 1 and 2 respectively, and suppose that Alice chooses to perform experiment F1
and Bob chooses to perform experiment F2. Further suppose that these yield
F1 = 1, F2 = 1. Alice can deduce from F1 = 1 and (5.14) that the photon from the
source would have been detected in u2 if Bob had placed U2 there. From F2 = 1 and
(5.15), Bob can deduce that the photon from the source would have been detected
in u1 if the detector U1 had been placed there by Alice. They cannot both be
correct, however, for only one photon has been emitted from the source; i.e., (5.13)
will then be violated.
According to Hardy, it is possible to avoid this contradiction if we are willing to
drop the assumption of locality :16
... there is an implicit assumption of locality in this reasoning, and ...
without this assumption there is no contradiction. Alice obtains F1 = 1.
Bob is actually measuring F2. Alice might deduce from her result and
the prediction [(5.14)] that had Bob measured U2 instead he would have
gotten U2 = 1. However, without assuming locality, this deduction is
16 Hardy’s interpretation of these results, when first published, were quite controversial (cf.
Vaidman 1995; Greenberger, Horne, & Zeilenger 1995; Hardy 1995). Since then, an improved, and
less controversial, version of Hardy’s experiment has been proposed which is both feasible and
capable of demonstrating Bell-inequality-violations (cf. Dunningham & Vedral 2007;
Terra Cunha et al. 2007). I have limited myself here to an exposition of Hardy’s original scheme as
it is conceptually simpler, while the differences between the various versions are inessential to the
point I am making.
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wrong, because if Bob had decided to measure U2 instead, there might
then have been a nonlocal influence from Bob’s end to Alice’s end
(Hardy, 1994, 2281-2282).
Let us forego evaluating Hardy’s interpretation of the significance of this
experiment (specifically, his attribution of nonlocality to the effects manifested by
the experiment). It is enough to note that, irrespective of whether we interpret
these effects as nonlocal, the Hardy gedankenexperiment manifests effects which we
would normally associate with physically interacting multi-particle systems. The
experiment thus illustrates, in a concrete manner, that the quantum superposition
of a single system can also be thought of in terms of the correlations consequent
upon its physical interactions with an experimental device.17 In this vein,
Dunningham & Vedral (2007, 1) conclude:
Feynman once famously claimed that superposition is the only mystery
in quantum mechanics. Others would add nonlocality to the list. If,
however, single particles can exhibit nonlocality, then these two
mysteries become one and the same.
Entanglement represents a real physical feature of quantum systems, whether or
not we maintain that we should require of such physical features that they be
explicable in terms of the physical interactions of systems. An explanation of
quantum speedup, therefore, according to which it is entanglement which makes it
possible for quantum systems to outperform their classical counterparts, is a
physical explanation of quantum speedup on a reasonable interpretation of what it
means for an explanation to be physical.
17As was explained previously, one can think of the entanglement effects that are manifested by
the subsystems of single particle systems as arising from the interaction of the system in question
with a state preparation device in the common causal past of its subsystems. In the Hardy
experiment, the vacuum state incident on the t mode of the first beam splitter comprises part of
the experimental setup, yet it seems strange to interpret the vacuum as part of the cause of the
correlations subsequently manifested by the experiment. This should not be controversial,
however, as long as we remember that we are not dealing, in this experiment, with a naturally
occurring vacuum, but rather with a vacuum that has been specifically prepared by a laboratory
technician (by, for instance, physically placing a screen in front of this part of the apparatus).
While vacuums do occur (rarely) in nature we do not, at least at this point, have any capability to
use them for the purposes of experiment. Vacuums must be created in order to be used in this
way, thus this state preparation may be interpreted as a part of the cause of the correlations
manifested in the Hardy thought experiment, in the manner outlined in the previous section. I
thank Wayne Myrvold for this point.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusion
In Chapter 2 I began this dissertation by considering the most popular of the
candidate physical explanations for quantum speedup: the so-called many worlds
explanation of quantum computation. I argued that, although it is inspired by the
neo-Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics, unlike the latter it does not
have the conceptual resources required to overcome the preferred basis objection. I
also argued that the many worlds explanation, at best, can serve as a good
description of the physical process which takes place in network-based computation,
but that it is incompatible in an important sense with other models of computation
such as cluster state quantum computing. I next considered, in Chapter 3, a
common component of most other candidate explanations of quantum speedup:
quantum entanglement. I investigated whether entanglement can be said to be a
necessary component of any explanation for quantum speedup, and I considered two
major purported counter-examples to this claim. I argued that neither of these, in
fact, show that entanglement is unnecessary for speedup, and that, on the contrary,
we should conclude that it is. In Chapters 4 and 5 I then asked whether
entanglement can be said to be sufficient as well. In Chapter 4 I argued that despite
a result that seems to indicate the contrary, entanglement, considered as a resource,
can be seen as sufficient to enable quantum speedup. Finally, in Chapter 5 I argued
that entanglement is sufficient to explain quantum speedup.
In this dissertation I have neither proved any original theorems, nor provided any
new experimental results. Rather, my conclusions are the result of an investigation
and analysis of the valuable scientific contributions which have already been made.
As compared to these, my own contribution is slight. But I hope that the reader
agrees that it is not unimportant—that even if, for all of my efforts, my conclusions
are in fact incorrect, that there has been some clarification of the underlying issues,
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with the hoped-for result that there will, in the not too distant future, be new
theorems and new results in the directions pointed to by this dissertation.
In his closing remarks to the Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap wrote of a
vision of “fruitful co-operative work on the part of the various investigators working
on the same problems—work fruitful for the individual questions of the logic of
science, for the scientific domain which is being investigated, and for science as a
whole.” For ‘logic of science’ I would put, in its place, ‘philosophy of science’. But I
wholeheartedly agree with the spirit of these words. And it is my sincere hope that
this dissertation makes some approximation to this so eloquently expressed ideal.
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Appendix A
Computational complexity theory
Alan Turing (1937; 1938) inaugurated the field of Computer Science by arguing
persuasively for the equivalence of the class of computable, or ‘effectively calculable’
functions with the class of problems computable by a Turing machine. The
statement of this equivalence is known as the Church-Turing thesis, and it is the
fundamental principle of computer science. In its early period, research in computer
science was focused primarily on the question of computability; i.e., on the question
of whether a given problem is or is not computable by Turing machine. More
recently, another focus of research has emerged: the field known as Computational
Complexity Theory. This field is dedicated to the more practical question
concerning the cost of solving a given computational problem.
A basic distinction, in Complexity Theory, is between those computational
problems that are amenable to an efficient solution in terms of time and/or space
resources, and those that are not. Easy (or ‘tractable’, ‘feasible’, ‘efficiently
solvable’, etc.) problems are those for which solutions exist which involve resources
bounded by a polynomial in the input size, n. Hard problems are those which are
not easy, i.e., they are those whose solution requires resources that are ‘exponential’
in n, i.e., that grow faster than any polynomial in n (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p.
139).1
For example, a problem, which for input size n, requires ≈ nc steps to solve
(where c is some constant) is polynomial in terms of time resources in n and thus
tractable according to our definition. A problem that requires ≈ cn steps to solve,
on the other hand, is exponential in terms of time resources in n and is therefore
intractable according to our definition. The definition is a coarse one, and its
1The term ‘exponential’ is being used rather loosely here. Functions such as nlogn are called
‘exponential’ but do not grow as fast as a true exponential such as 2n.
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usefulness will depend, in a given case, on the values of c and n. Nevertheless it is
adequate for most cases of practical interest.
An important theoretical reason for adopting the definition is the following
principle, usually referred to as the ‘Strong’ Church-Turing thesis in the literature.
In order not to confuse this thesis with the more fundamental (‘weak’)
Church-Turing thesis that I mentioned earlier, I will refer to it as the Computational
Efficiency Thesis (CET), which states that:
Any model of computation can be simulated on a probabilistic Turing
machine with at most a polynomial increase in the number of elementary
operations required (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p. 140).2
If, now, we identify easy problems with those having polynomial resource
solutions, then CET tells us that in our analysis of computational complexity, we
can restrict our attention to the probabilistic Turing machine model of computation
(Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p. 140). Our definition of an easy problem, coupled with
the CET, thus provides us with an elegant, model-independent theory of
computational complexity. But note that while CET is what gives computational
complexity theory its elegant model-independent character, and that without it
“computational concepts and even computational kinds such as ‘an efficient
algorithm’ or ‘the class NP’ will become machine-dependent, and recourse to
‘hardware’ will become inevitable in any analysis of the notion of computational
complexity” (Hagar, 2007, p. 245), it is not a foundational principle to the field of
computational complexity theory in the same way that the Church-Turing thesis is
to computer science.3
Problems that are decidable in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing
machine are said to be in the complexity class PTIME, usually referred to simply
as P. Problems for which a deterministic Turing machine can verify whether a given
solution is, in fact, a solution are said to be in the complexity class NP.4 For
2A probabilistic Turing machine is one for which transitions between states are chosen from a
set according to some probability distribution, rather than assigned deterministically.
3See, for example, Lance Fortnow’s blog entry (2006): “By no means does computational
complexity “rest upon” a strong Church-Turing thesis. The goals of computational complexity is
[sic.] to consider different notions of efficient computation and compare the relative strengths of
these models. Quantum computing does not break the computational complexity paradigm but
rather fits nicely within it.”
4This stands for “nondeterministic polynomial time,” as it can be equivalently defined as the
class of problems solvable in polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine.
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example, consider a language L = {10, 11, 101, 111, 1011, ...} over the alphabet
Σ = {0, 1}, the set of binary digits. L is the set of binary representations of prime
numbers. If it is possible for a deterministic Turing machine to decide, using only
polynomial time resources, whether an arbitrary binary input string is in the
language (i.e., whether it is a prime number), we say the problem is in P. If, on the
other hand, one is given a string in the language at the outset, then if it is possible
for a deterministic Turing machine to verify, in polynomial time, that the string is,
in fact, in the language, then the problem is said to be in NP.
A long-standing question in complexity theory is the nature of the relationship
between P and NP. P is clearly a subset of NP. If it can be decided in polynomial
time whether an arbitrary string is a member of L, then, trivially, it can be decided
in polynomial time whether a member of L is a member of L. It is strongly
suspected that P is a proper subset of NP, however this has not yet been proven.
This is known as the P 6= NP problem in complexity theory.
An important notion in complexity theory is reducibility. Intuitively, problem B
is reducible to problem A if, with no more than polynomial overhead, we can
convert an algorithm for deciding B into an algorithm for deciding A. In other
words, B is reducible to A if a solution for A can be used to solve B. Reducibility
leads us to our next important complexity class, NP-complete. A problem, C, is
called NP-complete if C is in NP and every other problem in NP is reducible (in
polynomial time) to C. The concept of an NP-complete problem is important for
the resolution of the P 6= NP problem, for if it can be shown that an NP-complete
problem is solvable in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine (i.e., if it
can be shown that it is in P), then it follows that all other problems in NP are also
in P, and hence that P = NP.
Besides P and NP, the two most relevant complexity classes with respect to
quantum computation are BPP and BQP. BPP stands for bounded-error
probabilistic time. A problem, A, is in BPP if there is a (classical) probabilistic
Turing machine that will accept a string x with probability 1/2 ≤ k ≤ 1 if x ∈ L
(the language representing A) and reject it with probability 1/2 ≤ k ≤ 1 if x /∈ L
(Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p. 152-153). The quantum analogue of BPP is BQP
(bounded error quantum polynomial time), the set of problems such that a quantum
computer will accept x with probability 1/2 ≤ k ≤ 1 if x ∈ L and reject x with
probability 1/2 ≤ k ≤ 1 if x /∈ L (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, pp. 200-202). BPP ⊆
BQP since a quantum computer can efficiently simulate a classical probabilistic
Turing machine (Nielsen & Chuang 2000, p. 30; Hagar 2007, p. 240). However, it is
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not clear whether BQP 6= BPP.
It is important to note that proving BQP 6= BPP amounts to proving that
quantum computers are more powerful than classical computers; but while it is
strongly suspected that BQP 6= BPP, this question has not yet been resolved.
Factoring, the most famous problem for which a quantum algorithm has been
developed, has not been proven to be outside P. Thus solving the factoring problem
does not show us that P 6= BQP, let alone that BPP 6= BQP. Note also that as of
yet no quantum algorithm has been developed which can efficiently solve a problem
inside the class NP-complete, and the relation between NP and BQP is still
unknown.
For more on computational complexity, see: Papadimitriou (1994),
Nielsen & Chuang (2000), Aaronson (2012).
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Appendix B
Information Theory
B.1 Shannon entropy
The birth and development of classical information theory is due, in large part, to
the pioneering work of Claude Shannon. In his seminal article, “A Mathematical
Theory of Communication” (1948), Shannon introduced the scientific community to
the fundamental information-theoretic concept of entropy. Entropy is a measure of
the information one gains when one comes to know the value of a random variable.
Equivalently, it can be thought of as the uncertainty associated with a random
variable; e.g., a message produced by an information source. We define the Shannon
entropy, H , with respect to the random variable x, as:
H(x) = −K
n∑
i=1
p(xi) log p(xi), (B.1)
where K is a positive constant (amounting to a choice of unit measure) normally
chosen to be 1 (Shannon, 1948, p. 11), 0 log 0 is conventionally defined to be 0, and
p(xi) refers to the probability of receiving message i, given a set of n possible
messages. The log is typically taken to base 2. For example, suppose an information
source transmits sequences of binary digits with the probabilities of the next digit in
the sequence being a 0 or a 1, 1/3 and 2/3, respectively. In this case our uncertainty
with respect to the next bit, or our entropy, is
−(1/3× log 1/3 + 2/3× log 2/3) = 0.92.
Considered as a measure of our uncertainty with respect to the messages
produced by an information source, we should expect H to be 0 if we are certain of
the result, i.e., if one of the p(xi) = 1. It is easily verified that this is the case. We
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should also expect H to be at a maximum when the bits are received with equal
probability, for this is the situation in which we are most uncertain of the result.
This is also easily verified (cf. Shannon, 1948, p. 11).
The joint entropy of two random events, x and y is the total uncertainty
associated with x and y. To determine it one must take into account the
probabilities of all possible combinations of values for x and y. Thus,
H(x, y) = −
∑
i,j
p(xi, yj) log p(xi, yj). (B.2)
Here, p(xi, yj) refers to the probability that message xi and yj occur together.
Note that it can be shown that H(x, y) ≤ H(x) +H(y), with equality only if the
events xi and yj are independent. This is called subadditivity (intuitively, the total
uncertainty associated with x and y is equal to the sum of the uncertainties of x and
y unless they share information in common). Strong subadditivity,
H(x, y, z) ≤ H(x, y) +H(y, z)−H(y), also holds for the Shannon entropy.1
The conditional entropy of x with respect to y,
H(x|y) = H(x, y)−H(y), (B.3)
is the total uncertainty associated with x and y minus the uncertainty that
disappears once we come to know y.
The information shared in common between x and y, or mutual information of x
and y is defined as
H(x : y) = H(x) +H(y)−H(x, y). (B.4)
This definition is easily grasped if one expresses the equation in terms of the joint
information, i.e., H(x, y) = H(x) +H(y)−H(x : y), which is the total information
gain associated with x and y minus the information shared in common (to avoid
double counting) (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p. 506).
1We subtract H(y) from the RHS since the uncertainty associated with y is common to H(x, y)
and H(y, z).
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B.2 Von Neumann entropy
The von Neumann entropy plays the same role in quantum information theory as
the Shannon entropy plays in classical information theory. It is defined as
S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ), (B.5)
for a quantum system represented by the density matrix, ρ. As before, by
convention, 0 log 0 ≡ 0. Since the trace of a matrix A is equal to the sum of its
eigenvalues; i.e., since tr(A) =
∑
λi; the von Neumann entropy can be more usefully
expressed as
S(ρ) = −
∑
x
λx log λx (B.6)
where λx are the eigenvalues of ρ.
The joint entropy of a state with two components A and B is defined as
S(A,B) = −tr(ρAB log(ρAB)), (B.7)
where ρAB is the density matrix of the composite system AB (Nielsen & Chuang,
2000, p. 514).
Conditional entropy and mutual information are defined analogously to their
classical counterparts. The conditional entropy is given by
S(A|B) = S(A,B)− S(B). (B.8)
The mutual information is given by
S(A : B) = S(A) + S(B)− S(A,B). (B.9)
There are interesting disanalogies between the von Neumann and the Shannon
entropy. For instance, the inequality S(A) ≤ S(A,B) does not hold in quantum
information theory, as it does for the classical case. In the classical case it is
intuitively obvious that the uncertainty associated with the state of one random
variable cannot be more than the uncertainty associated with the joint state of two.
But in the quantum case, this relation will fail to hold, for instance, in the case
where we have a maximally entangled state of two subsystems. In this case, the
joint state of the two systems is pure, and hence S(A,B) = 0, but the marginals are
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completely mixed and thus S(A) = S(B) = 1. One other disanalogy, between the
classical and quantum versions of mutual information, is discussed in greater detail
in Chapter 3.
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Appendix C
Quantum teleportation
One of the most well-known applications of entanglement in quantum information
processing is as a resource in the so-called teleportation protocol (cf.
Nielsen & Chuang, 2000; Mermin, 2007).1 Consider Alice and Bob, two spatially
separated experimenters, who have the ability to send classical information to one
another (e.g., Alice may call Bob on the telephone, send him an email, and so on).
Imagine that Alice would like to send the state (which she does not know) of some
arbitrary qubit, |ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, to Bob. Classically, this seems like a very difficult
task, for even if Alice knows the state of the qubit, she seems, in principle, to
require an infinite amount of classical information to describe it precisely, for the
state of a qubit will in general take on a continuum of values.2
But suppose that Alice and Bob are given one extra resource: suppose that the
Bell state |Φ+〉 is generated, and that one half of the Bell pair is given to Bob and
the other half to Alice. Alice may now proceed as follows. First, she interacts the
qubit represented by |ψ〉, whose state she wishes to send to Bob, with the Bell pair;
i.e.,
|ψ〉a|Φ+〉ab = 1√
2
[α|0〉a(|00〉+ |11〉)ab + β|1〉a(|00〉+ |11〉)ab],
where a and b indicate whether the qubits are in Alice’s or Bob’s possession. Alice
1The quantum teleportation protocol originally appeared in Bennett et al. (1993). The name
‘teleportation’ is something of a misnomer. To a layperson, teleportation usually brings to mind
the idea of physically transporting objects around, possibly instantaneously. Quantum
teleportation, however, is a protocol for transferring information, not physical objects, and the
speed at which information is transferred, since it involves the exchange of a classical signal, is
limited by the speed of light.
2It turns out that this claim is actually false. Surprisingly, the teleportation protocol has been
shown to be efficiently simulable classically. This is explained in Chapter 4.
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then applies a controlled-not (CNOT) operation to the qubits in her possession,
using the qubit represented by |ψ〉 as the control and her member of the Bell pair as
the target qubit. This results in:
1√
2
[α|0〉a(|00〉+ |11〉)ab + β|1〉a(|10〉+ |01〉)ab].
Now Alice sends the qubit represented by |ψ〉 through a Hadamard gate,3 which
results in:
1
2
[α(|0〉+ |1〉)a(|00〉+ |11〉)ab + β(|0〉 − |1〉)a(|10〉+ |01〉)ab]
=
1
2
[|00〉aa(α|0〉+ β|1〉)b + |01〉aa(α|1〉+ β|0〉)b
+ |10〉aa(α|0〉 − β|1〉)b + |11〉aa(α|1〉 − β|0〉)b].
In the next step, Alice measures her two qubits. This will yield one of four
possible measurement results (00, 01, 10, 11), and Bob’s qubit will correspondingly
be in one of the following four states:
00 : |ψ〉b ≡ (α|0〉+ β|1〉)b
01 : |ψ′〉b ≡ (α|1〉+ β|0〉)b
10 : |ψ′′〉b ≡ (α|0〉 − β|1〉)b
11 : |ψ′′′〉b ≡ (α|1〉 − β|0〉)b
Alice now communicates her result to Bob using a classical communications link
(e.g. a telephone line). If Alice’s result is 00, then Bob’s state is
|ψ〉b = α|0〉+ β|1〉 = |ψ〉a, i.e., the state that Alice had originally intended to
transfer. Otherwise, Bob can apply a unitary transformation to his qubit which will
transform it into the state |ψ〉b. For instance, if Alice’s result is 01, Bob will apply
the Pauli X transformation. Recalling that |0〉 ≡ ( 10 ) and |1〉 ≡ ( 01 ), we see that
X|ψ′〉b =
(
0 1
1 0
)[
β
(
1
0
)
+ α
(
0
1
)]
=
(
0 1
1 0
)(
β
α
)
=
(
α
β
)
= |ψ〉b.
3Alice’s purpose in performing the CNOT and Hadamard transformations is to implement, in a
roundabout way, a measurement in the Bell-basis (which we assume she does not have the
technology to perform directly).
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Figure C.1: A quantum circuit for the teleportation of a qubit. The top two lines
represent the parts of the system accessible to Alice; the bottom line is the part of the
system accessible to Bob.
If Alice’s result is 10, then Bob applies a Pauli Z transformation:
Z|ψ′′〉b =
(
1 0
0 −1
)[
α
(
1
0
)
− β
(
0
1
)]
=
(
1 0
0 −1
)(
α
−β
)
=
(
α
β
)
= |ψ〉b.
Finally, if Alice’s result is 11, then the reader can verify that Bob should apply
the combined transformation ZX.
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Appendix D
Separable operations
An open quantum system (e.g., a noisy quantum circuit) is one in which the state
changes of the system of interest, S, are due both to its own internal dynamics and
to its interaction with an external environment or ‘reservoir’, R. Let the initial state
of the overall system be the product state,1 ρ⊗ ωR, with ρ ∈ HS, ωR ∈ HR where
HS,HR are the Hilbert spaces associated with S and R. Then a state change of S
can be expressed as:
ρ 7→ Λρ = trR(Uρ⊗ ωRU †), (D.1)
where Λ is the dynamical transformation map for S which maps density operators
to density operators, U ≡ e−iHS+Rt/~ is the time evolution operator for the combined
system, and trR is the partial trace over R.
For many purposes it is more convenient to express Λ exclusively in terms of S.
Take |fν〉 to be an orthonormal basis for the state space of the reservoir (which we
assume, without loss of generality, to be pure2), with ωR = |f0〉〈f0| the reservoir’s
initial state. Since the partial trace, over R, of ρ⊗ ωR is given by
trR(ρ⊗ ωR) = 〈fν |ρ⊗ ωR|fν〉, we can rewrite (D.1) as:
ρ→ Λρ =
∑
ν
〈fν |U
[
ρ⊗ |f0〉〈f0|
]
U †|fν〉
=
∑
α
EαρE
†
α, (D.2)
1This is typically a safe assumption to make as the process of state preparation will destroy
any correlations between the system and the environment. See Cuffaro & Myrvold (2012) for a
discussion of the case where this assumption does not hold.
2If the reservoir begins in a mixed state, it is always possible to purify it by means of an extra
system. Cf. §3.2.3
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where Eα ≡ 〈fν |U |f0〉 is an operator on the state space of S, and the Eα, known as
Kraus operators or operation elements, satisfy the completeness relation:
∑
α
E†αEα = I. (D.3)
Separable operations are those operations that can be decomposed as a product
of Kraus operators as follows:
Λρ =
∑
k
Ak ⊗ BkρA†k ⊗ B†k (D.4)
such that
∑
k A
†
kAk ⊗B†kBk = 1⊗ 1.
If Alice and Bob perform only LOCC (‘local operations plus classical
communications’) operations on a shared system ρ, then their individual Kraus
operators may be joined together into product Kraus operators; i.e., into the form of
a separable operation. The converse is false (Bennett et al., 1999). Separable
operations are nevertheless a convenient proxy for LOCC operations, as the optimal
implementation, via separable operations, of a given task provides strong bounds for
what can be achieved using LOCC (see, for instance, Rains 2001; Virmani & Plenio
2003).
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Appendix E
Lance Fortnow’s Matrix
Framework
Let us first consider a classical nondeterministic Turing machine. We begin by
defining the transition function, δ, of the machine in terms of a transition matrix,
such that there is an entry in the matrix corresponding to every possible transition
of the machine. We allow matrix entries to contain arbitrary nonnegative rational
numbers. We then define the matrix entry, T (ca, cb), as the probability that the
computer goes to configuration cb from configuration ca in one computational step.
T r(ca, cb), correspondingly, is the probability of getting to cb from ca in r steps; it is
the sum of the probabilities of each computational path of length r leading from ca
to cb, with the restriction that the sum of all possible computational paths of length
r beginning from ca = 1.
For instance, given the matrix in Table E.1, we can determine that
ca cb cc cd ce cf cg ch
ca 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
cb 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
cc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
cd 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0
ce 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
cf 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
cg 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
ch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Table E.1: A sample state transition matrix. Entries represent probabilities of transition
between states.
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Figure E.1: State diagram representation of the transition matrix in Table E.1. The edge
labels represent the probability of a transition between the states connected by that edge.
T 3(ca, ce) = [T (ca, cb)× T (cb, cd)× T (cd, ce)] +
[T (ca, cc)× T (cc, cd)× T (cd, ce)]
= (0.2× 0.5× 0.6) + (0.3× 0.5× 0.6) = 0.15.
We can now define T t(ca, cf) as the probability of success for our
nondeterministic Turing machine (ca and cf are the initial and accepting states,
respectively) in t time steps. It can be shown that a language L is in the
computational complexity class associated with classical probabilistic computation1
(BPP) if there is a probabilistic matrix T such that, for x ∈ L and 1/2 ≤ k ≤ 1
(typically taken to be 2/3),
T t(ca, cf ) ≥ k,
and for x /∈ L,
T t(ca, cf ) ≤ k,
for polynomial t.
To capture the case of the quantum nondeterministic Turing machine, we omit
1Cf. Appendix A.
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the restriction that the matrix entries be nonnegative, and we redefine the
probability of acceptance as (T t(c1, cA))
2. It can be shown that a language L is in
the computational complexity class associated with quantum computation (BQP) if
there is a matrix T , as just defined, such that, for x ∈ L,
(T t(ca, cf))
2 ≥ k,
and for x /∈ L,
(T t(ca, cf))
2 ≤ k,
for polynomial t.
According to Fortnow, the fundamental difference between quantum and
classical computing is interference. The matrix framework, according to Fortnow,
shows us that, in a quantum computer, ‘bad’ computational paths are associated
with negative matrix entries, allowing other computational paths to occur with
higher probability. Fortnow writes: “The strength of quantum computing lies in the
ability to have bad computation paths eliminate each other thus causing some good
paths to occur with larger probability” (Fortnow, 2003, pp. 605-606).
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Appendix F
Spekkens vs. Quantum
Transformations
In Robert Spekkens’ toy theory (2007), a system consists of a ball that can be in
one of four boxes. A state, in the theory, is an expression of our knowledge of the
location of the ball. For instance, if we know that the ball is in either the first or the
second box, we write 1 ∨ 2. Knowledge is restricted in the Spekkens theory. Aside
from the ‘completely mixed state’, 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4, the only other allowable states are
the following six states of maximal knowledge:
≡ 1 ∨ 2 ≡ |0〉 (z+)
≡ 3 ∨ 4 ≡ |1〉 (z−)
≡ 1 ∨ 3 ≡ |+〉 (x+)
≡ 2 ∨ 4 ≡ |−〉 (x−)
≡ 2 ∨ 3 ≡ |+ i〉 (y+)
≡ 1 ∨ 4 ≡ | − i〉 (y−)
Transformations of the Spekkens states are just permutations of the boxes. For
instance, if we subject the state 1 ∨ 2 to the permutation 〈1→ 2→ 3→ 1〉, the
resulting state will be 2∨ 3. Subjecting 3∨ 4 to this permutation will result in 1∨ 4.
We can associate some of the permutations of boxes in Spekkens’ toy theory
with rotations of the Bloch sphere in quantum theory (Myrvold, 2010). In quantum
theory, a 2pi/3 rotation of the Bloch sphere about the direction of xˆ+ yˆ + zˆ takes
x+→ y+, y+→ z+, and z+→ x+ . In the Spekkens toy theory, this corresponds
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to the permutation 〈1→ 3→ 2→ 1〉. Let us call this transformation T1. A pi/2
rotation of the Bloch sphere about the z-axis, in quantum theory, leaves z+
invariant but takes x+ to y+ and y+ to x−. Let us call this transformation T q2 . It
cannot be achieved in the Spekkens theory. An alternative, however, is a pi/2
rotation about the z-axis followed by a reflection in the xy plane, which
corresponds, in the Spekkens theory to 〈1→ 3→ 2→ 4→ 1〉. Call this
transformation T S2 . Note that while T
q
2 leaves z+ invariant, T
S
2 takes z+ to z−. It
can be shown that the sets {T1, T q2 } and {T1, T S2 } are sufficient to generate the
Spekkens and quantum groups of transformations, respectively.
Spekkens’s toy theory contains entangled states, but because of the differences in
the allowable transformations between the toy theory and quantum theory, the set
of entangled states that the toy theory contains is not identical to the set of
entangled states contained in quantum theory; specifically, none of the entangled
states in Spekkens’s toy theory yield correlations between outcomes of experiments
that violate the Bell inequalities.
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